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ABSTRACT
U.S.S. NEW IRONSIDES:
THE SEAGOING IRONCLAD IN THE UNION NAV7

William Howard Roberts
Old Dominion University, 1992
Director: Dr. Harold L. Wilson
Of the ironclads completed by the Union during the
Civil War, only the U.S.S. New Ironsides was a seagoing,
high-freeboard design. Her seagoing qualities and heavy
battery made her uniquely valuable to the Union in combat.
Although New Ironsides was highly successful and her highfreeboard design squarely in the European mainstream, she
represented the last of her direct line in the U.S. Navy.
The lessons learned from her construction and wartime ser
vice, which should have provided invaluable instruction for
U.S. designers, were not followed up.

By failing to develop

the seagoing ironclad the United States forfeited the advan
tages it might have gained over European navies from its
extensive combat experience.

The Navy was unable to con

vince Congress that money for ironclads would be well spent,
and the U.S. Navy's best opportunity to build a seagoing
ironclad fleet was lost for a generation.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION: THE NEGLECTED IRONCLAD

I have never yet seen a vessel that came up to my ideas
of what is required for offensive operations as much as
the Ironsides.1
Admiral David Porter's words elicit little modern rec
ognition.

To most, "ironclad" is synonymous with "monitor,"

and scholars give New Ironsides but a few lines.2 Yet this
seagoing broadside ironclad presented one of the earliest
instances in which the U.S. Navy's tacticians and strate
gists were forced to adapt to technological change.

The new

technology of iron and steam, pressed into service with
neither precedent, wartime experience, nor sound theory to
guide the designers, yielded both unanticipated strengths
and unforeseen weaknesses.
New Ironsides participated in more engagements and
fired more shots than any other Civil War ironclad.

Her

strategic importance to the blockade of Charleston and her
:Rear Admiral David D. Porter to Secretary of the Navy
Gideon Welles, January 15, 1865, Official Records of the
Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion 28
vols. (Washington: GPO, 1894-1922) (hereafter ORN), 11: 602.
All references are to Series One unless otherwise noted.
2James Phinney Baxter III, The Introduction of the
Ironclad Warship (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1933;
reprinted Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1968), 268-69. This,
his most extensive discussion of the ship, is 23 lines.
1
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contributions to the bombardments of Charleston and Fort
Fisher were unmatched.

New Ironsides was in the mainstream

of ironclad development; while the low freeboard monitors
were an evolutionary dead end, New Ironsides was of the high
freeboard line that led to the dreadnought battleship.
Despite her highly successful career, New Ironsides
herself had no direct descendant in the U.S. Navy.

Her

bright promise was neglected in the post-War reaction, and
by the time the U.S. Navy again turned to seagoing iron
clads, she had been forgotten.

This is her story.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER TWO
GENESIS: IMPETUS AND DESIGN

By mid-1861, it was evident that the Union needed iron
clad warships.1 The impetus was clear: a Confederate iron
clad program was already underway.

The Confederate Navy

could not hope to challenge the U.S. Navy with conventional
wooden ships, so Confederate Secretary of the Navy Stephen
R. Mallory placed his faith not in numbers but in technolo
gy.

As he phrased the idea, "Inequality of numbers may be

compensated by invulnerability."2
Although there were several Confederate projects un
derway, the Federals worried most about the conversion of
the partially destroyed frigate U.S.S. Merrimack into the
ironclad C.S.S. Virginia.3 Virginia, being rebuilt at the
Navy Yard at Portsmouth, Virginia, might threaten the Union
JFor a discussion of the plans submitted before Welles
reported to Congress, Baxter, Ironclad Warship. 238-45.
2Mallory to C. M. Conrad, Chairman of the House Com
mittee on Naval Affairs, May 10, 1861, ORN ser. 2, 2: 69. A
detailed discussion of the resulting policy can be found in
William N. Still, Jr., Iron Afloat: The Story of the Confed
erate Armorclads (Columbia: University of South Carolina
Press, 1985), 5-17.
3Mallory approved the conversion plan for the Merri
mack on July 11, 1861. Baxter, Ironclad Warship. 229. Work
was in progress by mid-July. Still, Iron Afloat. 19.
3
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capital at Washington, D.C.

Official Washington received

frequent reports of Virginia's progress, as Union Secretary
of the Navy Gideon Welles wrote in his diary.4
On July 4, 1861, Welles advised the U.S. Congress of
the problem facing the Navy.

There was little time to ex

periment, he wrote, and Congress should appoint a board to
investigate the issue.5 Congress went beyond what Welles
requested.

On August 3, 1861, Congress authorized a board

of Naval officers to inquire into armored ships and appro
priated $1,500,000 to build "one or more armored or iron or
steel-clad steamships or floating steam batteries."6
The Navy lost no time.

In an advertisement of August

7, 1861, the Navy requested proposals for "iron-clad steam
vessels of war," of iron or wood and iron combined, to draw
between ten and sixteen feet of water.

The advertisement,

which required that the vessel be rigged with two masts,
stressed, "The smaller draught of water, compatible with
other requisites, will be preferred."7
Welles appointed a board on August 8, 1861, to examine
4Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles Secretary of
the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson. Howard K. Beale, ed.
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1960), 1: 65.
5U.S. Congress, House, House Executive Document 69,
Report of the Secretary of the Navy in Relation to Armored
Vessels. 38th Congress, 1st Session, 1864, 2 (hereafter Re
port . . . Armored Vessels).
6Ibid., 1-2.
7Ibid., 2.
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5
the proposals he expected to receive.

The "Ironclad Board"

consisted of Commodore Joseph Smith, Chief of the Bureau of
Yards and Docks, Commodore Hiram Paulding, and Commander
Charles H. Davis.8 Davis, the youngest at fifty-four, was
the only one of these seagoing officers who had no shipyard
experience, but since he had just served as a member of the
Navy's informal blockade strategy board, he had an excellent
idea of how the ironclads would be employed.

Paulding,

sixty-three years old, commanded the Washington Navy Yard
from 1851 to 1855, and Smith, the eldest at seventy-one, had
been Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks since 1846.9
None of the three was a naval constructor, and no naval
constructor was available to assist because they were all
too busy elsewhere.

The Board evaluated seventeen proposals

and recommended the Secretary accept three of them.10
sCommander John A. Dahlgren, inventor of the Dahlgren
gun, was originally assigned to the Board but was replaced
at his own request by Davis. Baxter, Ironclad Warship. 247.
9Dumas Malone, ed., Dictionary of American Biography
(New York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1961-64), s.v. "Davis,
Charles Henry," "Paulding, Hiram," "Smith, Joseph" (hereaf
ter DAB). James Grant Wilson and John Fiske, eds., Apple
ton's Cyclopaedia of American Biography (New York: D. Apple
ton & Company, 1888), s.v. "Davis, Charles Henry," "Paul
ding, Hiram." National Archives, Record Group 24, Records
of the Bureau of Personnel, Records of Officers, s.v.
"Smith, Joseph." (National Archives Record Groups hereafter
"NARG.")
10The board's report ("Report on Iron Clad Vessels")
is reprinted in Report . . . Armored Vessels. 3-7, and in
Frank Marion Bennett, The Steam Navy of the United States
(Pittsburgh: W. T. Nicholson Press, 1896; reprinted West
port, CT: Greenwood Press, 1974), 264-72. The proposals,
with comments, may be found in National Archives, Record
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The three proposals recommended by the Board varied
widely.

The first design, which became U.S.S. Galena. was

proposed by Bushnell & Co. of New Haven, Connecticut.

The

Bushnell ship had a conventionally shaped hull with a novel
system of interlocking armor.

Confederate guns easily pene

trated this light armor in an engagement at Drewry's Bluff
in the James River during May 1862, and Galena was not a
success.11 The design proposed by John Ericsson, a low
freeboard vessel with a single turret, became the Monitor.
The third, a fully rigged high freeboard ship with a broad
side battery on the European model, proposed by the firm of
Merrick & Sons of Philadelphia, became the New Ironsides.
There were four reasons the Ironclad Board accepted
only these proposals.

First, the Board could not evaluate

some designs because the proposals lacked detail.

Although

some such proposals were apparently from cranks or self
anointed inventors, others were from respectable firms.

The

Board members apparently felt they did not have time to
pursue the authors to get the details which should have been
Group 19, Records of the Bureau of Ships, Plan File, Plan
80-11-3.
nFlag Officer Louis M. Goldsborough wrote to Assis
tant Secretary of the Navy Gustavus V. Fox, "The Galena has
turned out precisely as I expected-beneath Naval criticismt . . . she is a poor stick for an iron clad." Golds
borough to Fox, May 21, 1862, in Robert Means Thompson and
Richard Wainwright, eds., Confidential Correspondence of
Gustavus Vasa Fox Assistant Secretary of the Navy 1861-1865
(Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1972; reprint of
1918-19 edition), 1: 272. Bennett, Steam Navy, 272.
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supplied with each proposal.12
Second, the Board had to pick designs with technical
merit.

While they were not naval constructors, they were

men of long practical experience and could see that some
designs were not sound.

They rejected, for example, William

Kingsley's theory that projectiles would bounce off the
rubber-clad vessel he proposed.
Third, Congress appropriated only $1,500,000 for build
ing ironclads, and some proposals would have invested too
much of it in a single ship.

Shipbuilder Donald McKay of

fered to build an ironclad for $1,000,000, and Henry R.
Dunham's design was to cost $1,200,000.13 While these
ships were probably feasible and McKay at least had a good
shipbuilding reputation, concentrating all the Union's re
sources on one ship would noticeably increase the risk to
the nation.

If the chosen design were a technical failure

or if construction of an ambitious design took too long, the
consequences would be grave.
Fourth, the Board had to choose builders who had the
technical and financial ability actually to build the ships
they proposed.

While many proposals came from men with

shipbuilding or iron-working backgrounds, others came from
men who had no experience whatsoever to help them translate
12Examples are proposals of W. Perine, J. C. Le Ferre,
Benjamin Rathburn, Henry Dunham, John Westwood, Neafie &
Levy, and A. Beebe. Report . . . Armored Vessels. 5-7.
13Ibid., 6.
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their drawing-board designs into wood and metal.

Given the

urgency of the situation, the Board could not afford to
subsidize a new builder's errors of inexperience.
The Board fully grasped the important point that the
immediate demands of the war required "vessels invulnerable
to shot, of light draught of water, to penetrate our shoal
harbors, rivers and bayous."

They advocated the construc

tion of such ships "before going into a more perfect system
of large iron-clad sea-going vessels of war," but recommend
ed the Navy construct seagoing ships later, building on the
experience obtained from the smaller ships.14
In great part, the Southern coast shaped the Civil War
at sea.

The coast was long and low, penetrated by many

rivers, bays and inlets.

Because it was so shallow, few of

the rivers and inlets were navigable.

The irregularity of

the coastline and the limitations of visual surveillance
meant that many ships would be needed to enforce a blockade,
and shallow water meant that those ships would require shal
low draft to patrol close enough to shore to be effective.
The Northern blockade problem was not insurmountable
since the Southern coastal regions were also economically
behind the North.

Materials brought in through the blockade

would do only local good if they

could not readily be moved

to where they were needed.

seven Southernseaports had

Only

14Ibid., 5. New Ironsides, while at 3,500 tons the
largest of the three, was much smaller than her European
counterparts Gloire (5,600 tons) and Warrior (9,000 tons).
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interstate rail connections.

They were Norfolk, Virginia;

Wilmington, North Carolina; Charleston, South Carolina;
Savannah, Georgia; Pensacola, Florida; Mobile, Alabama; and
New Orleans, Louisiana.15 These cities became prime tar
gets for the Union since closing seven major ports would be
easier and have more effect than blockading many lesser
harbors.
After the fall of Fort Sumter in April 1861, General
Winfield Scott proposed a plan, known to its detractors as
the "Anaconda Plan," to blockade the Confederate coast and
advance along the Mississippi River.

This strategy aimed to

cut the Confederacy in two and strangle the commerce upon
which its economy depended.

The Union Navy was to seize

bases from which to operate, penetrate the interior on the
rivers and choke off commerce by blockading or capturing
seaports.

The Confederate strategic challenges were to

maintain commerce and protect the coastline and rivers.
The Confederacy set out to meet these strategic chal
lenges by building fortifications to protect the coast,
ironclads to break the blockade, and commerce raiders to
15Bern Anderson, By Sea and By River: The Naval His
tory of the Civil War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), 15.
Anderson states six, Norfolk being the exception, but the
Norfolk and Petersburg Railroad had interstate connections.
"Mitchell's New Travellers Guide through the United States
1860," in National Geographic Society, Historical Atlas of
the United States (Washington: National Geographic Society,
1988), 197; United States War Department, An Atlas to Accom
pany the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Ar
mies 1861-1865 (Washington: GPO, 1891-95; reprinted New
York: Fairfax Press, 1978), plate 137.
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take the war to the Union.

At first the Confederacy em

ployed privateers, but when European powers closed their
ports to Confederate prizes and the blockade kept them from
being sent into Southern ports, Mallory began to commission
Confederate States Navy vessels as commerce raiders.16 The
Confederate Army and state troops were given charge of
coastal defense and ironclad building began in earnest.
Underlying the U.S. Navy's choice of designs was the
need for haste, which stemmed from the Confederate program
of ironclad construction.

By late 1861 there was "quite a

panic" about the Confederate ironclads, with no Union ves
sels yet built to meet them.17 When submitting his propos
al, each designer had to estimate how long it would take to
build.18 John Ericsson's vessel was to be completed within
one hundred days and the Bushnell vessel in four months, the
shortest periods of the technically acceptable proposals,
and short construction time was the key factor in Welles'
16Anderson argues that privateering attacks on Union
shipping were the direct cause of the blockade. Anderson,
By Sea and By River. 25-26. Privateers had to send captured
ships to prize courts for adjudication; if they did not, in
law they were pirates. Warships could destroy their prizes.
17Gustavus V. Fox to Mrs. Fox, October 8, 1861.
Thompson, Correspondence of Fox. 1: 385. Even after Monitor
fought Virginia the need for additional ironclads was acute
ly felt; in a letter to Fox dated March 14, 1852, Major
General George B. McClellan asked, "How soon will the Mystic
[Bushnell] iron clad ship be finished?" Ibid., 439.
18Report . . . Armored Vessels. 2.
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decision to build the Monitor.19 The Merrick vessel,
however, would take nine months.

Despite the Board's evi

dent bias in favor of speedy construction, it accepted Mer
rick & Sons' proposal as well as Ericsson's and Bushnell's.
Despite the claim that the selection of the Merrick
design "showed that the old officers valued the sailing ship
as far superior to the steam vessel," the primary reason for
choosing Merrick & Sons' design was to reduce technological
risk and ensure that the Union received a combat-effective
ship.20 The Bushnell proposal was novel, and the Board
recommended it only if the contractor guaranteed she would
"float her armor and load sufficiently high, and have sta
bility enough for a sea vessel."21 The "Ericsson battery"
was even more novel.

The Board was not confident that the

ship would be "shot and shell proof" as Ericsson stated and
recommended a guarantee of this quality.

Indeed, the Navy

19Two other proposals stipulated four months but could
not carry their designed gun batteries. One would have re
quired sixty to seventy-five days, but was for an unarmored
iron boat, and A. Beebe's one hundred day ship was "defec
tive." Ibid., 4-7. Stephen C. Thompson, "The Design and
Construction of USS Monitor," Warship International 27, no.
3 (1990): 224. "As Mallory had felt he must gamble on iron
clads, so Welles felt he must gamble on Ericsson." John
Niven, Gideon Welles: Lincoln's Secretary of the Navy (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1973), 368.
20Stephen C. Thompson, "The Construction of the U.S.S.
Monitor" (unpublished M.A. Thesis, Old Dominion University,
1987), 17. Thompson's statement that the Board "was reluc
tant to try anything new" is not supported by their choice
of two novel designs, Bushnell's and Ericsson's.
21Report . . . Armored Vessels. 6.
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required that the ship be brought "before an enemy's bat
tery" as a test before finally accepting her.22
The philosophy behind the Merrick design, however, was
known to be sound, since the British and French had been
building ironclads on the high freeboard principle for two
years.

The high freeboard design traded increased construc

tion time and cost for low technological risk.

The Merrick

ship would take three times as long to build as Ericsson's
vessel, but there was much greater assurance that the re
sulting ship would be effective in combat, and combat effec
tiveness was the most important criterion.

Despite the com

pelling urgency Welles had to balance the risk of failure
inherent

in untried designs; according to a recent biogra

phy, "Above all, as he [Welles] and [Assistant Secretary
Gustavus V.] Fox struggled to improvise a Navy, they needed
the proven rather than the experimental."23
This was especially true in light of the prevailing
rumors about the Virginia. Many believed the Confederate
ship could ascend the Potomac River and attack Washington,
and others feared that she would instead put to sea to
attack seaboard cities such as New York.24 Although more
22Ibid., 5; Baxter, Ironclad Warship. 259. Monitor
still belonged to her builders when she fought the Virginia.
23Niven, Gideon Welles. 350.
24Welles, Diary. 1: 62-65, for Secretary of War Edwin
M. Stanton's "almost frantic" reaction to the news of Hamp
ton Roads. Welles later called men in New York "the most
easily terrified and panic-stricken of any community."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

13
sober minds assessed Virginia's draft and saw that she could
not reach Washington without going aground, her seagoing
qualities were untried.

Little could be said other than

that the steam frigate Merrimack, from which Virginia had
been converted, was a seagoing vessel.25 Since it was en
tirely plausible that she could be formidable on the open
sea, a secondary tradeoff for Welles was therefore seagoing
qualities and draft for risk.26 In seagoing qualities the
high freeboard but deeper draft broadside design was again
the known quantity, while shallower draft favored the novel
and untried Ericsson and Bushnell designs.
Merrick & Sons, who proposed the New Ironsides, was a
Philadelphia firm well known for building marine steam
engines.

Samuel Merrick first became associated with the

steam Navy in 1839, when he and his partner John Towne,
doing business as Merrick & Towne, built the engines for the
sidewheeler U.S.S. Mississippi. Merrick & Towne also built
the Ericsson-designed engines for the U.S.S. Princeton. the
U.S. Navy's first propeller-driven steamer, and later, en
gines for the screw steamer U.S.S. San Jacinto. The firm
Ibid., entry for September 11, 1862, 1: 123.
25The Merrimack class frigates were well-regarded for
seagoing qualities. John D. Alden, "Born Forty Years Too
Soon," American Neptune 22, no. 4 (October 1962): 252-53.
2SWelles received reports that "she could not venture
outside, and was to be used in Hampton Roads, and the river
Chesapeake." This part of his Diary was written retrospec
tively and his low opinion of Virginia's seaworthiness may
have been strengthened by hindsight. Welles, Diary. 1: 65.
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built its first Navy machinery under the Merrick & Son name
in 1854 for the U.S.S. Wabash. The Merricks continued with
machinery for the U.S.S. Wyoming in 1858, and in 1861 built
engines for U.S.S. Miami. Tuscarora. and Mononqahela.27
Since Merrick & Sons had no building ways, the firm
planned to subcontract the hull to William Cramp and Sons,
also of Philadelphia.28 Merrick & Sons tendered their pro
posal to the Navy on September 3, 1861, offering to complete
their vessel in nine months for $780,000.29
A prime mover of the Merrick proposal was Barnabas H.
Bartol, Superintendent of the Southwark Foundry.
born in Freeport, Maine, on October 31, 1816.

Bartol was

After an

apprenticeship with the West Point Foundry and an attempt in
1837 to start his own business, Bartol returned to West
Point in 1838 and became Superintendent there in 1839.
became Superintendent at Southwark in 1847.

He

R. G. Dun

27Bennett, Steam Navy. Appendix B.
28[J. Vaughn Merrick], "Editorial. The U.S.S. Armored
Frigate New Ironsides," Journal of the Franklin Institute of
the State of Pennsylvania for the Promotion of the Mechanic
Arts (hereafter Journal of the Franklin Institute!. 3d ser.,
53, no. 2 (February 1867): 79; Augustus C. Buell, The Mem
oirs of Charles H. Cramp (Philadelphia: J. P. Lippincott
Company, 1906), 68.
29Merrick & Sons to Smith, September 3, 1861. Nation
al Archives, Record Group 71, Bureau of Yards and Docks,
Entry 5, Miscellaneous Letters Received, Box 447, 1: 54^.
September 3 was the deadline. Baxter, Ironclad Warship.
254.
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called Bartol "a man of great practical skill."30
Merrick & Sons later credited Bartol with originating
the New Ironsides design, but it was quite similar to the
French ironclad Gloire (Figures 1 and 2).31 The internal
arrangements were also similar.32 Like Gloire. the Merrick
design called for a high freeboard wooden hull armored with
iron, carrying a broadside battery, and equipped with sail
and steam power.
A comparison shows the close resemblance between New
Ironsides and Gloire and their British contemporary, H.M.S.
Warrior, but also shows some of the sacrifices made in the
New Ironsides design in pursuit of the Navy's requirement
for shallow draft.

Although shallow draft was needed to

operate in the coastal waters of the Confederacy, as with
all warship designs the exaggeration of one characteristic
required the compromise of others.

A later analysis noted

30In 1863 Bartol was elected to the Board of Managers
of the Franklin Institute. He left Merrick & Sons in Janu
ary 1867 and died February 10, 1888. W. P. Tatham, Wm. Sel
lers and Washington Jones, "Obituary. Barnabas H. Bartol,"
Journal of the Franklin Institute 125, no. 6 (June 1888):
499-503. For Dun comment of June 10, 1857, Harvard Univer
sity, Baker Library, R. G. Dun Collection, Pennsylvania 135:
138.
31[Merrick], "U.S.S. New Ironsides," 79. It is doubt
ful that Bartol had the shipbuilding knowledge to do the
hull design (for which Charles H. Cramp later claimed cred
it), but he was an excellent choice for arranging the armor.
32Plans of Gloire are reprinted in Andrew Lambert,
Warrior: The World's First Ironclad Then and Now (Annapolis:
United States Naval Institute Press, 1987), 42-43, 68-71.
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the disadvantages imposed on a shallow-draft vessel:
1st. Her lines must be more full (other things
being equal), and hence more difficult of propulsion
and of manageability. 2dly. Her screw must be
smaller, and therefore less effective as an instru
ment of propulsion. 3dly. Her hull must be more
strengthened owing to lack of depth, and must,
therefore, be heavier. . . .33

Table 1.— Comparison of New Ironsides. Gloire, and
Warrior
New Ironsides
Length
Armored length
Beam
Draft
Speed (knots)
Max armor
Displacement
Coal
Battery

230 '0"
170'0"
56 '0"
15 '8"
7
4.5"
3500 tons
400 tons
14 XI" ML
150-pdr MLR

Gloire

Warrior

255'6"
255'6"
55'9"
27'10"
12.5-13
4.7"
5630 tons
665 tons
36 6.4" MLR

380'2"
213 ' 0 "

58'4n
26 '0"
14.08
4.5"
9137 tons
850 tons
10 110-pdr BL
26 68-pdr ML
4 70-pdr BL

Sources: New Ironsides from "Statistical Data," ORN 2d ser.
1: 159 and manuscript sources. Gloire and Warrior from
Robert Gardiner, ed. Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships
1860-1905. United States Naval Institute Press edition.
(New York: Mayflower Press, 1979), 286, 7. Length is be
tween perpendiculars; beam is overall; tons are long tons.

33[Merrick], "U.S.S. New Ironsides," 76. See Oscar
Parkes, British Battleships Warrior to Vanguard: A History
of Design. Construction and Armament (Hamden, CT: Archon
Books, 1970), 115-16, for the design compromises forced upon
the British in a shallow-draft ironclad.
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Figure 1. U.S.S. New Ironsides outboard profile. (From BuShips Plan 107-9-12L,
redrawn by William J. Jurens.) The lettered stations correspond to the similarly
lettered stations in the Body and Sheer Plan, Figure 16.
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Figure 2. French Ironclad La Gloire outboard profile.
Institution of Naval Architects 2, 1861)

(From Transactions of the
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The proposed vessel was wooden hulled, 230 feet long
at the water line and 56 feet in extreme beam.

Her depth of

hold was 24 feet 9 inches and her draft exclusive of her
keel beam was fourteen feet.

She was a three-decked vessel,

with a spar deck (the highest, and the only weather deck), a
gun deck and a berth deck above her hold (Figures 3 through
5).

She had six feet clear between decks.34
The woodwork of the hull was of white oak, based on a

keel eighteen inches wide and twelve inches deep.

The mas

sive framing timbers of the sides tapered from fourteen
inches deep at the turn of the bilge to six inches at the
edge of the spar deck.

The spaces between the frames were

filled in solidly with wood, and this "filling" was then
caulked to make it watertight.35 The wooden filling was
intended to be white pine but was later changed to oak.36
Hull planking was then installed over the outside of
34The Merrick proposal is in NARG 19, Plan 107-9-12-H.
The specifications "as proposed" are taken therefrom. The
contract specifications are identical. National Archives,
Record Group 71, Entry 42, Contracts and Bonds 1861, 269-95,
is the contract for the New Ironsides.
3sFor a description of wooden shipbuilding of the pe
riod, see John W. Watson, "The Building of the Ship,"
Harper7s New Monthly Magazine 24 (April 1862): 608-20.
36Charles H. Cramp designed the hull. He later stat
ed, "With the exception of pine decking every stick of tim
ber was of white oak." Buell, Cramp. 63. This address was
apparently made on December 14, 1897, to the Contemporary
Club of Philadelphia, where George E. Belknap also spoke. A
typescript of Cramp's address is in the Belknap papers.
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Naval Historical
Foundation Collection, Papers of Rear Admiral George E.
Belknap, Box 2; hereafter "Cramp, [Contemporary Club]."
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Figure 4. U.S.S. New Ironsides Berth Deck and Hold Plans.
107-9-12B, -12C, redrawn by William J. Jurens.)

(From BuShips Plans
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Pilot house
Hold
Companion hatch
Hatch to Engine Room
Smokestack
Captain's Cabin
Hold
Galley stand
Scuttle
Hatch to Store Room
Light Box
Sick Bay
Dispensary
Hatch to Magazine Psg
Hatch to Shell Room
Hatch to Sail Room Psg
Hatch to Bread Room Psg
Hatch to Hold
Chain Pipe
Engineers Mess Stores
Midshipmens Mess Stores
Paymaster Stores
Sailmaker SR
Carpenter SR
1st Asst Eng SR
Asst Eng SR
Chief Eng SR
Master SR
Paymaster SR
Surgeon SR
Stateroom
4th LT SR
3rd LT SR
2nd LT SR
1st LT SR
Midshipmen Berth
1st Asst Eng SR
Boatswain SR
Gunner SR
Pantry
Warrant Officer SR
Marines' Stores

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Wardroom Pantry
Wardroom
Steerage
Hatch to Wardroom Stores
Hatch to Captain's Stores
Hatch to Magazine Passage
Hatch to Shell Room
Light
Steerage Pantry
Hatch to Spirit Room
Hatch to Hold
Hatch to Paymasters Stores
Hatch to Engineers Stores
Armory
Hospital Stores
General Stores
Magazine
Magazine
Air Psg
Shell Room
Sail Room
Bread Room
1200 gallon tank
1253 gallon tank
Sand Locker
Chain Locker
Paymasters Stores
Engineers Stores
721 gallon tank
890 gallon tank
527 gallon tank
Shaft Psg
Spirit Room
Shell Room
Magazine
Boat Ammunition
Wardroom Stores
Captains Stores
Machinery Room
XI-inch gun carriage
Hold

Figure 5. U.S.S. New Ironsides Deck Plans (Key).
J. Jurens.)

(William
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the frames.
thick.

This planking was also white oak, five inches

The first plank below the iron plating was nine

inches thick at the top, tapering to five at the bottom, to
fair the joint between the iron and the unarmored hull.37
The total thickness of oak behind the armor, both hull
planking and filling, varied from eleven inches just under
the spar deck to about sixteen at the water line.
Inside the filling were two sets of iron braces, com
monly used in wooden shipbuilding to strengthen the hull.38
One set, at an angle of 45 degrees, was let flush into the
frames; the other, at right angles to the first, lay on top
of them.

The braces were bolted to each frame and rivetted

to each other where they crossed.
The armor arrangement was that later known as "belt
and battery."

It included a belt of iron extending entirely

around the ship from four feet below to three feet above the
designed load line, which was the fourteen foot waterline.
The first plate below the waterline was 4% inches thick, and
the second, or lower, plate, three inches thick.

Above the

seventeen foot line, the armor extended 170 feet only, or 85
37Cramp's paper stated twelve inches at the top, ta
pering to five at the turn of the bilge. Buell, Cramp. 65.
38Watson, "Building of the Ship," 612, for description
and diagram. See also NARG 19, BuShips Plan 80-11-3. The
braces, made of iron bars 4% inches wide and 3/4 inch thick,
ran from six inches below the plank sheer to the turn of the
bilge, with the ends on every third frame.
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feet each way from the center of the ship.39
All the armor above the load line was to be "plates
forged of best American Scrap iron of 4% inches thickness,
fifteen feet long and 28 inches wide."

Each plate was

grooved on all four edges, one inch deep and 1\ inches wide;
as the armor was installed, tongue pieces of iron (Figure 6)
were placed in these grooves, "so as to connect the several
plates as one in their resistance to shot."40

Figure 6.

Tongued and Grooved Armor (Side View)

Although tonguing and grooving appeared to be a good
idea, it actually weakened the armor.

The interlocking

39Admiral John A. Dahlgren erred when he said, "the
iron plating is not carried around the stern." Dahlgren to
Welles, November 5, 1863, ORN 15: 99. The waterline was
completely armored. George E. Belknap, "Reminiscent of the
'New Ironsides' Off Charleston," United Service Magazine,
o.s., 1 (January 1879): 63.
40A sketch appears in a report of the Merrick propos
al, NARG 19, BuShips Plan 80-11-3.
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plates transmitted the effects of a blow and let a single
shot damage more than one plate.

It also made the replace

ment of damaged plates very difficult, since to replace a
plate in a lower tier the plates above it had to be removed.
J. D. A. Samuda, a prominent British builder of iron ships,
argued cogently against tonguing and grooving as early as
March 186l.41 Definitive British experiments were not
conducted until October 1861 and the report of them not
issued until March 1862, so the results were probably not
known in the United States in time to affect the detailed
armor design for the New Ironsides.42
The armor was attached with screws (Figure 7) with
countersunk heads, which did not extend through the wooden
hull.43 On the monitors the armor was attached with bolts
that passed completely through the "sandwich" of laminated
armor.

British practice employed through bolts, while the

41Lambert, Warrior, 68-69; J. D. A. Samuda, in dis
cussing J. Scott Russell's paper, March 1, 1861, "On the
Professional Problem Presented to Naval Architects in the
Construction of Iron-Cased Vessels of War," Transactions of
the Institution of Naval Architects (hereafter Transactions
INA) 2 (1861): 85-86.
42See Edward W. Very, "The Development of Armor for
Naval Use," Proceedings of the United States Naval Insti
tute (hereafter Proceedings USNU 9, no. 3 (July 1883): 42426; Baxter, Ironclad Warship. 203. A brief item about the
experiments ran in London Times. November 29, 1861: 7.
43Belknap, "Reminiscent of the 'New Ironsides'," 63;
[Merrick], "U.S.S. New Ironsides," 77.
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French used screws.44 The spar deck was made of iron
plates one inch thick/ joined with riveted butt pieces and

10 FEET

BSf

ao1
&o~
4.5'

Figure 7. U.S.S. New Ironsides Midships Section and sec
tional drawing of armor arrangement. (Merrick & Sons draw
ing of January 1862; Edward Very drawing from "Development
of Armor for Naval Use," Proceedings USNI 9 (1883): 390;
redrawn by William J. Jurens.)
covered with three inches of yellow pine planking.
The battery was located on the gun deck, the middle
44Baxter, Ironclad Warship. 97; Lambert, Warrior. 76;
Very, "Development of Armor," 380-81, Alvah Folsom Hunter, A
Year on a Monitor and the Destruction of Fort Sumter, Craig
L. Symonds, ed. (Columbia: University of South Carolina
Press, 1987), 51-53. The contract specified screws passing
from within the hull out into the armor "where there is
nothing to prevent," but an 1863 sketch confirms the heads
were outside, and Very's article concurs. Carpenter Thomas
H. Bishop to Turner, September 9, 1863, ORN 14: 555; Very,
"Development of Armor," 390-91.
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deck of the three.

Charles Cramp later stated that when the

ship was conceived, he specified that the battery was to
consist of VUI-inch guns.

The Model 1845 VUI-inch shell

gun, a smoothbore muzzle-loader which was not a Dahlgren
design, was apparently the gun he intended to use.
By the time Merrick & Sons submitted their proposal to
the Navy, the VIII-inch guns had been superseded by the much
more effective IX-inch Dahlgrens.

Merrick & Sons proposed

battery of sixteen IX-inch Dahlgrens weighed 76 tons, com
pared to 56 tons for an equal number of VUI-inch guns, and
needed more men than the 165 intended for the VUI-inch bat
tery.

Since the size of the crew allowed for the ship was

based upon the size and composition of the battery, the
crew's accommodations were designed for 200 men.45
In her single screw reciprocating engine propulsion
plant the proposed vessel was little different in broad from
the European ships.

The machinery, duplicating what Merrick

& Sons built for the 1858 sloop of war Wyoming. was to drive
45[Merrick], "U.S.S. New Ironsides," 78. United States
Navy Department, Bureau of Ordnance, Ordnance Instructions
for the United States Navy (Washington: GPO, 1866), Appendix
A, vi; Warren Ripley, Artillery and Ammunition of the Civil
War (New York: Promontory Press, 1970), 102-103. In 19th
Century convention, a Roman numeral designating caliber
indicated a smoothbore gun, an Arabic numeral a rifled gun.
For specification of 200 men, NARG 71, Entry 42, 280. Cap
tain Thomas Turner mentioned "160 men, the complement of the
ship originally intended." Turner to Welles, August 27,
1862, quoted in Report . . . Armored Vessels. 30.
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the ship at 9% knots.46 New Ironsides had two horizontal
reciprocating engines, each with a cylinder of fifty inches
diameter and thirty inches stroke, driving a single shaft of
ten inches diameter.

One double surface condenser mounted

between the engines served them both.

Her brass screw was

twelve feet in diameter, smaller than normal but all that
could be accommodated on her limited draft.47 New Iron
sides had a clutch coupling to permit disconnecting the
screw propeller from the engines.

A disconnecting propeller

was common since allowing the propeller to turn freely re
duced its drag when the ship was under sail.48
As was usual at the time, little auxiliary machinery
was provided.49 There were two boiler feed water pumps,
two air pumps, two condenser seawater circulating pumps, and
4SThe duplication of Wyoming7s machinery, which Cramp
found very useful, is explicit in Merrick & Sons7 proposal.
NARG 19, BuShips Plan 80-11-3; Cramp, [Contemporary Club],
9. Drawings of Wyoming7s machinery are in NARG 19, BuShips
Plans, Bureau of Steam Engineering alphabetical file, s.v.
Wyoming (hereafter "Wyoming plans").
meter.

47The screw fitted to H.M.S. Warrior was 2476" in dia
Lambert, Warrior, 110.

48Some propellers could be hoisted, such as Wyoming7s.
NARG 19, Wyoming Plans. New Ironsides7 clutch coupling was
exercised at anchor but never disconnected at sea; with her
bad sailing characteristics she would have made no headway
under sail alone even with her full rig. See also Robert
Murray, Rudimentary Treatise on Marine Engines and Steam
Vessels. together with Practical Remarks on the Screw and
Propelling Power, as used in the Royal and Merchant Navy,
3d. ed. (London: John Weale Architectural Library, 1858).
49Warrior was fitted with steam pumps only.
British Battleships. 20.

Parkes,
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two bilge pumps, one of each driven from each main engine.
In addition, there were two auxiliary engines, each fitted
to power a forced draft blower via a belt drive.

A salt

water auxiliary pump provided salt water to pump bilges,
wash decks, extinguish fires, supply the distilling plant
and furnish emergency feed to the boilers.50
The four boilers (Figure 8) were of the horizontal
fire-tube type, in which tubes slanting up at a slight angle
to the horizontal carry the hot gases from the firebox to
the smoke pipe, thus heating the water which surrounds them.
They were placed facing each other forward of the main en
gines.

The hydrostatic test pressure was 50 pounds per

square inch, and the working pressure normally between 20
and 25 pounds per square inch.51
Each boiler, seventeen feet wide and eleven feet deep,
had six coal furnaces, and all four boilers were connected
50The contract specified two pumps but only one was
provided. Commodore Stephen C. Rowan to Dahlgren, August 1,
1863, Library of Congress, Papers of Stephen Clegg Rowan,
"Copies of Letters written by S. C. Rowan, U.S. Navy, from
Feby 22, 1854 to Jan 21, 1880, and transferred, Jany 18/82,
from various Letter Books," 138; NARG 71, Entry 42, 287.
The pump was to be driven by one of the blower engines, but
the ship's engineering log and the Wyoming Plans show it had
its own engine. A second pump was installed in 1864.
51Each steamer in the U.S. Navy kept a "steam log,"
containing pressure and temperature readings for machinery
and remarks about the Engineering Department. New Iron
sides' logs show boiler pressures from 10 to 26 pounds. On
August 31, 1862, 30 and 37 pounds are recorded, the only
time pressures greater than 26 pounds were logged. National
Archives, Record Group 19, Entry 1072, Steam Log of the U.S.
Steamer New Ironsides.
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to the same smoke pipe.52 A single auxiliary boiler could
be used when the main boilers were secured.

The main

Figure 8. Main Boiler of U.S.S. New Ironsides. (Historical
Society of Pennsylvania, Dr. A. C. Bining Collection.)
boilers could be fed with fresh water, which would dramati
cally reduce the amount of scale formed in them, decrease
S2The boilers are described in [Merrick], "U.S.S. New
Ironsides," 77. These dimensions differ from the contract
but agree with an advertisement of August 1869 (Figure 8)
which shows a rectangular boiler with the uptake at one end
of the firing front and six furnace doors; the Steam Log
confirms six furnaces. The four uptakes together make a
complete circle to form the base of the smoke pipe. "Adve
rtisement for One or More (4 in all) Horizontal Tubular
Boilers," Dr. A. C. Bining Collection, The Historical Soci
ety of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia; NARG 19, Wyoming Plans.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

31
the maintenance required and increase their efficiency.

In

service, however, main and auxiliary boilers were fed with
salt water.

The reason appears to be that the distilling

plant, large by contemporary standards, had a nominal capa
city of 500 gallons per day.

With the ship able to make 500

gallons per day for a crew of more than 400 men, there was
little surplus fresh water for the boilers.53
After the Ironclad Board made its report on September
16, 1861, the Navy began to negotiate with the three firms
who were recommended.

The Bureau of Construction, Equipment

and Repair was normally responsible for building Navy ships,
but Welles gave the responsibility for the first ironclads
to Commodore Smith's Bureau of Yards and Docks, apparently
due to Smith's connection with the Board.
Joseph Smith was born March 30, 1790, in Hanover, Mas
sachusetts.

He entered the Navy in 1809 and served in the

Battle of Lake Champlain during the War of 1812.

He later

commanded U.S.S. Ohio, a sailing ship-of-the-line and, from
1843 to 1845, the Mediterranean Squadron.

From 1846 until

1869 he was Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks.54
Despite his age and long experience in sailing ships,
Smith proved receptive to new ideas and made many well
S3The salinometer readings confirm that in service the
main boilers were fed with sea water. NARG 19, Entry 1072,
Steam Log of New Ironsides, various dates.
54Smith retired in 1869 and died January 17, 1877.
DAB, s.v. "Smith, Joseph."
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considered suggestions during the construction not only of
New Ironsides but of Monitor and Galena, the other two iron
clads built by the Bureau of Yards and Docks.55 As Welles
wrote later about the Monitor. but in terms applicable to
all three ships, "Admiral Smith beyond any other person is
deserving of credit, if credit be due any one connected with
the Navy Department for this vessel."56
Merrick & Sons chose William Cramp's shipbuilding firm
to build their vessel.

The two firms were of similar age

but had markedly different financial reputations.

Merrick &

Sons' founder, Samuel V. Merrick, was born in Hallowell,
Maine, on May 4, 1801.

During the 1820s he built hand-oper

ated fire engines with John Agnew under the name of S. V.
Merrick & Company.
Works.

By 1835 the firm was called the Franklin

Merrick and Agnew continued to make fire engines but

in 1837 they built a foundry and added steam engines to
their line.
Merrick established the Southwark Foundry in 1839 in
partnership with John H. Towne, doing business as Merrick &
Towne until Towne left in 1849.

By 1854 Samuel Merrick had

taken his son into the firm.57 In 1857, the credit rating
55For some of his correspondence with Ericsson, Thomp
son, "Design and Construction," 224-27.
56Welles, Diary, entry for January 3, 1863, 1: 214.
57DAB: Appleton's Cyclopaedia. s.v. "Merrick, Samuel
V." Bruce Sinclair, Philadelphia's Philosopher Mechanics: A
History of the Franklin Institute 1824-1865 (Baltimore and
London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), 290-91.
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firm of R. G. Dun noted, "Each department has its efficient
& reliable foreman, which renders the estate one of the best
conducted in the country."58
By 1859 Merrick & Son had become Merrick & Sons.59
Even after Samuel Merrick retired, the business prospered.
In May 1861, R. G. Dun called the company "one of the best
in the line."

Their wharf near the Navy Yard facilitated

their "great deal of work for the Gov't."60 Merrick & Sons'
machinery was well known in the pre-Civil War Navy, and this
cannot have hurt their efforts to secure Government con
tracts .61
Unlike the Merrick firm, Cramps' establishment had not
always been sound.

William Cramp, born September 22, 1807,

in Philadelphia, founded his shipbuilding company at 23 and
took his sons in they came of age.62 The business failed in
SSR. G. Dun Collection, Pennsylvania 135: 138.
“According to DAB. Samuel Merrick retired from the
firm in 1860. The Dun records indicate he withdrew on Janu
ary 7, 1861. R. G. Dun Collection, Pennsylvania 135: 138.
Samuel Merrick died August 18, 1870.
60Ibid., Pennsylvania 135: 138; 131: 233. By January
1862, the partners were J. Vaughn Merrick, W. H. Merrick,
John E. Cope and Hartley Merrick. For a letterhead, Nation
al Archives, Record Group 19, Entry 61, Letters Received by
the Bureau of Construction and Repair, Box 1, 2: 54.
“During the Civil War, Merrick built engines for the
sidewheeler Miami, the monitors Tonawanda and Yazoo, and six
screw steamers, as well as New Ironsides. Bennett, Steam
Navy. Appendix B.
“William Cramp remained president of the firm until
his death July 6, 1879. DAB, s.v. "Cramp, William."
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1855.

Cramp and his sons, Charles H. and William M. Cramp,

continued it, successfully enough that by 1862 they could
make a 50 percent settlement with William Cramp's old credi
tors.

By 1863, they were doing business as William Cramp

and Sons, with a capital of $100,000 and, as the Dun firm
noted, "as much work as they can get through."

They made

$60,000 profit on New Ironsides, the first of their many
ships for the Navy.63
Charles H. Cramp designed New Ironsides. Born in
Philadelphia on May 9, 1828, he was William Cramp's eldest
son.

He joined his father's shipyard in 1846 after an ap

prenticeship in the shipyard of his uncle John Byerly.64 He
stated after the war, "The design, plans and specifications
of hull complete had been made by me in connection with Mr.
B. H. Bartol. . . . "

He wrote about his extremely conserva

tive design philosophy when he said he provided against
exceeding the required fifteen foot draft, "by allowing a
foot for a margin.

The draught was not to exceed fifteen

feet; I allowed for fourteen feet. . . ."65
63For founding, The William Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine
Building Company, Cramp's Shipyard founded by William Cramp
1830 (Philadelphia: The William Cramp and Sons Ship and
Engine Building Company, 1910), 13. For bankruptcy, recov
ery and profit, R. G. Dun Collection, Pennsylvania 141: 70.
64Charles H. Cramp became president of the firm in
1879 and remained as president or chairman until he died
June 6, 1913. DAB, s.v. "Cramp, Charles Henry."
65Cramp, [Contemporary Club], 6. Cramp said he re
ceived "much credit and congratulation from the Board and
others for my foresight in allowing the margin as I did, and
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After negotiations in September, Merrick & Sons signed
the contract for their ship on October 15, and with that act
took the first step towards the seagoing ironclad United
States Navy.66
for the correctness of my calculations."
“Smith to Merrick & Sons, September 24, 1861, Na
tional Archives, Record Group 45, Entry 464, Office of Naval
Records and Library (ONRL), Subject File, U.S. Navy 17751910, AD— Design and General Characteristics 1860-1910,
Ironclads, Box 51, typescript marked Naval War Records
(NWR), 2634: 28. For execution, Merrick & Sons to Smith,
October 21, 1861, NARG 71, Entry 5, Box 447, 2: 7. The
contract imposed a $500 penalty on Merrick & Sons for each
day the ship's completion was delayed beyond July 15, 1862.
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CHAPTER THREE
CONSTRUCTION HISTORZ AND DESIGN EVOLUTION

Once the contract was signed, construction of "the
Merrick vessel" could begin.

Though the idea of armor pro

tection was old, its practical application was still so new
there was no consensus on how to solve the myriad of de
tailed construction problems an armored vessel would encoun
ter.1 Compounding the difficulty of designing a successful
ironclad was the then-primitive state of hydrodynamics.2
Since ironclad ships had never engaged in combat, there was
no way to winnow sound practices of armored construction
from unsound ones, and seemingly insignificant details could
have far-reaching impact.

It was inevitable there would be

delays, false starts and second thoughts.
Merrick & Sons subcontracted the hull to William Cramp
Compare the armor arrangements of Galena, New Iron
sides. Monitor and the later Keokuk. Report . . ♦ Armored
Vessels. 4-7; Very, "Development of Armor," 389-90, 396-97.
2The design of ships7 hulls and machinery was based on
experience and rules of thumb. William Froude7s pioneering
work in model testing did not begin until 1870. New Ency
clopedia Britannica. 1988 ed., s.v. "Froude, William."

36
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within a week after signing the primary contract.3 The
Navy participated in the design, since Naval Constructor
Henry Hoover, the Chief Constructor at the Philadelphia Navy
Yard, prepared the details of laying the ship down.

His

specifications included some timbers that were only avail
able at the Navy Yard, and Bartol requested authority for
Cramp to buy them from the Government.4
Cramps' first challenge was scarcity of timber for the
hull.

Charles Cramp stated that when he contracted for the

ship, there was no white oak timber available outside of
Pennsylvania.

All the timber "was growing in the forests"

when the contract was signed.

The ship's frames were unusu

ally heavy and the large trees needed to make them were hard
to find.

In October 1861 Cramps advertised for timber, of

fering a dollar per running foot for suitable trees.

This

brought in enough heavy timber to construct the ship's
frame.5 Although haste and shortages dictated the use of
unseasoned timber, the ship's long-term future was mortgaged
since green timber decayed faster than seasoned wood.
3Bartol to Smith, no date, received October 19, 1861,
and marked "Private." NARG 71, Entry 5, Box 5, 2: 78.
4Ibid. Hoover's participation is confirmed in Bartol
to Smith, October 21, 1861, ibid., 2: 79. This does not
invalidate Cramp's claim to have designed the hull; Hoover
probably took Cramp's design and worked out details of what
piece of wood should go where.
5Curved pieces for the futtocks were also hard to
locate, and they were made primarily from roots from Dela
ware. Cramp, [Contemporary Club], 4.
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Smith chose two experienced officers to supervise the
construction.

On November 14, 1861, he appointed Hoover and

Chief Engineer William W. W. Wood as inspectors.

Wood was

to oversee the engineering plant and the armor while Hoover
dealt with the remainder.

Hoover was already at the Phila

delphia Navy Yard, and Wood reported for duty November 6.®
The Government made regular progress payments to Mer
rick & Sons.

Despite their solvency, Merrick & Sons' could

not finance the construction of the vessel from their own
resources.7 Progress payments (best considered as advances
against the final contract price) relieved the contractor of
much of the financial burden of constructing the ship.
The Government paid the Merricks every two weeks be
ginning in December 1862, and one of the inspectors' duties
was to certify that the contractor's bills were correct.
The usual increment for payment was $50,000, but the Govern
ment reserved 25 percent of each, or $12,500, in case the
sSmith to Hoover, November 14, 1861, NARG 45, Entry
464, Subject File, AD— Ironclads, Box 51, typescript, NWR,
2634: 92. Smith to Wood, ibid., 2634: 93. Smith requested
Wood in October. Smith to Welles, October 9, 1861, National
Archives, Record Group 45, Microfilm Entry M518, Letters
Received by the Secretary of the Navy from Navy Department
Bureaus, 1861, 3: 62; Wood to Smith, November 6, 1861, NARG
71, Entry 5, Box 445, 14.
7In April 1864 Merrick & Sons were worth $700,000. R.
G. Dun Collection, Pennsylvania 135: 320. The value of the
New Ironsides contract was thus more than the firm's entire
assets during roughly this period. Cramps' firm, with less
capital, needed its share of the progress payments passed on
from Merrick & Sons even more.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

39
vessel did not meet the contract specifications.8 This 25
percent reservation was normal practice for Government ship
and engine contracts and did not show unusual concern for
the success of the ironclads.
Merrick & Sons undoubtedly needed the money from the
progress payments.

When the Navy Agent in Philadelphia re

fused on a technicality to pay one draft, W. H. Merrick
wrote Smith, "Excuse me for thus troubling you but in thin
times money is a desireable [sic] article."9 Merrick &
Sons later claimed the Government's delay in making progress
payments delayed the ship's completion.10 Their claim is
believable considering the great increase in the price of
labor and materials brought about by the War.
Shipbuilders, like all other businessmen, were drama
tically affected by wartime inflation.

Charles Cramp,

commenting on its effects, said that when the contract was
made, wages for shipwrights were $1.75 per day, and in less
8For duties, Smith to Hoover, November 14, 1861, NARG
45, Entry 464, Subject File, AD— Ironclads, Box 51, type
script, NWR, 2634: 92. Smith to Wood, ibid., 2634: 93. For
contract provisions, National Archives, Record Group 71,
Entry 48, Contract Ledger for Iron Clads 1861-62, 11-12;
NARG 71, Entry 42, 269.
9W. H. Merrick to Smith, January 6, 1862, NARG 71,
Entry 5, Box 447, 3: 8.
10Smith's endorsement on Merrick & Sons to Welles, No
vember 13, 1862: "The Contractors aver that the Govm't did
not pay them as provided in the Contract and therefore they
were delayed in the work." Ibid., Box 448, 2: 159. Late
payments by the Treasury retarded the Monitor. Baxter,
Ironclad Warship. 267.
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than two months they rose to $3.00 per day.

He ordered all

the copper sheathing and bolts the day after signing the
contract at 29 cents per pound; in four months copper was up
to 60 cents per pound.

Materials in general, he said, rose

from 50 to 100 percent before the ship was finished.11
Another of Cramp's problems was hiring enough skilled
labor.

As Charles Cramp later stated, "Nearly all the

skilled workmen and ship-wrights here had gone into the Navy
Yard. . . . "

Many ship carpenters and other men came from

Baltimore and Maine.12
The iron armor was forged by two Pennsylvania firms,
half by Bailey, Brown & Co. of Pittsburgh and half by the
Bristol Forge Co., of Bristol.13 Bailey, Brown had been
doing business since at least 1846, and R. G. Dun rated them
as a "safe good house" with very good credit.14
During this period, large iron plates could be
uCharles H. Cramp, quoted in Buell, Cramp. 69.
“Cramp, [Contemporary Club], 5. Cramp asserts many
men "left their home to avoid conscription and to secure the
high rates of wages paid here." Since the draft had not yet
begun, he apparently confused this with a later period.
“ [Merrick], "New Ironsides," 79.
14R. G. Dun Collection, Pennsylvania 5: 90. John H.
Brown of Bailey, Brown wrote to John Covode, a Pennsylvania
Republican Congressman, that despite New Ironsides they were
not invited to bid on plates for Roanoke. He complained,
"Pennsy* is nowhere, and New York gets the work at an extra
vagant figure." Brown to Covode, May 17, 1862, in National
Archives, Record Group 19, Entry 71, Miscellaneous Letters
Received by the Chief of the Bureau of Construction and
Repair, 2: 183.
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produced either by rolling or by forging (hammering). In
each method, the starting point was a red hot stack of iron
about twice the desired thickness.

The stack was pressure-

welded by rollers or a hammer into a single mass and simul
taneously compressed to the finished thickness.15 The two
processes produced a similar product but had different ad
vantages.

Forging was slow, manpower intensive and expen

sive, but at the time could produce a thicker and larger
plate.16 Rolling was faster and cheaper and if properly
done made a more uniform plate, though it required several
trips through the rollers to reduce the thickness gradually.
Existing rolling machinery was limited.

First, wide

plates required long rollers, which had a tendency to
"spring" or separate in the middle.

The resulting plates

were uneven, thicker in the middle than at the sides.17
Second, the wider and thicker the desired plate, the greater
the total force required from the machine and the more
15Very, "Development of Armor," 560-66. For a de
scription of forging and iron-clad construction, A. H.
Guernsey, "Iron-Clad Vessels," Harper's New Monthly Magazine
25, no. 148 (September 1862): 433-46.
16Isherwood and Lenthall to Welles, March 17, 1862,
discusses plates. National Archives, Record Group 19, Entry
49, Letters Sent by the Chief of the Bureau of Construction
and Repair to the Secretary of the Navy, Book 0144, 377; re
printed in U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on the Conduct of
the War, Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the
War. "Light Draught Monitors," 38th Cong., 2d Sess., 1865,
110- 12 .

17Testimony of Chief Engineer Eben Hoyt before the
Joint Committee, ibid., 34.
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expensive and specialized it had to be.

Since "such masses

of rolled iron are not used in private business," machinery
to roll solid four-inch plates was practically nonexistent
in the United States.18 Charles Cramp stated that the
plates for the New Ironsides, "which could now [1897] be
rolled in many mills and be considered light work, were then
looked upon as marvels of heavy forging."19 Accordingly,
the plates for which Merrick contracted were forged.

Once

hammered to the correct thickness, the plates were straight
ened and their sides and ends planed and slotted.20
New Ironsides' solid plates contrasted with the
laminated armor used by Ericsson in his Monitor design.
There were two reasons for Ericsson's choice of laminated
armor.

First, he could obtain thin (one inch) plates more

rapidly than thick ones, and speed of construction was a
18Isherwood and Lenthall to Welles, March 17, 1862.
NARG 19, Entry 49, Book 0144, 377. Several letters attest
to interest in heavy rolled plating: Smith to A.S. Winslow,
March 27, 1862, NARG 45, Entry 464, Subject File, AD— Iron
clads, Box 51, typescript, NWR, 2634: 239; Smith to C.W.
Whitney, December 6, 1861, ibid., 2634: 124; Brown & Co. to
Welles, June 6, 1862, National Archives, Record Group 45,
Microfilm Entry M124, Miscellaneous Letters Received by the
Secretary of the Navy, Roll 409: 112.
19Cramp, [Contemporary Club], 9.
20Very, "Development of Armor," 562. For tools used,
James Fletcher, "On Improvements in Heavy Tools for General
Engineering and Iron Ship-building Work," Journal of the
Franklin Institute 3d ser. 51, no. 2 (January-July 1866):
100-110 .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

43
vital factor in the acceptance of his design.21 Second,
the turret design called for plates bent inan arc, and no
means for bending thick plates were then available.22
At this date there was still some small doubt linger
ing about the relative effectiveness of laminated and solid
plating.

The minority held that laminated plates would be

more resistant to shot than solid ones.

Chief Engineer

Alban C. Stimers wrote in his 1863 report of the first at
tack on Charleston, South Carolina, that although the lami
nated plates of the monitors "impressed the nonprofessional
observer with the idea of great injury," their "power to
resist shot has not been greatly reduced."

Notwithstanding

that the solid plates of the New Ironsides appeared less
damaged, "the unprejudiced engineer" would perceive that
laminated plates were more effective.23
Stimers, as the engineer in charge ofmonitor
construction, was hardly unprejudiced.

War experienceand

further experimentation proved repeatedly that thick solid
21Ericsson wrote Smith on October 8, 1861, saying the
only contractor who replied positively to his request for
four inch thick plates required two months preparations.
"The i inch plate I can have at once . . . at the rate of
140 tons per week." NARG 71, Entry 5, Box 447, 2: 50.
22Isherwood and Lenthall to Welles, March 17, 1862.
NARG 19, Entry 49, Book 0144, 377. Similarly, Roanoke's
turrets were laminated even though the hull armor was solid.
Guernsey, "Iron-Clad Vessels," 440. New Ironsides7 round
pilot house was also laminated.
23Report of Chief Engineer Stimers, April 14, 1863,
ORN 14: 42.
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plates were indeed more resistant and that Stimers was
engaging in political engineering.24
Experimental confirmation of the superiority of solid
plates may not have been known in the U.S. when Monitor and
New Ironsides were designed in 1861, although it was widely
available by February 1862.

In an article reprinted then in

the Journal of the Franklin Institute. John Brown, a noted
iron maker from Sheffield, stated that English experience
and trials favored solid plates.25 In March 1861, in dis
cussion at the Royal Institution of Naval Architects, J. D.
A. Samuda, a prominent builder of iron ships, stated, "You
could resist more effectually with a solid plate than you
could do with the same weight placed in layers."26
24Very said Stimers showed "absolute blindness to any
and all imperfections of the monitor . . . as early as 1854
it had been definitely established that laminated armor only
possessed two thirds the resisting power of solid plates of
the same thickness." Very, "Development of Armor," 399.
25John Brown, "On the Manufacture of Steel Rails and
Armor Plates" from Newton7s London Journal. February 1862,
reprinted in Journal of the Franklin Institute 3d ser. 43,
no. 2 (January-June 1862): 255.
26 J. D. A. Samuda, discussing Russell's "Iron-Cased
Vessels," Transactions INA 2 (1861): 87. In his example,
comparing two three-inch plates with one six-inch plate, the
resistance of the two would be (32 + 32) = 9 + 9 = 18 and of
the one 62 = 36, making the two half as effective as the
one. For wrought iron the correct equation for effective
thickness can be simplified to T = (tj2 + t22 ... + tn2)1/2,
where T is the effective thickness and t2 through tn are the
actual thicknesses of the component plates. The ratio of
the resistance of two three-inch plates to the six-inch
plate would actually be 181/2 to 361/2, or 4.24 to 6.0, making
the two plates 70% as effective as the one. Nathan Okun,
"Armor and its Application to Warships," Warship Interna
tional 15, no. 4 (1978): 284-85.
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In an 1862 discussion at the Institution, Sir John C.
Dalrymple Hay, Chairman of the Iron Plate Committee of
Parliament, stated,
The resisting power shewn by the
nearly measured by the square of
inches; that is to say, assuming
a resisting power of 4, a 4-inch
16. . . .27

iron will be very
the thickness in
a 2-inch plate has
plate is equal to

Later, in an 1863 discussion at the Royal United Service
Institution, it was noted that,
When a mass of iron is produced by overlaying plates
one upon the other, you lose in the mass the cohe
sive strength which iron has when it is in one
thickness.28
While the question of hammered or rolled plates was
still open, Hay said the Iron Plate Committee found almost
no difference between them, and rolled plates "if equally
well done" were equal to hammered plates.29
As might be expected with so novel a ship, New Iron
sides ' design continued to change during her construction.
The rigging was at issue in December 1861, but a three
27John C. Dalrymple Hay, March 27, 1862, discussing
John Ford's paper, "On the Manufacture of Armour Plates,"
March 27, 1862, Transactions INA 3 (1862): 153. (The paper
was reprinted in the Mechanics' Magazine in April 1862 and
again in the Journal of the Franklin Institute 3d. ser. 44
(July-December 1862): 39.)
28A Mr. Clarke, discussing Jasper H. Selwyn's "On the
Future of Naval Attack and Defence," February 16, 1863,
Journal of the Royal United Service Institute (hereafter
Journal RUSH 7, no. 26 (1863): 49.
29John C. D. Hay, March 27, 1862, discussing Ford's
"Armour Plates," Transactions INA 3 (1862): 153.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

46
masted bark rig was chosen.30 The battery was in flux as
late as April 15, 1862, when Smith wrote to Commander John
A. Dahlgren, then Commandant of the Washington Navy Yard, "I
have deck plans of 'Ironsides,' also plans of shutting
ports.

Come up & see them & see how many XI inch guns she

can fight."31 As a result, fourteen Xl-inch Dahlgren
smoothbores and two 150-pounder Parrot rifles replaced the
sixteen IX-inch Dahlgrens then planned for the ship.32
The battery was again changed in July 1862, when the
two 150-pounder Parrott rifles were moved from the spar deck
to the gun deck.33 In addition to the guns, the ship's
weapons included an iron ram on the prow.
The increased battery caused a large increase in the
size of the crew, which grew to almost 400.

Cramp's concep

tual design for the ship included a battery of VUI-inch
30Smith to B. H. Bartol, December 3, 1861, NARG 45,
Entry 464, Subject File, AD— Ironclads, typescript, NWR,
2634: 114. For rigging plan, NARG 19, Plan 107-9-12L (Fig
ure 1).
31Smith to Dahlgren, April 15, 1862, NARG 45, Entry
464, Subject File, AD — Design, Box 48. Dahlgren became
Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance on July 18, 1862, and was
promoted Captain on August 5, 1862. David K. Allison, "John
A. Dahlgren: Innovator in Uniform," in Captains of the Old
Steam Naw: Makers of the American Naval Tradition 18401880. ed. James C. Bradford (Annapolis: United States Naval
Institute Press, 1986), 36-37.
32For armament listing, National Archives, National
Archives, Record Group 74, Records of the Bureau of Ord
nance, Entry 121, Reports of Armaments on Vessels, 1: 80.
33Dahlgren to Turner, July 24, 1862. National Ar
chives, Record Group 74, Entry 2, Letters and Telegrams Sent
to Naval Officers, Box 2, 3: 116.
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shell guns.

The VUI-inch was allowed 1\ men per gun, re

sulting in a total crew of 120 for the guns and 41 more for
the powder division (to carry powder and shell and help the
surgeon by carrying wounded), for a total crew of 161 exclu
sive of engineers.

The revised design, carrying IX-inch

Dahlgrens, required gun crews totaling 136 men and 46 men
for the powder division, for a crew of 182 not counting
engineers.

The Xl-inch battery required 200 men for gun

crews, plus 22 to handle the fifty-pounder Dahlgren rifles
added on the spar deck and 75 more in the powder division,
totalling 297 exclusive of engineers.34
Other major additions to the original design included
armored shutters to cover the gun ports, armored bulkheads
to protect the ends of the battery, and an armored pilot
house.35 The port shutters, four inches thick, pivoted at
their tops on axles penetrating the ship's sides.

Ten men

worked each shutter, but since the shutters were operated
from within the battery the crews were well-protected.36
34The allowance for the Xl-inch Dahlgren and 150pounder Parrott used on the broadside was 12.5 men per gun.
The IX-inch was allowed 8.5 men per gun. Ordnance Instruc
tions . Appendix A, iii, vi.
35Merrick & Sons to Smith, August 7, 1862: "The fol
lowing work additional to contract is now progressing
rapidly, viz., Gun carriages, Port shutters, Iron bulk
heads. . . . " NARG 71, Entry 5, Box 448: 105. Edward Shippen, "Fort Fisher - December, 1864, and January, 1865,"
United Service Magazine, n.s., 2 (July 1889): 11; also Bel
knap, "Reminiscent of the 'New Ironsides'," 63-64.
36Captain Thomas Turner to Smith, April 2, 1863, NARG
71, Entry 5, Box 449, 2: 7.
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The original design provided no defense against shot
that might enter the unarmored wooden bow or stern and pass
lengthwise through the ship, an effect known as "raking."
To prevent it, Merrick & Sons designed armored bulkheads to
protect the battery, which Bartol proposed to Smith on
January 9, 1862.

The bulkheads would run across each end of

the battery, on the gun deck and the berth deck below.

Each

was of twelve inch oak covered with 2h inches of iron.37
On January 16, Smith wrote back that he had considered
the proposal, but expressed concern about the effect of the
bulkhead on the working of the anchor cables and a bow
gun.38 His letter crossed one from Bartol that gave an es
timate of the added weight and enclosed a drawing.

This

letter was sent to the Bureau of Construction, Equipment and
Repair for comment and was returned with the note, "The dis
advantages viz. weight above water and obstruction on deck
are greater than any advantage we can perceive."

On the

strength of this, Smith noted on January 18, "Concluded not
to put in the bulkhead."39
Fortunately for the Navy, Merrick & Sons did not drop
37Merrick & Sons to Smith, January 8, 1862, ibid., Box
447, 3: 17.
38Smith to Merrick & Sons, January 16, 1862, NARG 45,
Entry 464, Subject File, AD— Ironclads, Box 51, typescript,
NWR, 2634: 157. No bow gun was ever installed.
39Bartol to Smith, January 16, 1862, with annotations,
NARG 71, Entry 5, Box 447, 3: 32. Smith notified Merrick &
Sons on January 18, 1862.
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the matter.

On February 13, 1862, Smith wrote to Merrick

and Sons that he would accept the bulkheads as long as they
did not affect the other characteristics of the ship.

He

was especially worried about her speed, saying, "I do not
mean to let up a hair on the speed of the vessel. . . ."40
Bartol replied on February 14 that
we think the bulkheads absolutely essential between
the spar and gun deck because a raking shot might
disable several guns . . . an ironclad steamer is
expected to be proof against an accident of this
kind.41
Smith, still concerned about increased weight and draft,
approved bulkheads between the spar and gun decks only.42
The armored pilot house was added late in the
construction period.

The small circular structure extended

through the spar deck and was entered from the gun deck
level by a spiral staircase.43 It was placed on the cen
terline of the spar deck directly aft of the smokestack and
mainmast, probably because unarmored ships were normally
40Smith to Bartol, February 13, 1862, NARG 45, Entry
464, Subject File, AD— Design, typescript, NWR, 2634: 184.
41Bartol to Smith, February 14, 1862, NARG 71, Entry
5, Box 447, 3: 81.
42Smith to Merrick & Sons, February 15, 1862, NARG 45,
Entry 464, Subject File, AD— Ironclads, Box 51, typescript,
NWR, 2634: 185.
43The placement was not determined as late as April.
On April 4, 1862, Smith telegraphed Merrick & Sons, request
ing their proposal. Ibid., 2634: 257. For placement, NARG
19, Plan 107-9-12A. The "Look Out" had an inside diameter
of four feet and an outside diameter of five feet. Merrick
& Son to Lenthall, NARG 19, Entry 71, 4: 198.
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directed from that area.

In this decision the lack of

either precedent or sound ideas to guide the designer led to
a serious operational problem, since the smokestack drasti
cally reduced the conning officer's forward vision.
New Ironsides was usually steered from a wheel on the
spar deck but in action was steered from a wheel behind
armor on the berth deck.

A speaking tube apparently con

nected the conning officer in the pilot house with the
helmsman below.

Engine orders were passed by voice until

late August 1863 when the engine room bell pull was extended
to the spar deck level.
While design details were being resolved, construction
continued at Cramps' shipyard.
during the early stages.

There was little security

Charles Cramp wrote, "The war on

land . . . occupied the entire attention of the people, so
that the yard was left open; no fence around it and no visi
tors.” After the battle between Monitor and Virginia,
interest in ironclads rose and the number of visitors
soared.

"We had to build a high fence around the yard and

only admitted those who secured tickets issued by us."44
Under pressure of war New Ironsides' construction was
remarkably rapid for such a novel design, although she, like
Monitor, took longer to build than the contracted time.
44Cramp, [Contemporary Club], 7.
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Ironsides was launched on May 10, 1862.45 By June the
engines were on board and the armor was being installed.
The ship was drydocked on June 6 at the Philadelphia Navy
Yard to install her copper and propeller, and the urgency of
completing her was so great that the coppering was worked
day and night.46 By June 14, the propeller shafting was
installed, and Wood was optimistic enough of prompt comple
tion to request permission to enlist firemen for the ship.
The boilers and engines were tested under steam in July.47
By this time, New Ironsides' prospective Commanding
Officer had reported to the Navy Yard.

He was Captain

Thomas Turner, a naval officer of 37 years experience.

Born

December 23, 1808, in Washington, D.C., he entered the Navy
in 1825.

A veteran of combat against Malay pirates, he had

commanded several other ships, both sailing vessels and
45U.S. Navy Department, Naval History Division, Civil
War Naval Chronology (Washington: GPO, 1971), 11-62. Smith
was unable to attend. NARG 45, Entry 464, Subject File,
AD— Ironclads, Box 51, typescript, NWR, 2634: 282. The
ship's sponsor, Commodore Charles Stewart, launched her at
10:27 A.M. "Launch of the 'New Ironsides.'" Philadelphia
Daily Evening Bulletin. May 10, 1862: 1; Edith Wallace Benham and Anne Martin Hall, Ships of the United States Navy
and their Sponsors (Norwood, MA: Privately printed [Plimpton
Press], 1913), 121.
46Wood to Smith, June 7, 1862, NARG 71, Entry 5, Box
448, 1: 15. For coppering, Turner to Smith, April 2, 1863,
ibid., Box 449, 2: 7.
47For firemen, Wood to Smith, June 14, 1862, ibid.,
Box 448, 1: 25. Permission was granted. For testing, Wood
to Smith, July 12, 1862, ibid., 1: 68.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

52
steamers, before assuming command of Mew Ironsides.48
On August 2, 1862, Welles directed Dahlgren, by this
time Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, to rush production of
the ordnance equipment.49 In reply, Dahlgren told Welles
that the ship's iron gun carriages would be done by August
11.

Of the sixteen carriages, eight were made by Merrick &

Sons and eight by Cooper & Company of Trenton, New Jer
sey.50 Dahlgren visited New Ironsides in Philadelphia on
July 29, and on July 31 visited Cooper in Trenton.51
The ship's guns were probably received on board in
early August.

Most were prewar pieces; eight of the four

teen Xl-inch Dahlgrens were cast in 1856, two in 1860, and
four in 1862.
ry.

All except one were made at West Point Found

The two 150-pounder Parrotts were cast in 1862 by the

Parrott firm.52
48Turner commanded the South Pacific squadron from
1868 to 1870. He died on March 24, 1883. Appleton's Cyclo
paedia . s.v. "Turner, Thomas.”
49Welles to Dahlgren, August 2, 1862, National Ar
chives, Record Group 74, Entry 16, Letters Received from the
Secretary of the Navy and Navy Department Bureaus, Box 4,
62.
50To meet the delivery date, Dahlgren had to send men
from the Washington Navy Yard to help Cooper. Dahlgren to
Welles, August 4, 1862. National Archives, Record Group 74,
Entry 1, Letters Sent to the Secretary of the Navy and Navy
Department Bureaus, Box 1, Book 3: 9.
“Madeleine Vinton Dahlgren, Memoir of John A. Dahlqren Rear Admiral United States N a w (Boston: James R. Os
good and Company, 1882), 377.
“NARG 74, Entry 121, 1: 80.
Ironsides.

May 4, 1863, U.S.S. New
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During the ship's construction, the Philadelphia Navy
Yard supplied some skilled labor to the contractors.53 The
Yard also furnished hemp and manila line and various iron
parts.

This labor and material, and the cost of drydocking

the ship in June, were deducted from the contract price.
Despite the urgency accompanying her construction, the
nine months specified in the contract stretched to ten by
the time New Ironsides was completed.

On August 7, 1862,

Merrick & Sons notified the Navy Department that construc
tion was complete.

There was still work to do on gun car

riages, port shutters and iron bulkheads, but these items,
Merrick & Sons' averred, were additional to the contract.
Smith disagreed: "The contract is not complete til the Bulk
heads are in. . . ."54
The originally calculated weights had by this time
increased considerably.

The heavier battery added 301 tons,

the armored bulkheads 110 tons, and the pilot house 16.5
tons.

Additional men and their "appendages" added 29 tons,

and increased fresh water storage another 51 tons.

Against

this there was a deduction of 40 tons for masts and rigging,
as the full sail rigging was discarded for pole masts.

The

53Among other tasks, Navy Yard carpenters installed
the ship's capstan. Merrick & Sons to Smith, January
13[14?], 1863, NARG 71, Entry 5, Box 449, 1: 36. It in
cludes a letter from Hoover to Merrick dated January 14.
54Merrick & Sons to Smith, August 7, 1862, with pencil
note in Smith's hand, ibid., Box 448, 1: 105.
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total was 495 tons beyond that initially estimated.55
Even with the additional weight, the ship drew between
fourteen and fifteen feet.

Bartol wrote Smith on August 14,

"To day she draws 14 ft.9 aft & 14 ft forward & as she has
immense capacity and they will not stop until she is full
they will get her to the 15 feet [emphasis added]."56 The
shallower draft was a mixed blessing, despite the original
Navy advertisement that called for the least possible draft.
In an unarmored seagoing ship, draft mattered for two
reasons.

First, shallower draft permitted the ship to navi

gate in shallower water.

Second, given a specific ship's

design, draft determined the height of the gun ports above
the water.

A ship with higher ports, all else being equal,

could work her guns better in rough weather.

For an iron

clad, draft was more significant, since the armor had to be
laid out around a nominal design draft.
The armor of the New Ironsides provided protection
below as well as above the design waterline.

This was

because the actual position of the water relative to the
armor was variable.

It depended not only upon the ship's

draft, but upon her heel, roll and pitch, and upon the ac
tion of the seas.

Given the established dimensions of the

55The full rigging was returned after the initial tri
als. Turner to Merrick & Sons, September 22, 1862, ibid.,
2: 79.
56Bartol to Smith, August 14, 1862, marked "Private."
Ibid., 2: 118.
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protection, too shallow a draft could have exposed the unar
mored hull below the armor to enemy fire when the ship
heeled before a wind or rolled in the seas.
The contract required New Ironsides' gun port sills to
be at least seven feet above water when the ship was ready
for sea.

This was within reason for a seagoing ship; the

port sills of the French Gloire were six feet six inches,
although those of the much larger British Warrior were nine
feet.57 Cramp designed the ship such that the port sills
were eight rather than seven feet above his nominal fourteen
foot waterline.

He later said,

Having in view the fact that all war-ships hereto
fore built— particularly steamships— exceeded their
calculated draught, I determined to avoid a similar
error . . . by allowing a foot for a margin.58
Yet he oriented the armor around the fourteen foot water
line.
When New Ironsides floated at her designed fourteen
foot draft, she exposed her rudder head to shot.59 This
shows that Cramp's original protective scheme, oriented
around the fourteen foot water line, was defective.

To

57Russell, "Iron-Cased Vessels," 24.
58NARG 71, Entry 42, 269; Cramp, [Contemporary Club],
6. Increasing the height of the gun ports by a foot in
creased the range of the guns by no more than 20 yards.
59When coal was removed to compensate for the weight
added during construction, the rudder head was out of the
water. See below, 71-72. C.S.S. Virginia also suffered
from inadequate immersion, the edges of her armor being only
six inches below the waterline when she fought the Monitor.
Still, Iron Afloat. 23.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

56
protect the rudder, the ship had to sit deeper in the water
than fourteen feet.

It made no difference whether the

weight added to achieve this was guns, men, armor, coal or
ballast; weight, not its composition, was the key.

The

increased weight of battery, bulkheads, and pilot house
saved Cramp the embarrassment of having to ballast the ship
to protect the rudder.
Cramp's margin did maintain the seven-foot height of
the port sills above the waterline after the "normal" load
draft was increased to fifteen feet to protect the rudder.
Fortunately, the ship still met the requirement for a fif
teen foot maximum draft after the rudder protection was
resolved.
Merricks officially delivered the ship to the Navy on
August 10, 1862, though shipyard work continued.60 The
pressure for departure was great and the situation confused,
and 53 crewmen deserted during the next week due to poor
living conditions on board.

Turner told Commodore Garrett

J. Pendergrast, Commandant of the Philadelphia Navy Yard,
that the crew should have remained in the receiving ship,
since they had no cooking facilities— the men had been put
on board "without the ordinary conveniences."

In a lament

familiar to naval officers, he complained, "I do not command
and cannot control the mechanics."

Although "the Gov't is

6QMerrick & Sons to Welles, November 13, 1862, en
dorsed by Smith and Welles, NARG 71, Entry 5, Box 448, 2:
159.
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exceedingly anxious to despatch this ship," he observed, "so
far from the departure of the ship being accelerated, it has
been retarded by the crew being on board."61
Turner wrote to Assistant Secretary Fox on August 16,
1862, saying,
I beg you to be assured that every effort is being
made in every Dept, to get the 'New Ironsides' off
as soon as possible. The utmost energy & activity
is employed by the Contractors— and every one
concerned to despatch her— as many men are employed
as can be worked to advantage.62
Turner expressed misgivings in the same letter, writing,
My only fear is that the extraordinary haste, may
cause things to be not so complete as I could wish.
The Commodore [Pendergrast] acting under the spur of
telegraphs & letters from the Dept is disposed to
push us off— before the finishing stroke can be
given to make her a complete success.63
The main armament was completed August 15, and New Ironsides
was commissioned on August 21, 1862.64 The seagoing iron
clad U.S. Navy had become a reality.
61New York Public Library, Captain Thomas Turner Let
ter Book (hereafter "NYPL, Turner Letter Book"), August 19,
1862.
“August 16, 1862, Thompson, Correspondence of Fox. 1:
356-57.
“ Ibid., 1: 356-57.
“For armament, Dahlgren to Welles, August 18, 1862,
NARG 74, Entry 1, Box 1: 9; Turner to Fox, August 16, 1862,
Thompson, Correspondence of Fox. 1: 356-57. For commission
ing, National Archives, Record Group 24, Records of the
Bureau of Personnel, Log of the U.S.S. New Ironsides. August
21, 1862.
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CHAPTER FOUR
TEETHING TROUBLES: A "HOT-HOUSE" SHIP

Every new ship displays her share of defects when she
leaves her builders' hands, and New Ironsides was no excep
tion.

In normal times, she would have a trial period for

her crew to become familiar with their ship and their du
ties.

Following this "shakedown" period, the ship would

return to the shipyard to correct the flaws the crew identi
fied.

A workup and trial period would be especially impor

tant to an ironclad ship, unorthodox and unfamiliar to her
officers and crew.
The summer of 1862 was not a normal time.

The New

Ironsides. like the Monitor, had no formal trial period or
shakedown cruise.

Unlike the Monitor, which had at least

been tested in New York Harbor, New Ironsides' very first
trip underway took her down the Delaware River enroute to
possible action.
New Ironsides was urgently wanted at Hampton Roads,
where Rear Admiral Louis M. Goldsborough began asking for
her in July 1862.

Her duty there was to counter the threat

58
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posed by Confederate ironclads up the James River.1 After
her commissioning on August 21, she started down the Dela
ware River to Hampton Roads on August 22, 1862, in what her
Commanding Officer called "unprecedented haste."2 On Au
gust 26 she anchored off Newport News.

On August 31, 1862,

after the flurry caused by the Richmond-based Confederate
ironclads had subsided, New Ironsides steamed back to Phila
delphia for post-trial repairs.

Although Goldsborough want

ed to keep the ship, Welles decided that the needed work
could better be done at Philadelphia than at Hampton Roads
and directed the ship's return there on August 29, 1862.3
During this first active service, New Ironsides dis
played several failings, some best described as the "teeth
ing troubles" expected in any new ship, and some less easily
corrected.

Most of the "teething troubles" were corrected

during her refit.

They included enlarging the galley and

hammock nettings, both too small for the enlarged crew, and
replacing the catheads, too drooping and not long enough to
lnI would urgently suggest that the Ironsides be sent
here as early as practicable. I have but little faith in
the Galena, and regard the Monitor as exceedingly overrat
ed. . . . " Goldsborough to Welles, July 8, 1862, ORN 7:
549; Goldsborough to Welles, July 13, 1862, ibid., 7: 569.
2Turner to Welles, August 27, 1862, in Report . . .
Armored Vessels. 30.
3NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. August 22-31, 1862.
ORN 7: 688-89. Goldsborough continued to request New Iron
sides . Goldsborough to Welles, September 12, 1862, ibid.,
8: 14. Welles wrote, "two or three times a week we are as
sured they are in sight. . . . " Welles, Diary, entry for
August 10, 1862, 1: 72.
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handle the anchors properly.4 The galley was the most sig
nificant of these difficulties.

As Turner wrote,

The galley was made for 160 men, the complement of
the ship originally intended. There are now four
hundred on board— none too many; consequently, my
crew are suffering in their meals, and are abso
lutely living on raw beef and pork. . . .5
The surgeon blamed the galley for sickness in the crew.6
The major deficiencies revealed were in her speed,
steering and gun carriages.

In speed, the ship failed by a

considerable margin to make her contract speed of 9% knots.
During the open ocean passage from Cape Henlopen, Delaware,
to Hampton Roads, she steamed an average of 5.7 knots for
ten hours.

The engines were not tested at maximum power

because of steering problems, which became worse at speeds
above 5.7 knots.7
4Turner to Welles, August 30 and October 5, 1862,
NYPL, Turner Letter Book. The full list is in Lenthall to
Pendergrast, September 4, 1862, National Archives, Record
Group 19, Entry 54, Letters Sent by the Bureau of Construc
tion and Repair to the Commandant of the Philadelphia Navy
Yard, 2: 196. Catheads were used to stow an old-fashioned
stocked anchor.
sTurner to Welles, August 27, 1862, quoted in
Report . . . Armored Vessels. 30.
6He also wrote, "Eating too much with abundant drink
ing of wine and ice water may account for the officers being
affected." National Archives, Record Group 52, Bureau of
Medicine and Surgery, Entry 22, Medical Records of Ships,
Medical Journal of the U.S.S. New Ironsides. August 26,
1862.
7Wood to Welles, August 27, 1862, published in
Report . . . Armored Vessels. 31. The steering is mentioned
in the report of trial made by Turner to Welles, August 27,
1862, ibid., 30, and in Wood's report, ibid., 31.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

61
On her return up the Delaware River, Turner claimed a
speed of ten knots for her.

He based this upon the ship

having covered an adjusted distance (allowing for the cur
rent) in an adjusted time (allowing for maneuvering).8 As
will be discussed later, his adjustments were incorrect; her
speed was much lower than ten knots.
The steering problem was that the ship could not be
controlled at high speed.

She required constant attention

and would veer off unexpectedly to starboard, at times so
badly that she had to slow or stop to regain her course.9
This was probably due to poor hydrodynamic design of the
hull, but at the time it was supposed to be the fault of the
rudder.10 The ship had a novel articulated rudder, consist
ing of a rudder hung with pintles and gudgeons to the stern
post with another rudder attached to the aft end of the
first and fitted with gearing to connect the two (Figure
8Turner to Merrick & Sons, September 22, 1862, NARG
71, Entry 5, Box 448, 2: 79. The highly complimentary let
ter was apparently forwarded to the Bureau by the firm.
9Turner to Smith, October 20, 1862, ibid., 2: 110.
10The hull was very blunt aft, giving a poor flow of
water into the screw and rudder. NARG 19, Plan 107-9-12M.
The rudder was directly aft of the centerline of the screw.
In modern practice, single screw ships of comparable dis
placement have finer lines, their screws and rudders are
below the plane of the ship's bottom rather than above it
and their rudders are offset for improved steering. R. S.
Crenshaw, Jr., Naval Shiphandlina. 4th ed. (Annapolis: Uni
ted States Naval Institute Press, 1975), 20-25.
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9).11 The outer rudder was moved by pendants.12
Smith and Turner initially thought the problem was due
to insufficient force on the tiller.

During the post-trial

repair period in Philadelphia, from September 3 to September
26, 1862, blocks were rigged to give a three to one mechani
cal advantage to the tiller ropes.
problem.

This did not correct the

Turner wrote,

The trouble is not that it [the
with difficulty, but when moved
cumstances . she will not answer
trary persists in going her own

tiller] is moved
under certain cir
it, but on the con
way.13

Smith proposed an "equipoised," or balanced, rudder to
correct the problem.

Figure 8 shows the articulated rudder

with a one-piece balanced rudder overlayed, but no change
was made to the ship during her commissioned service.14
There was a lesser steering problem with the lower
(secondary) wheel.

This wheel was placed on the berth deck

“Turner to Rear Admiral Samuel F. DuPont, February 6,
1863, ORN 13: 646-47. The rudder was a proprietary design,
sold by S. & G. Yerkes. NARG 19, Entry 71, Box 3, 1: 18.
“Based on Figure 9 and a letter, the inner rudder was
actuated by the tiller and the outer by pendants. Commodore
William Radford to Porter, January 1, 1865, National Ar
chives, Record Group 45, Entry 395, Subentry 87, Correspon
dence of Commodore William Radford. A description of a
similar "fish rudder" is in Henry Lumley, "On the Steering
of Ships," Transactions INA 5 (1864): 128-34 and plate.
“Turner to Smith, October 20, 1862, NARG 71, Entry 5,
Box 448, 2: 130.
“NARG 19, Plan 107-9-12F. On March 31, 1865, Len
thall told Commodore Isaac B. Hull, Commandant of the Phila
delphia Navy Yard that the rudder would be replaced with a
"balanced rudder of metal." NARG 19, Entry 54, 2: 302.
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Figure 9. U.S.S. New Ironsides Screw and Rudder Plan (BuShips Plan 107-9-12F.)
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so the ship could be steered from a protected place in ac
tion.

Turner called it "radically defective," but rerigging

the tiller ropes improved it.15
The gun carriage problem, potentially the most serious
of the three, was that the guns showed excessive recoil when
fired.

This risked injuring personnel and putting the bat

tery out of action by breaking the carriages or dismounting
the guns.

The carriages for New Ironsides7 guns were of a

new design (Figure 10), made of iron instead of wood.16
The gun itself rode in an upper cradle which slid on iron
rails.

The upper cradle had eccentric axles with small

wheels that lifted the cradle clear of the rails when en
gaged.

They were engaged to run out the gun easily and

released for firing, to increase the friction working
against the recoil.

The carriage, attached to a pintle in

the ship's side, pivoted at the outboard end.
Recognizing that the recoil of the Xl-inch gun would
be greater than the friction of the cradle on the slide
could dissipate, the designers included a compressor, or
friction clamp, on each side of the sliding cradle.

When

tightened, the compressors squeezed the iron rails of the
“Turner to Smith, October 20, 1862, NARG 71, Entry 5,
Box 448, 2: 110.
16A plan (Figure 10) shows detail and dimensions.
NARG 19, Plan 10-3-19. Monitor's Xl-inch Dahlgrens, also on
iron rails, had different mountings with more elaborate
compressors. Ernest W. Peterkin, Drawings of the U.S.S.
Monitor (Raleigh: North Carolina Department of Cultural
Resources, 1985), 525-27, 532-39, 543-53.
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Figure 10. Iron Carriage and Slide for New Ironsides7 Xl-inch Dahlgren guns. This
drawing, with two compressors on each side, shows the carriage as modified in
September 1862. (BuShips Plan 10-3-19, redrawn by William J. Jurens.)
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carriage to increase friction and dissipate recoil energy.
The compressors were the only means provided to control the
recoil.
Dahlgren advised Turner on August 19, 1862, that it
was "desirable to be assured of the proper working of the
armament of the 'Ironsides,' particularly because the guns
are mounted on Iron Carriages."17 Turner tested the guns
during the ship's first trip and observed excessive recoil.
In a telegram he called the results "quite unfavorable."18
Turner was extremely concerned about the gun car
riages.

He wrote Dahlgren that he hoped the Bureau would

correct the recoil but, "my only anxiety now is my battery."
He believed he had "escaped by the skin of my teeth— Had I
gone into action . . . I would have disgraced myself and the
noblest specimen of Naval Architecture— This Ship. . . . "
Turner blamed the "hot house system— forcing things
into existence before they could mature" and complained,
"Those iron clad steamers Warrior-Couronne &. had 18 months
to try and test things— two weeks is begrudged me . . . We
are again hurrying the ship off from here."19
17August 19, 1862, NARG 74, Entry 2, Box 1, 4: 26.
“Turner to Fox, telegram, August 23, 1862, NYPL,
Turner Letter Book.
19"It ought not to be tested here at this wharf— I
should know as the Captain of this ship before then that my
guns will stand the charges intended for them— and then I
should be held responsible for my management of them." In
this letter, he addressed Dahlgren as "my dear friend."
Turner to Dahlgren, September 10 [1862], Library of
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After the excessive recoil was observed on the trial
trip, the Bureau of Ordnance sought a remedy.

The first

proposal was to increase the friction of the compressors.
Tubes, three feet long, were provided to increase the lever
age and permit the gun crews to tighten the compressors more
than they could by hand.

This was unsatisfactory because it

slowed the rate of fire without sufficiently restraining the
recoil.20 Another solution, implemented simultaneously,
was to add a second compressor to each side of the carriage.
Along with the extra compressors, installed in Phila
delphia during the September 1862 refit, breechings were
specified.

New Ironsides left for Hampton Roads on Septem

ber 23, 1862, with the installation of breechings just be
ginning.21 Dahlgren, still concerned, directed Turner to
retest the guns with four compressors each.22 The recoil
was still not subdued, even with the extra force provided by
the extension tubes, and the compressors themselves could
Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of John A. B. Dahlgren
[hereafter "Dahlgren papers”], General Correspondence Sep
tember 1861-July 1863.
20Lieutenant Henry B. Robeson, Ordnance Officer, to
Turner, November 13, 1862. National Archives, Record Group
74, Entry 21, Letters Received from Inspectors of Ordnance,
Ironclads, Box 1, 1: 34. Turner to Dahlgren, November 14,
1862, ibid.
21Dahlgren to Welles, November 11, 1862, NARG 74, En
try 1, Box 1, 41.
22Dahlgren to Turner, October 10, 1862, calling a test
"of the utmost importance." NARG 74, Entry 2, Box 1, 4: 63.
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not stand the stresses imposed by increased leverage.23
These trials in early October resulted in two com
plaints from Captain Turner.

On October 17, Turner wrote

from Hampton Roads to the Bureau of Ordnance that the appa
ratus for controlling recoil was "utterly worthless" and the
ship could not go into action without a remedy.24
Turner also wrote to Rear Admiral Samuel P. Lee, Com
mander of the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, requesting
that Lee appoint a board of officers to examine the guns.
Turner claimed, "It would be impossible to carry this ship
through an action of more than three or four rounds without
tearing everything to pieces and disabling the guns."

He

blamed the Bureau: "My apprehensions as to the means adopted
by the Bureau to correct the excessive recoil of the gun,
that they would prove insufficient, are realized."25
Lee appointed the board of examination that Turner
requested, and it convened on October seventeenth.

The next

day, Turner wrote again to the Bureau, qualifying his re
marks to say the carriages, though not as bad as he asserted
the day before, were "sufficiently unsatisfactory as to
23Dahlgren to Fox, October 19, 1862, reported that the
recoil was still not sufficiently controlled. NARG 74,
Entry 1, Box 1, 3: 30; Turner to Dahlgren, November 14,
1862, NARG 74, Entry 21, Box 1, 1: 34.
24Turner to Dahlgren, October 17, 1862, NYPL, Turner
Letter Book.
“Turner to Lee, October 17, 1862, ORN 8: 136.
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raise grave doubts" about protracted action.26
Commenting on the board's report, Dahlgren noted that
after firing seven rounds from two guns, the board found the
recoil "only inconvenient, not dangerous."

He opined that

the breechings the board had suggested would fix the problem
and took exception to Turner's letter to Lee, noting that it
might "impose upon me a responsibility that is not due— I
allude to that where you express your 'apprehension as to
the means adopted by the Bureau. . . ,'"27
Dahlgren reminded Turner that he (Dahlgren) had en
tered the Bureau of Ordnance when the iron carriages were
nearly completed and had authorized the ordnance officer in
Philadelphia to do anything that Turner desired to correct
the problem.

Furthermore, the board appointed by Lee had

come to the same conclusions as the Bureau.

Dahlgren felt

the trouble began when iron carriages were adopted "without
that full experimental knowledge of their operation which
should have been required."28
In addition to the installation of breechings Dahlgren
recommended a change in the Xl-inch guns, from the "tulip"
26Turner to Dahlgren, October 18, 1862, NYPL, Turner
Letter Book.
27Dahlgren to Turner, October 21, 1862, NARG 74, Entry
2, Box 1, 4: 86.
28Ibid. Dahlgren to Welles, November 11, 1862: The
difficulty "has arisen from the use of Iron carriages before
it was fully known what the effect might be." NARG 74,
Entry 1, Box 1, 41.
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(flared) muzzle variant to the straight muzzle variety.

He

arranged for New Ironsides to come to the Washington Navy
Yard for the exchange, but when circumstances changed to
prevent this, he visited the ship on October 28, 1862.29
After watching the guns fire ten rounds, he concluded that
the guns should be exchanged even if New Ironsides could not
come to Washington.

He sent the guns downriver by ship, and

the first vessel with replacement guns arrived in Hampton
Roads on November 5, 1862.30
In a telegram on November 6, Dahlgren left the deci
sion to Turner.

Because of the threat of Confederate iron

clads, Turner decided not to replace the guns, saying, "The
Galena I think is not enough to help me if I am in any way
hampered . . . I don't wish to be caught napping."31
In the meantime, another carriage problem arose.

On

October 31, Turner wrote to Dahlgren that one gun had been
disabled because the rollers on the forward eccentrics
29Dahlgren recalled visiting on October 26 but the
ship's log shows the twenty-eighth. NARG 24, Log of New
Ironsides; Dahlgren, Memoir, 381; Telegram, Dahlgren to
Turner, October 26, 1862, NARG 74, Entry 2, Box 1, 4; 96.
30Dahlgren to Turner, October 30, 1862, ibid., 4; 97;
NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. November 5, 1862. Turner es
timated the exchange would take two or three weeks. Turner
to Dahlgren, November 6, 1862, NYPL, Turner Letter Book.
31Telegram, Dahlgren to Turner, November 6, 1862, NARG
74, Entry 2, Box 1, 4: 112; Dahlgren to Welles, November 11,
1862, NARG 74, Entry 1, Box 1, 41. NARG 24, Log of New
Ironsides. November 8, 1862. For his reasoning, Turner to
Fox, November 6, 1862, in Thompson, Correspondence of Fox.
2: 427-28. The guns were never changed.
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broke.

Dahlgren attributed the casualty to bad material in

the rollers and told Turner he would send new parts.

Turner

blamed recoil stress, but Dahlgren appears to have been
correct since the problem did not recur.32
New breeching bolts and stouter breechings were
installed in November 1862 as New Ironsides lay in Hampton
Roads.

Mechanics from the Washington Navy Yard worked seven

days a week to complete the job, and the guns were again
test fired on November 14 and 18.

On November 18, 1862,

Turner wrote to Dahlgren from Hampton Roads that a Mr. Wil
son, the ordnance supervisor from the Washington Navy Yard,
had developed a solution.

Wilson installed strips of ash

wood so the compressors bore upon the wood rather than upon
the iron carriage directly.

The effect was to increase the

friction markedly.33 On December 8 and 12, 1862, the bat
tery was fired successfully.34
32Robeson to Turner, October 31, 1862, as enclosure to
Turner to Dahlgren, October 31, 1862, NARG 74, Entry 21, Box
1, 1: 10, 11. Telegram, Dahlgren to Turner, November 2,
1862, NARG 74, Entry 2, Box 1, 4: 103. Turner to Dahlgren,
November 5, 1862, NYPL, Turner Letter Book.
33Turner to Dahlgren, November 18, 1862, NARG 74, En
try 21, Box 1, 1: 35. Coefficients of friction for cast
iron on cast iron vary from 0.11 (lubricated) to 0.4 (chemi
cally clean): for wood on iron from 0.2 to 0.6. Larger num
bers mean more friction. Robert C. Weast, ed., CRC Handbook
of Chemistry and Physics. 51st ed. (Cleveland, Ohio: Chemi
cal Rubber Company, 1970), F15-F16. The carriages must have
had some grease on them, so friction was at least doubled by
the wooden strips.
34Telegram, Turner to Dahlgren, November 20, 1862,
NARG 74, Entry 21, Box 1, 1: 36; NARG 24, Log of NewIron
sides. December 8 and 12, 1862.
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While the ship was correcting her problems and train
ing in Hampton Roads, the Navy Department and Merrick & Sons
were clearing up contractual loose ends.

The government

made the last progress payment on August 13, 1862, but
$195,000, or 25 percent of the contract price, was reserved
as surety for the ship's performance.35
The Government had ninety days from the date of deliv
ery to test the ship's ability to meet the contract require
ments.

If she did not meet the specifications, the Govern

ment could recover the money advanced to the contractor,
holding the ship as collateral until it was repaid.

The

government would then return the ship to the contractor.36
On September 27, 1862, the Government paid Merrick &
Sons

$34,322.06 "by bill of extras allowed byagreement."

This

apparentlycovered the addition of thearmored

bulk

heads but probably not the port shutters and pilot house.
On October 4, though the ninety-day period had not expired,
the Government paid Merrick & Sons $100,000 of the reserva
tion.37 There were, however, disagreements to resolve.
Chief among them were the "extras."

Smith wrote,

since "omissions in regard to fitments" were to be supplied
at the demand of the Navy Department, "the pilot house was
one omission, and the port shutters another, which should
3SNARG 71, Entry 48, 1: 11-12.
36NARG 71, Entry 42, 270.
37NARG 71, Entry 48, 1: 11-12.
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not be charged as extras."

It was, he said, "doing you a

favor to pay the $100,000 before the expiration of the time
specified."

Merrick & Sons replied that they were awaiting

the results of "further experiments with the vessel."38
On October 1, 1862, Smith directed Turner to report on
the ship's performance.

Smith reiterated his direction on

October 16.39 Turner replied that he would conduct a trial
if possible, but Lee was apprehensive of New Ironsides leav
ing her Newport News station.40
In the event, the speed trial could not be run as
Smith desired.

Since her builders blamed the ship's failure

to meet the contract speed requirement (9h knots) on the
weight added during construction, he had directed that the
coal on board New Ironsides, normally about 400 tons, be
reduced to under 100 tons to compensate for the added
weight.

Lightening the ship so much exposed the rudder to

shot.41 Combat readiness demanded that Turner keep enough
coal on board to maintain fighting draft, and this require
ment combined with Lee's prohibition on leaving station to
38Smith to Merrick & Sons, October 4, 1862, NARG 45,
NARG 45, Entry 464, Subject File, AD— Ironclads, Box 51,
typescript, NWR, 2634: 443. Merrick & Sons to Smith, Octo
ber 7, 1862, NARG 71, Entry 5, Box 448, 2: 110.
39Smith to Turner, October 1, 1862, NARG 45, Entry
464, Subject File, AD— Ironclads, Box 51, typescript, NWR,
2634: 431; Smith to Turner, October 16, 1862, ibid., 458.
40Turner to Smith, October 20, 1862, enclosing Lee to
Turner, October 18, 1862, NARG 71, Entry 5, Box 448, 2: 130.
41Turner to Smith, November 11, 1862, ibid., 2: 157.
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keep Turner from running the trial.42
The results of lightening the ship confirm that
Cramp's original protective scheme was defective.

Had the

original IX-inch battery not been increased to Xl-inch, some
300 tons of non-productive ballast would have been needed to
submerge the rudder head.
On November 13, Merrick & Sons wrote to Welles, re
questing the remaining reservation of $95,000.

In his en

dorsement, Smith noted that the ship was "highly spoken of
except in speed in which she has failed to comply."43
Merrick & Sons had received $585,000 in progress pay
ments, $34,322.06 on September 27, 1862, for agreed upon
extras, and $100,000 on October 1, 1862, as an advance on
the reservation.

Without deducting the contractual penalty

of $500 per day for delayed delivery, the Navy thus owed
Merrick & Sons $95,000, the reservation remaining, minus
$1,280.73 to cover the work done for them by the
42The results of a light-ship trial would probably not
have differed much from the full-load trial enroute to Hamp
ton Roads in August. A ship's top speed is achieved when
resistance equals propulsive power. A major factor is wavemaking resistance, which varies with hull form, and a minor
one is frictional resistance, which varies with area of
wetted curface. Removing weight would change the effective
hull form and decrease the wetted surface slightly, but with
her bluff lines it would certainly not have given the addi
tional three knots to fulfill the contract. Thomas C. Gillmer, Modern Ship Design. 2d ed. (Annapolis: United States
Naval Institute Press, 1975), 97-98, 100-110. Also Smith to
Merrick & Sons, October 4, 1862, NARG 45, Subject File, AD—
Ironclads, Box 51, typescript, NWR, 2634: 443.
43Merrick & Sons to Welles, November 13, 1862, with
endorsements, NARG 71, Entry 5, Box 448, 2: 159.
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Philadelphia Navy Yard, making the total due $93,719.27.44
The Government could hardly give up a powerful and
perfectly serviceable ironclad just because she was three
knots too slow.

Welles implicitly acknowledged this when,

on November 24, he favorably endorsed Merrick & Sons'
request: "Admiral Smith will make a requisition on the De
partment to pay the balance [on] the 'Ironsides.'"45
44Merrick & Sons claimed the Navy Yard had double
billed them and asked for $544.77 more. Smith declined,
noting that Merricks' still owed the Yard for drydocking.
"The Secv was very liberal to the Contractors with settle
ment." Endorsement on Merrick & Sons' letter of January
13[14], 1863, ibid., Box 449, 1: 36. The ledger shows only
the one correct charge from the yard, for $1280.73 on Octo
ber 21, 1862. NARG 71, Entry 48, 1: 11-12. Given that the
$500 per day penalty was not enforced and the ship did not
make her contract speed, settlement was very liberal indeed.
45Merrick & Sons to Welles, November 13, 1862, with
endorsements by Smith and Welles, NARG 71, Entry 5, Box 448,
2: 159. From the Contract Ledger, the price was $813,041.33
(exclusive of armament). ORN gives a total of $865,514.66,
which probably includes work done on the Bureau of Ordnance
account. ORN. ser. 2, 1: 159.
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Figure 11. New Ironsides with her masts and rigging.
(Carte de Visite photograph by B. F. Cooper, Philadelphia.
Courtesy of the U.S. Marine Corps Historical Center, Person
al Papers Section, Collection of Henry Clay Cochrane. U.S.
Naval Historical Center Photograph.)
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CHAPTER FIVE
EARLY EXPERIENCE: CLEARING FOR ACTION

Her initial refit period behind her, New Ironsides
joined the fleet in Hampton Roads in September 1862.

From

then until she left for Port Royal, South Carolina, in Janu
ary 1863, her crew of 461 officers and men gained experience
while they guarded Hampton Roads.1
Her arrival in Hampton Roads was not unremarked by
naval officers.

Captain John Rodgers, a respected officer

then commanding the ironclad Galena, wrote that New Iron
sides was a "magnificent vessel— with the appearance of
great strength— indeed of invulnerability to any ordinary
artillery while her battery is most formidable— I know of no
vessel which can pretend to cope with her."2 About Turner
:The first available muster roll for New Ironsides is
dated September 23, 1862. The crew included 50 petty offi
cers, 51 seamen, 43 ordinary seamen, 187 landsmen and boys,
25 firemen, 24 coal heavers and 49 Marines, for a total of
429. There were 32 officers. National Archives, Record
Group 24, Entry 138, Civil War Muster Rolls of USS New Iron
sides.
2John Rodgers to his wife Ann, September 28, 1862,
quoted in Robert Erwin Johnson, Rear Admiral John Rodgers
1812-1882 (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute Press,
1967), 220. Rodgers left Galena in November 1862 for the
monitor Weehawken, then under construction.
77
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he was less complimentary: "Turner will fight his vessel
gallantly.

I do not think he has thought much about fight

ing her at all. . . ."3
While in Hampton Roads, New Ironsides lay at anchor
with steam up and fires banked.

At first the engineers

maintained steam in all four boilers for maximum readiness,
but in mid-November 1862 they were permitted to secure one
boiler at a time for maintenance.

The ship remained on

three boilers until January 11, 1863, when she departed for
Port Royal, the U.S. Navy's base near Hilton Head, about
sixty miles south of Charleston.4 Arriving there on Janu
ary 18, she prepared to join the ironclad fleet in an attack
on Charleston under the commander of the South Atlantic
Blockading Squadron, Rear Admiral Samuel F. DuPont.
Samuel Francis DuPont was born at Bergen Point, New
Jersey, on September 27, 1803.

He was appointed a midship

man in the Navy in 1815 and his service included combat in
the Mexican War.

Appointed Flag Officer in September 1861,

in his first Civil War service he seized Port Royal from the
Confederates.

He was promoted to Rear Admiral in July

1862.5 From a patrician family, DuPont thought much of his
3John Rodgers to Ann, September 29, 1862, quoted in
ibid., 220.
4NARG 19, Entry 1072, Steam Log of New Ironsides,
various dates.
5DuPont died in retirement on June 23, 1865.
s.v. "DuPont, Samuel Francis."

DAB,
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reputation.

At first he looked at the attack on Charleston

as a chance to gain more laurels, but he gradually concluded
that the risks of failure outweighed the possible gains.
New Ironsides had two major jobs to do at Port Royal.
The first was to remove her masts and replace them with thin
poles suitable for signalling but not for carrying sail
(Figure 12).
1863.®

This was done between January 29 and 31,

The second was to cut down the stack so it did not

block the view from the pilot house.
The pilot house was located directly abaft the stack.
Since the stack was eight feet in diameter and the pilot
house only four, it was impossible to see straight ahead
from the pilot house.7 DuPont called attention to the lack
of "sufficient scope of vision to steer the ship in a devi
ous channel" when he inspected the ship in October 1862.8
He wanted the pilot house moved forward, but instead the
stack was cut down.

On November 7, Fox informed DuPont,

The smoke pipe is fitted to take entirely off even
with the rail, and the eyelet holes of the pilot
house are enlarged, which will give more sweep
SNARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. 29-31 January, 1863.
7NARG 19, Plan 107-9-12A, 107-9-12E; Figure 3.
8DuPont to Mrs. Sophie M. DuPont, October 20, 1862,
John D. Hayes, ed., Samuel Francis DuPont: A Selection from
his Civil War Letters (Ithaca, NY: Columbia University Press
for The Eleutherian Mills Historical Library, 1969), vol. 2,
The Blockade; 1861-1862. 250. He wrote that Turner told
Bartol about the problem but nothing was done. DuPont to
Benjamin Gerhard, January 30, 1863, ibid., 2: 395.
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Figure 12. U.S.S. New Ironsides under bare poles.
Charles Peery, used by permission.)

(From the collection of Dr.

81
especially with everything off even with the deck.9

The job was to be done in Hampton Roads, but under the cir
cumstances there the ship could not shut down her boilers to
permit it.10 It was deferred until she reached Port Royal.
On January 26, 1863, the stack was cut down to four
feet, and New Ironsides took a trial trip around the harbor
the next day.11 The experiment was unsuccessful.

Stack

gas nearly suffocated men in the pilot house and on the gun
deck, and the lack of draft to carry away smoke and hot
gases made it almost impossible to open the furnace doors to
feed the boiler fires.12 The stack was reinstalled and
moving the pilot house (called the "turret," though it did
not revolve) was investigated.

Since it weighed eighteen

tons, it could not be moved with the means available.13
DuPont wrote,
One would suppose that where you could not feel your
way, by using a lead and line to ascertain the
soundings, that at least an opportunity to see to
9F o x

to DuPont, November 7, 1862, ibid., 2: 279.

10Turner to Welles, November 30, 1862, NYPL, Turner
Letter Book.
“For trial, NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. January
26-27, 1863.
“Turner to Dupont, January 29, 1863, ORN 13: 550-51.
“DuPont to Welles, January 28(?], 1863, ibid., 13:
543-44.
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advantage would have been provided.14
He said, "We will have to 'go it blind.'. . .

If we don't

run ashore going in, it will be because God is with us."15
While New Ironsides was at Port Royal, the Confederate
ironclads Chicora and Palmetto State attacked the Federal
blockading ships off Charleston.

The two Confederate ves

sels were very similar, each being about 150 feet long,
thirty-five feet in beam and twelve feet in draft.

Palmetto

State carried two seven-inch rifles and two IX-inch smooth
bores while Chicora carried four 32-pounder rifles and two
IX-inch smoothbores.

Each carried two two-inch layers of

iron plate on her casemate sides, with a single layer of
two-inch iron at bow and stern.16 The Confederates knew
that New Ironsides was in Port Royal, so the timing of their
raid may have been connected with her imminent arrival at
Charleston.

William H. Parker, Executive Officer of the

Palmetto State, mentioned only that plans were afoot
throughout January to attack the blockaders.17
14DuPont to Mrs. DuPont, January 28, 1863, Hayes, Du
Pont Letters 2: 389. The ram and the extreme tumble-home
precluded the use of a lead from the eyes of the ship; it
had to be heaved from a gun port farther aft. Turner to Du
Pont, April 10, 1863, ORN 14: 25.
“DuPont to Gerhard, January 30, 1863, Hayes, DuPont
Letters 2: 395.
16Still, Iron Afloat. 81-82, 97; Civil War Naval Chro
nology. VI-211-12, VI-279.
17William Harwar Parker, Recollections of a Naval Of
ficer 1841-1865 (New York: Scribner, 1883; reprinted Anna
polis: United States Naval Institute Press, 1985), 314; J.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

83
The Confederate ships got underway the night of Jan
uary 30, 1863, and crossed Charleston Bar soon after 4:00
A.M. on January 31.

In the ensuing action, Palmetto State

rammed the Federal steamer Mercedita, which surrendered, and
Chicora engaged Keystone State, which also yielded.

The

other Federal ships withdrew but both Mercedita and Keystone
State escaped from the Confederates.18 General Pierre G.
T. Beauregard, in charge of the defenses of Charleston, im
mediately proclaimed that the blockade had been broken.19
Beauregard was trying to use the law of blockade to
the Confederacy's advantage.

Specifically,

To make a blockade legal, the primary require
ment is that it be effective. . . . ships had to
hover close enough to the blockaded port or coast to
be able to sight and capture blockade-runners day or
night— the traditional 'close-in' blockade.20
If the blockade were broken by being made ineffective, the
Union would have to issue new notices of blockade to
Thomas Scharf, History of the Confederate States Navv from
Its Organization to the Surrender of Its Last Vessel (New
York: Fairfax Press, 1977; reprint of 1887 edition), 674-75.
18There was some dispute over the incident, which the
Confederates considered a "faithless act." Commander J. R.
Tucker, commanding C.S.S. Chicora. to Flag Officer Duncan L.
Ingraham, January 31, 1863, ORN 13: 619-20.
19Letters from Beauregard and from the Confederate
Secretary of State to foreign consuls are in ibid., 620-21.
Parker considered the proclamation ill-advised: "I looked
upon it as all bosh." Parker, Recollections. 320, 323.
Also Scharf, Confederate States N a w . 683-85.
20Burdick H. Brittin, International Law for Seagoing
Officers. 5th ed. (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute
Press, 1986), 272.
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reimpose it.

The waiting period of legal ineffectiveness

would be a godsend to blockade runners.
Beauregard had foreign consuls taken on a tour of the
lower harbor to show them that the blockading forces were
nowhere to be seen.

The British consul and others stated

the next day that they saw none of the blockading fleet; the
Federals denied their claim.

Beauregard's efforts were

unavailing; the Federals resumed their stations the after
noon of the raid and the blockade continued as before.21
New Ironsides hastily departed Port Royal on February
1, 1863, as a result of the Confederate raid.22 DuPont or
dered Turner to "prevent the rebel ironclads from again
attacking the blockading fleet."23 In a conference on
January 31, Turner objected strenuously to lying outside the
Charleston bar.

He claimed New Ironsides was unwieldy and

would be blown ashore in a gale, that she needed her masts
“Certificate of commanding officers of United States
vessels regarding the condition of the blockade, January 31,
ORN 13: 605-607; Anderson, By Sea and By River. 160-61.
Welles said the reports were "made up for the European mar
ket by the foreign consuls who are Rebel agents." Welles,
Diary, entry for February 4, 1863, 1: 232-33.
“George E. Belknap recalled New Ironsides arrived at
Port Royal after the raid. His recollection was incorrect.
George E. Belknap, "Address Before the Contemporary Club of
Philadelphia, Dec. 14, 1897," Papers of Rear Admiral George
E. Belknap, Box 2, 9 (hereafter "Belknap, [Contemporary
Club]").
“DuPont to Turner, January 31, 1863, Hayes, DuPont
Letters 2: 399.
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and sails, and that her anchor chains were untrustworthy.24
DuPont told him to go anyway, saying he understood the great
distinction between New Ironsides and the monitors lay in
New Ironsides "being able to keep the sea."25
The next morning, February 1, DuPont received a letter
from Turner officially stating his objections to outside
blockade service.

When DuPont said he could defer going,

thereby implying Turner was unequal to the task, Turner
reconsidered, withdrew his letter and departed.26
The Charlestonians quickly noted New Ironsides' pres
ence.

They reported first "a very large, formidable looking

propeller, without masts," and then correctly identified the
ship as New Ironsides. The Daily Courier reported,
She is not at all so formidable as described by the
Yankee Abolition newspapers. . . . Those who ought
to know say she is no match for our impenetrable
little iron-clads, excepting perhaps in speed and
sailing qualities.27.
24Turner wrote to Andrew H. Foote, Chief of the Bureau
of Equipment and Recruiting, that New Ironsides' anchor
chains were unsatisfactory. Government chain had a swivel
every thirty fathoms, the contractor's only one in its whole
length. This made for kinks, risk of breakage and difficul
ty getting in the anchor. Turner to Foote, December 24,
1862, NYPL, Turner Letter Book. New Ironsides broke a chain
and lost an anchor while preparing to enter Port Royal.
NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. January 18, 1863.
25DuPont to Mrs. DuPont, February 1, 1863, Hayes,
DuPont Letters 2: 405.
26DuPont to Mrs. DuPont, February 1, 1863, ibid., 2:
405-406; Turner to DuPont, January 31, 1863, ORN 13: 623-24.
27"From the Bar," Charleston Daily Courier. February
3, 1863, 2. See also "Situation of Affairs Off the Bar,"
Charleston Mercury. February 3, 1863, 2.
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Turner was not so sure about her sailing qualities, or
at least her seaworthiness at anchor.

He soon wrote from

Charleston, again expressing his anxieties.

Rough weather

had caused problems with the rudder and anchor chains.

The

rudder broke loose and had to be secured by men let down
over the side.

The anchor chains became fouled and because

of the bow design they were difficult to unsnarl.

The ram

interfered with the ship's motion by catching the chains on
its surface.28 The "fearful" yawing and sheering caused
such problems that Turner left Charleston on February 6 and
returned to Port Royal on February 7, 1863.29
Showing the importance he attached to New Ironsides'
presence off Charleston, DuPont noted his astonishment and
wrote, "He should never have come back. . . . If those rams
come out tonight he may be broke."30 A survey directed by
DuPont reported that New Ironsides was uninjured but recom
mended strengthening the rudder, soon accomplished by dint
of the machine shop working all night.31 Leaving Port
28Turner to DuPont, February 6, 1863, ORN 13: 646-47.
Turner to Smith, February 16, 1863, NARG 71, Entry 5, Box
449, 1: 79.
29NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. February 5-7, 1863.
30DuPont to Mrs. DuPont, February 7, 1863, Hayes, Du
Pont Letters 2: 416. DuPont could not know that the Con
federate rams did not even dare to anchor outside the bar
overnight, since "in case of a blow the vessels would have
foundered." Parker, Recollections. 323.
31DuPont to Mrs. DuPont, February 7, 1863, Hayes, Du
Pont Letters 2: 416-17. Turner had earlier written in
"flattering terms” about the rudder. Silas Yerkes, Jr., to
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Royal on February 9, New Ironsides was back on station at
Charleston on February 10, 1863.32
Although some of her early deficiencies were correct
ed, New Ironsides' slow speed was a long term handicap.

As

experience mounted, it became clear that the ten knot figure
Turner obtained during the return from her maiden voyage was
wrong.

The ship made a full power trial on February 11,

1863, under favorable wind and sea conditions.

Harman New

ell, New Ironsides/ chief engineer, reported her best speed
ever under steam was 6^ knots, but the best shown during
this trial was six knots.

Turner wrote,

Six (6) knots is her maximum speed per hour. When
passing up the Delaware the last time . . . I gave
her a higher rate of speed, but there was evidently
a mistake . . . she can never have exceeded the rate
I have given her here.33
In May 1863, Turner reported to DuPont, "This ship is
so unwieldy and moves so slowly . . . if they only knew that
on shore they would not give themselves much trouble about
Lenthall, January 8, 1863.

NARG 19, Entry 71, Box 3, 1: 18.

32NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. February 9 and 10,
1863. The Confederates did not miss her until February 9,
thinking she laid off in the morning and returned after
dark, "hoping to catch our ironclads should they make anoth
er night attack on the Yankee fleet." "News from the Yankee
Fleet," Charleston Daily Courier. February 9, 1863, 2;
February 10, 1863, 2; for a similar opinion, "News From The
Blockading Fleet," Charleston Mercury. February 9, 1863, 2.
33Turner to Smith, February 16, 1863, and Chief Engi
neer Harman Newell to Turner, February 11, 1863, enclosure
to Turner's letter to Smith of February 16, 1863, NARG 71,
Entry 5, Box 449, 1: 79.
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her."34 George E. Belknap, Executive Officer of New Iron
sides from the autumn of 1862 until her decommissioning in
June 1864, wrote that pursuit of a swift blockade runner
would have been "as absurd and useless as the efforts of an
elephant in pursuit of a camelopard [giraffe]."35
In the Navy Department's technical bureaus, opinion of
her speed was similarly negative.

John Lenthall, Chief of

the Bureau of Construction and Repair, and Benjamin Franklin
Isherwood, Chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering, told
Welles that New Ironsides had
just two-thirds of the speed guarantied [sic], and
as the speed is in the ratio of the cube of the
power, it follows that the contractor provided just
one-third enough machinery, while the Government
paid for the three-thirds, and, in addition, paid
very large extra bills.36
The best speed the ship ever logged under both steam and
34Turner to DuPont, May 6, 1863, ORN 14: 178.
35Belknap, "Reminiscent of the 'New Ironsides'," 70.
Belknap, born on January 22, 1832, in Newport, New Hamp
shire, began his Navy career in 1847. After leaving New
Ironsides for further wartime service as Commanding Officer
of the monitor Canonicus, he rose to the rank of Rear Admi
ral before retiring in 1894. He died at Key West, Florida,
on April 7, 1903. DAB, s.v. "Belknap, George Eugene," NARG
24, Records of Officers.
36C. H. Davis, Lenthall, Isherwood, Cullum[?] to
Welles, August 15, 1863, NARG 45, Entry 464, Subject File,
AD— Design, Box 48. Isherwood was right. Effective horse
power = ([Total resistance coefficient x density x (veloci
ty)3 x wetted surface]/2)/550. The ratio of power required
for 9.5 knots to power required for 6.5 knots is thus
(9.5)3/(6.5)3, or approximately 3.12. Gillmer, Modern Ship
Design. 136.
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sail was seven knots.37
New Ironsides remained on guard at Charleston even as
the monitors assembled for DuPont's assault.

In March 1863

DuPont had to discourage Turner's request to return to Port
Royal.

DuPont called New Ironsides "the only iron vessel

which can lay outside" and noted that if a second Confeder
ate raid were attempted in her absence, "the accountability
would not be light."38 The Confederates were well aware of
New Ironsides' presence, considering that she was, "perma
nently stationed off the Bar, to protect the wooden sides of
the Yankee gunboats from our 'iron clads.'"39
As one Confederate officer wrote, "It was not consid
ered advisable to send our vessels [Chicora and Palmetto
State! out to attack her."40 Unseaworthy, lightly armed
and carrying only two two-inch layers of armor, neither
would have stood a chance against New Ironsides. Instead,
according to Belknap the time on board the frigate was spent
"in perfecting the drills at the guns and in watching the
37NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. January 12, 1863.
There was a strong wind from dead astern.
38DuPont to Turner, March 3, 1863, ORN 13: 714-15.
39Charleston Daily Courier. February 14, 1863, 2;
Charleston Mercury. February 14, 1863, 2.
40Parker, Recollections. 327. Richmond was full of
rumors about an impending Union assault. For examples, John
Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confeder
ate States Capital 2 vols. (Philadelphia: J. P. Lippincott,
1866; reprinted Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1982), en
tries for January 27 and 31, February 5, 6 and 10, 1863.
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enemy strengthening his defenses."41 During the first week
in April 1863, the monitors arrived and the Federals made
final preparations for their attack.
The most significant preparation aboard New Ironsides
was strengthening the spar deck.

Civil War-era sea battles

were conducted at ranges less than 2,000 yards.

Projectile

trajectories were flat, and it was unusual to receive a hit
on the deck in a ship-to-ship action.

Since New Ironsides

was designed to fight other ships, her deck protection was
thin, and that made her vulnerable to plunging fire from
shore guns and mortars.42 Plunging fire was considered
very dangerous.

Turner wrote, "One inch of iron and three

of wood upon her spar deck form a very feeble barrier to
resist plunging shot, and bombs."43
To increase resistance to plunging fire, Turner in
creased the spar deck protection with sandbags over a layer
of green (untanned) hides.44 A thick coating of grease on
41Belknap, [Contemporary Club], 11.
42In the low Charleston country "plunging" fire was
misnamed. At 1000 yards, the angle of impact of an Xl-inch
shell fired from sea level was 2.7 degrees; fired from an
elevation of fifty feet, it would strike at 3.5 degrees.
Trajectory extrapolation from BALLISTA, a program to calcu
late exterior ballistics; the original version, by William
J. Jurens, appeared as "Exterior Ballistics with Microcompu
ters," Warship International 21, no. 1 (1984): 49-72.
43Turner to Smith, April 2, 1863, NARG 71, Entry 5,
Box 449, 2: 7. "Bombs" were mortar shells.
44This was the only engagement in which hides were
used. Belknap wrote years later that the hides were placed
on top of the sandbags, but Turner in his report and in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

91
her armored sides, to increase the tendency of shot and
shell to glance off, completed New Ironsides' battle outfit.
sworn testimony in 1863 stated specifically that the hides
were under the sandbags. Belknap, "Reminiscent of the 'New
Ironsides'," 66, 70; ORN 14: 26; Turner's testimony at the
Stimers Court of Inquiry, Report . . . Armored Vessels. 149.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

STOKO

tfiLBT

H A !’ OP
APPROACHES

CHARLESTON, S.C

«4

9

Pr«p,r from M«p««ntia U Cotil S«r«»y.
M|y|l Wjr Arc«r«, |n< Amy War M (« H l
Stala

Figure 13. Outline chart of Charleston Harbor.
Vol. 14, facing page 1.)

tOfficial Records . . . Navies.

CHAPTER SIX
BATTLE EXPERIENCE: "A CAPITAL SCARECROW"?

New Ironsides' first combat experience was the April
7, 1863, assault on Charleston, in which her unique design
affected the outcome of the battle.

Serving Rear Admiral

DuPont as fleet flagship, New Ironsides engaged the Charles
ton fortifications at a range of more than 1,000 yards.
Charleston Harbor was well defended.

The major works

of the outer defenses were Fort Moultrie on Sullivan's Is
land and Fort Sumter.

They were supported by Batteries

Wagner and Gregg on Morris Island and Batteries Bee and
Beauregard on Sullivan's Island.
were earthworks.

All except Fort Sumter

The inner layer included Fort Johnson and

Battery Glover on James Island, Fort Ripley and Castle
Pinckney in the harbor, and the White Point Battery on Bat
tery Point in Charleston itself (Figure 13).
Charleston had little strategic importance, but it was
the "original seat of the great wickedness that has befallen
our country," and accordingly "there is not another place

93
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[our anxious countrymen] would so rejoice to see taken."1
As Welles wrote before he received news of the assault,
A desperate stand will be made at Charleston, and
their defenses are formidable. Delay has given them
time and warning, and they have improved them. They
know also that there is no city so culpable, or
against which there is such intense animosity.2
The Confederates knew a Federal assault was probable.

Writ

ing, "Charleston is bitterly hated. . . . " the Charleston
Mercury told Charlestonians in mid-February 1863 to expect
"some eight or ten iron-clad gunboats to try the harbor" in
the near future.3
DuPont had been planning his assault on Charleston for
months, and as his planning continued his requirements grew.
He insisted on more ships and wrote, "the limit of my wants
in the way of ironclads is the capacity of the Department to
supply them."4 Secretary Welles sent the ironclads, but as
DuPont's delays mounted, Welles began to worry.

When they

met in October 1862, Welles called DuPont "skillful and
belles, Diary, entry for May 26, 1863, 1: 314. A
Philadelphia paper called South Carolina "the insolent, con
ceited, unreasonable and arbitrary author of all our
national troubles. . . . " "Port Royal." Philadelphia Daily
Evening Bulletin. November 15, 1861: 1.
2Welles, Diary, entry for April 9, 1863, 1: 264.
3"The Yankee Preparations,"
ruary 12, 1863: 1.

Charleston Mercury. Feb

4DuPont to Fox, March 2, 1863, Hayes, DuPont Letters.
2: 463. Fox replied that Welles had sent DuPont "every ves
sel except the Sangamon." guarding Hampton Roads. Other
commanders had called for ironclads, "but we have not given
them any." Fox to DuPont, March 11, 1863, ibid., 2: 487.
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sagacious," noting that although he was "given to the for
mation of cliques," Welles would make no controversy "while
he continues to do his duty so well."5
By February 1863, Welles was writing that
DuPont shrinks from responsibility, dreads, [sic] the
conflict he has sought yet is unwilling that any other
should undertake it, is afraid the reputation of DuPont
will suffer. . . .
I deplore the signs of misgiving and
doubt which have recently come over him . . . It is not
what we have talked of. . . .6
By March 1863, Welles was convinced, "DuPont is getting as
prudent as McClellan . . .

He has a reputation to preserve

instead of one to make."7
Welles' concept of the attack was that the Navy could
move independent of
stop to batter it.
town under the guns
in the forts and on
to leave.8

the Army, and pass Sumter, not
Once in the rear, and having the
of the ironclads, the military
James Island would be compelled

DuPont appears to have based his plan on the same idea of
passing the outer defenses, Forts Moultrie and Sumter, but
he intended then to destroy Sumter from behind.

He planned

to proceed up the channel between Sumter and Moultrie, pass
into the harbor, and reduce Sumter from Rebellion Roads,
belles, Diary, entry for October 2, 1862, 1: 160. He
later noted, "When here last fall, expressly to consult and
concert measures for the capture of Charleston, he was as
earnest and determined as any of us, did not waver a moment,
and would not listen to a suggestion of Dahlgren as an
assistant." Ibid., entry for April 15, 1863, 1: 273.
sIbid., entry for February 16, 1863, 1: 236.
7Ibid., entry for March 12, 1863, 1: 247.
8Ibid., entry for February 16, 1863, 1: 236.
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that is, from the north and northwest.
Fort Sumter, a pentagonal brick fort constructed
between 1829 and 1860, was shaped as four sides of a regular
hexagon with the gorge opening closed by a straight wall.
It joined Moultrie to cover the ship channel with a cross
fire.

Sumter was oriented so its lightly armed gorge faced

southwest, protected by Morris Island, and the four heavily
armed sides covered the channel.9
DuPont knew that attacking Sumter from inside the
harbor would have two serious disadvantages.

First, his

ships would have to navigate a channel full of obstructions
including, he believed, torpedoes (Figure 14).10 These
would have "entangled the vessels and held them" under heavy
fire.

Second was the risk to New Ironsides. Attacking from

the northwest,
We are further inside and if we meet disaster will
lose this ship, which from her size and unwieldiness
cannot be got out like the monitors. . . .
If I
leave her out altogether, or down here, I divest
myself of half my force. . . .“
Despite these disadvantages, DuPont chose to enter the
9Willard B. Robinson, American Forts; Architectural
Form and Function (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press
for the Amon Carter Museum of Western Art, Fort Worth,
1977), 107-109.
10DuPont to Welles, April 15, 1863, ORN 14: 7. The
Civil War "torpedo" was what is now called a mine, a water
tight container of explosive with a detonator. Various det
onators, including contact and electrical fuzes, were used.
“DuPont to Mrs. DuPont, April 6, 1863, Hayes, DuPont
Letters. 2: 552.
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harbor for two major reasons.

First, it would remove his

ships farther from Fort Moultrie and place them in a
position where, he believed, some of the forts and batteries
would be unable to fire upon them.

Second, once inside, the

ships would have deeper water and more maneuvering room.12
DuPont's plan appears to owe something to advice he
received from Captain John Rodgers on attacking Charleston.
Rodgers' plan, set forth in a letter to DuPont, called for
taking a position close enough to Fort Sumter to breach its

Figure 14. Typical Confederate barrel torpedo.
Scharf, Confederate Navy. 757.)

(From

walls but far enough away to render its cannon ineffective
against the ironclads.

Rodgers estimated, based upon a

"very incomplete" account of British experiments he had
read, that the ironclads would be secure at ranges of 1200
to 1300 yards.

Since "Beauregard breached the walls of Fort

12DuPont to Mrs. DuPont, April 6, 1863, ibid., 2: 552.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

98
Sumter" at a distance greater than this, he recommended
positioning the ironclads near the center of Charleston
Harbor, along the arc of a circle of 1250 yards radius cen
tered on Sumter.

"I should be inclined to anchor," he

wrote, for "better aim, [and] less danger from torpedoes."
Rodgers' chosen position was over a mile from Forts Moultrie
and Johnson, permitting the ironclads to "take the forts
successively in quiet."13
Beauregard, on the contrary, expected the Federals to
run past the forts.

If they did not, he expected that they

would silence Battery Wagner on Morris Island first and then
attack Sumter "where it is weakest,— i.e., the gorge, south
east angle, and east face."

The Federals might also

send one or more monitors during the night to take
position in the small channel north of Cummings
Point, within close range. . . . That mode of at
tack being the one most to be apprehended should be
guarded against, as well as our limited means will
permit. . . ,14
Beauregard underestimated the draft of the monitors and the
difficulty they would have in coping with Charleston's
tricky tidal currents, and overestimated DuPont's daring.
DuPont's tactics were straightforward.

He planned to

cross the bar with New Ironsides, seven monitors and the
13John Rodgers to DuPont, October 29, 1862, ORN 13:
421-22. Johnson, John Rodgers. 239-40.
14Beauregard to Ripley, February 8, 1863, United
States, War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compi
lation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate
Armies 128 vols. (Washington: GPO, 1880-1901), ser. 1, 14:
769. Hereafter OR.
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hybrid Keokuk.15 The ships would form in line astern at
two hundred yards interval, with the monitor Weehawken lead
ing, New Ironsides fifth in line, and Keokuk last.

The

ships would pass up the main ship channel without returning
the fire of the Morris Island batteries and open fire on
Sumter "when within easy range."

DuPont planned to remain

underway and his preferred firing position was 600 to 800
yards from the northwest face of the fort.16 After re
ducing Sumter, the ships would return outside to destroy the
batteries on Morris Island.
DuPont's choice of close action rather than Rodgers'
plan of prolonged distant firing may have been influenced by
the reported short life and unreliability of the monitors'
XV inch guns.17 By moving closer, he gained greater effect
for his ships' guns in exchange for increasing their vul
nerability to Confederate projectiles.

Because of the prim

itive state of gun fire control technology and the monitors'
slow speed, keeping the monitors moving reduced slightly
both their chances of hitting vital portions of the forts
and the Confederates' chances of hitting them.
In choosing New Ironsides as his flagship and placing
her in the center of the line, DuPont had his ability to
“Keokuk had a monitor's low freeboard but her two
stationary "turrets" did not revolve.
“DuPont's plan of attack, April 4, 1863, ORN 14: 8-9.
17Johnson, John Rodgers. 240.
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direct his fleet foremost in his mind.

The only reliable

means of signalling from ship to ship in daylight was by
hoisting signal flags.

The ability of subordinates to see

their commander's flag hoists depended upon the prevailing
visibility, their distance from the flagship and the posi
tion of the flagship's halyards upon which the signals were
hoisted.

DuPont could not change the visibility nor prevent

it from being reduced by powder smoke in battle.

He could

control the other two factors by judicious selection of the
flagship and the formation.
To this end, he chose Hew Ironsides as his flagship.
In addition to better accommodations for an admiral and his
staff, with her high freeboard and tall masts New Ironsides
provided a better signalling platform than any monitor.

To

minimize the distance over which signals would have to be
seen, he placed the flagship in the center of the line of
ships.18 Another benefit of having a monitor lead the line
was that the shallower-draft monitors could act as pathfind
ers for New Ironsides among the harbor shoals.
The battle did not go as DuPont planned.

As Welles

foresaw, the defenses had been "strengthened much faster
than the assailants.1,19 The ironclads were to cross
Charleston Bar on April 5, but the crossing took longer than
18"The New Ironsides being in the center, from which
signals could be better made to both ends of the line."
DuPont to Welles, April 15, 1863, ORN 14: 5.
19Welles, Diary, entry for March 17, 1863, 1: 249.
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expected.

DuPont and his staff boarded New Ironsides at

7:30 A.M. on April 6 and she finally crossed the bar at 9:00
A.M.

That afternoon the ships anchored in the planned line

of battle.20 Due to this delay and to bad visibility, the
attack, originally planned for April 6, was delayed until
April 7.

The Confederates had noted the unusual activity

and were ready for "important movements."21
At 12:10 P.M. on April 7, 1863, DuPont signalled his
ships to get underway (see Figure 15).

Further delay was

caused when a special torpedo-clearing raft, equipped with
grapnels for catching and removing torpedoes, fouled the
anchor chain of the Weehawken. the monitor that was to push
it ahead of the formation.

The force finally started up the

channel at 1:15 P.M., and at 2:10 P.M. Weehawken. the
leading ship, met the first obstructions.22
Weehawken/s Commanding Officer, John Rodgers, believed
he saw a torpedo explode near his ship.

Upon reaching the

rope obstruction the Confederates had placed across the
channel, he turned aside to avoid it, writing, "upon
deliberate judgment I thought it right not to entangle the
20NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. April 6, 1863.
21"From the Bar," Charleston Daily Courier. April 6
and 7, 1863; also, "Highly Important From the Bar," Charle
ston Mercury. April 6, 1863: 2 and "The Hour at Hand,"
ibid., April 7, 1863: 2.
22Times are from DuPont's report. The times recorded
in New Ironsides' Log are consistently ten to fifteen min
utes earlier. NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. April 7, 1863.
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vessel in obstructions which I did not think we could have
passed through and in which we should have been caught."23
Rodgers' action threw the formation of ships into confu
sion.24 Although DuPont later reported Weehawken had 250
feet of rope wrapped around her propeller shaft and inferred
that it came from the obstructions, the Confederates said
she had not come within 600 yards of them.25
The Confederate batteries commenced firing about 3:00
P.M. and at 3:15 P.M. DuPont signalled to Weehawken to begin
the action.

The monitors and Keokuk engaged the east and

northeast faces of Fort Sumter, but no further attempt was
made to pass or clear the rope obstruction.

Beauregard

claimed the ships "were baffled and driven back before
reaching our lines of torpedoes and obstructions. . . ."26
A strong flood tide was making, pushing the ships into
the obstructions.

By 3:25 P.M. New Ironsides became unman

ageable and DuPont signalled to disregard the motions of the
23John Rodgers to DuPont, April 8, 1863, ORN 14: 12.
24DuPont to Welles, April 15, 1863, ibid., 14: 6.
25DuPont to Welles, April 22, 1863, ibid., 14: 54.
DuPont wrote two weeks after the attack, and Weehawken prob
ably fouled the rope after the assault. For Confederate
views, General Ripley to General Thomas Jordan, October 12,
1863, ibid., 14: 107-108; Colonel William Butler to W. F.
Nance, October 9, 1863, with endorsement by General T. L.
Clingman of October 10, ibid., 14: 108-109; Colonel Alfred
Rhett to Jordan, October 12, 1863, ibid., 14: 109-110.
Jones, Rebel War Clerk's Diary, entry for April 25, 1863,
provides more contemporary evidence of Confederate opinion.
26Beauregard to General S. Cooper, May 24, 1863, ORN
14: 76.
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flagship.

At 3:30 P.M. New Ironsides anchored to avoid

going aground but almost immediately hove up her anchor.27
At 4:05 P.M. she was once again in difficulty, as shown by
DuPont's signal to give the flagship more room.

The moni

tors Catskill and Nantucket. next astern of her, struck her
at about that time.28 Keokuk, originally last in line, ran
past her to within 500 yards of the fort.

Confederate guns

penetrated Keokuk's armor ninety times in thirty minutes of
close action and she withdrew mortally wounded.
New Ironsides' officers believed their ship came
within 800 yards of Sumter, but Turner's report credited her
with 1000 .29 The smoke was so thick that Sumter could not
be seen, and at times Turner could not see fifty yards from
the ship.30 At 4:15 P.M. New Ironsides fired her port
broadside at Fort Moultrie, her only shots during the ac
tion.
In the midst of this, at 4:30 P.M. DuPont signalled
his force to withdraw.31 Soon after, New Ironsides again
27The incident of the "boiler torpedo" probably
occurred at this time.
28New Ironsides' Log records a brief anchorage at 3:30
P.M., the signal for more room at 3:40 P.M., and the col
lision at 3:45 P.M.
29Western Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland, Ohio,
John M. Butler Diary, 1862-1864, MSS 3947 (microfilm) (here
after Butler Diary), entry for April 7, 1863; ORN 14: 26.
Butler was a volunteer officer in New Ironsides.
“Butler Diary, entry for April 7, 1863; ORN 14: 26.
“DuPont to Welles, April 15, 1863, ibid., 14: 5-6.
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sheered badly and anchored for the second time.
again at 4:45 and steamed down the channel.32

She hove up
After nine

ty minutes of fighting and with evening approaching, the
ironclads departed.33 The ships had fired 139 shot and
shell; the fortifications fifteen times that number.34
The attack was no surprise to the Confederates, either
tactically or strategically.35 The forts and batteries had
been instructed in detail on how to attack ironclads.

Dis

tance buoys were installed to permit close estimates of
range, and there were obstructions liberally scattered
through the channel.36 Torpedoes were also installed to
block the channel, although there may not have actually been
any in place in the obstructions when DuPont attacked.37
For New Ironsides, this first combat action showed
32NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. April 7, 1863.
33Sunset in Charleston during the first week in April
was between 6:20 and 6:30 P.M.
34Abstract of ammunition expenditure, dated April 14,
1863, and signed by Lieutenant A. S. Mackenzie, ORN 14: 27.
35Jones, Rebel War Clerk's Diary, entries for February
5, 6, and 21; March 23 and 28; April 4, 6 and 7, 1863.
36Circular of Instructions from the Commanding General
at Charleston, S.C., dated December 26, 1862, and signed by
Brigadier General Roswell S. Ripley, ORN 14: 102-103.
37Weehawken supposedly saw explosions, and Beauregard
wrote that installation of torpedoes began soon after he
took command in September 1862. Pierre G. T. Beauregard,
"Torpedo Service in the Harbor and Water Defences of Char
leston," Southern Historical Society Papers (hereafter SHS
Papers) 5, no. 4 (April 1878): 147-48. Other Confederates
stated the only torpedo in place at the time was the large
one which failed. Hayes, DuPont Letters, 3: 13, note 1.
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more of her deficiencies than of her strengths, although the
small amount of damage she suffered was encouraging.

Her

chief deficiency was her inability to support Admiral DuPont
as his fleet flagship, caused by her unique pilot house and
touchy maneuvering qualities.

DuPont, writing two months

after the failure of his assault, was caustic.

Calling the

ship's defects "glaring," he particularly disliked "the
contracted size of her pilot house and its improper location
behind the enormous smokestack," which shut out all view
ahead and "most materially interfer[ed] with the management
of the vessel in battle. . . ."38
Turner's report cited three major deficiencies, all of
which adversely affected shiphandling.
unmanageable in the current.

First, the ship was

Second, the pilot house was

too small, holding only three people.

Third, the ship's

draft placed her within a foot of the bottom during the
action.39 Turner implied New Ironsides could not be navi
gated effectively in combat.
The design of the pilot house contributed to DuPont's
problems both directly and indirectly.

The design of its

small viewing ports and its placement on deck abaft the
38DuPont to Welles, June 3, 1863, ORN 14: 69.
39Turner to DuPont, April 10, 1863, ibid., 14: 25. A
contemporary Union chart shows the channel depths to be
approximately three fathoms, or 18 feet. "Charleston Harbor
and Its Approaches, 1863," National Archives, Record Group
23, Records of the Coast and Geodetic Survey, Special Civil
War Maps.
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smoke stack directly reduced the Admiral's ability to see
the battle and control the ship.
small size was more serious.

The indirect impact of its

Merely four feet in inside

diameter, it had room only for DuPont, his pilot Acting
Master John W. Godfrey, and his fleet captain, Commander C.
Raymond P. Rodgers.40
DuPont had considered the problem before the attack,
calling the pilot house "miserably small."

He told Turner

that if Rodgers could not be in the pilot house with him, he
would have to shift his flag to a monitor.41 Since DuPont
insisted on Rodgers' presence, lack of room in the pilot
house forced Turner to station himself on the gun deck.42
This meant that Turner, the senior officer most familiar
with the ship and most knowledgeable of her characteristics,
could not contribute to maneuvering her in action.
Ship control, difficult enough under fire, was made
even more difficult by being within a foot of grounding.
The full lines of the ship (Figure 16) combined with the
shallow water to make steering difficult, and the novel
40Belknap opined it had only room for two.
[Contemporary Club], 15.

Belknap,

41DuPont to Mrs. DuPont, April 5, 1863, Hayes, DuPont
Letters, 2: 546. If nothing else, the monitor pilot houses,
being atop the turrets, had excellent all-around vision.
42Turner to DuPont, April 10, 1863, ORN 14: 25.
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articulated rudder probably aggravated the situation.43
The need for precise control, and the frustration of being
unable to get it, must have been a factor in DuPont's man
agement of the battle.

DuPont undoubtedly found that maneu

vering his flagship took much attention, which detracted
from his ability to control the fleet.44 Turner's report
to DuPont noted the skill with which Godfrey kept the ship
clear of the bottom, but the pilot's performance was de
cidedly mixed: he kept the ship off the ground but did not
maneuver her to be effective in combat.45
Much of the difficulty with ship control came only
because the Admiral and his pilot were unfamiliar with the
ship and what her Executive Officer, George Belknap, called
"wrinkles in the management of the helm." DuPont and God
frey did not board the ship until April 6.46 As shown by
43NARG 19, Plan 107-9-12M. The lines did not permit
smooth flow to the rudder. With the ship's hull only a foot
from the bottom, rudder effectiveness would be reduced by 25
percent. Crenshaw, Naval Shiphandlino, 20-25, for forces
affecting a single-screw ship. Stephen B. Luce, Text-Book
of Seamanship, rev. ed. (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1884),
538-48, is understandably less sophisticated.
44Notes from Papers of Rear-Admiral DuPont, U.S. Navy,
on the attack on Fort Sumter, April 6, 1863, ORN 14: 28.
The old saying about a collision at sea ruining your whole
day is apropos. DuPont wrote, "This ship would not
steer . . . and had to be anchored twice." DuPont to Mrs.
DuPont, April 8, 1863, John D. Hayes, ed., DuPont Letters,
vol. 3, The Repulse: 1863-1865. 3.
45ORN 14: 25.
46Belknap, "Reminiscent of the 'New Ironsides'," 68.
Belknap later said Godfrey was "utterly ignorant" of the
ship and handled her badly. Belknap, [Contemporary Club],
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her later movements in the same channel, at night and under
fire, New Ironsides would have given a better account of
herself had her own Commanding Officer and pilot been per
mitted to maneuver her instead of DuPont and Godfrey.47
DuPont's tactical leadership is also open to critical
discussion.

Foremost is the question of whether DuPont

should have led the formation as he did at Port Royal.

The

advantage of leading the line was that he could draw his
ships on by example.

A resolute commander could execute the

simple and direct "follow the leader" by force of will,
without relying on a subordinate, as when Admiral David G.
Farragut took the lead at Mobile Bay and saved the day for
the Union.

Civil War gun fire control, even from shore

batteries, was poor enough that the leading ship ran little
increased risk of being hit by concentrated fire.

Against

this, "follow me" leadership put the leader in the most
hazardous position because leading the line increased the
commander's exposure to torpedoes.48 It also reduced his
16. Belknap incorrectly wrote the attack was the first time
Godfrey handled the ship; she crossed the bar "in charge of
Pilot (Mr. Godfrey)." George E. Belknap, "Reminiscent of the
Siege of Charleston," in Naval Actions and History 1799-1898
(Boston: Military Historical Society of Massachusetts,
1902), 170; NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. April 6, 1863.
47Pilot Benjamin Dorey worked New Ironsides up to
Moultrie "in the night without lights, bearings or compass."
Captain S. C. Rowan to Rear Admiral John A. Dahlgren, Sep
tember 10, 1863, Report . . . Armored Vessels. 240.
48At New Orleans and Mobile, Farragut was dissuaded by
his captains from leading the line due to the perceived
torpedo risk. Clarence Edward Macartney, Mr. Lincoln's
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ability to control all of his ships at once.
DuPont knew New Ironsides could not operate outside
the narrow channel.

By choosing a position in the middle of

the line to increase his ability to communicate, DuPont
foreclosed his option to haul out of line and take the lead
if necessary.

At the decisive moment of his attack he had

to rely completely upon John Rodgers's judgment that the
obstructions could not be passed.
Although Rodgers had an excellent reputation, his
conduct shows a keen appreciation of risk but not of possi
ble gain.49 Without trying to pass the obstructions or use
the grapnel-equipped torpedo clearing raft, he turned away
from the obstructions and disrupted the formation.
From his position in the middle of the line, DuPont
could do little to rectify the situation.

A British

critique opined that the Federals were repulsed
because their vessels were delayed under the enemy's
guns. . . .
It will have been seen how little,
after all, the Confederate obstructions were re
quired to do. Only one vessel, the Weehawken, . . .
was directly affected by them. The others . . .
thus thrown into partial confusion . . . half an
hour's firing then completed their discomfiture.50
DuPont's disposition of New Ironsides was, on balance,
adequate.

Disregarding her steering qualities, which could

Admirals (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1956), 43, 64-65.
49G. F. Eliot considered him to be "probably the best
captain of the war." Ibid., viii.
S0H. W. Tyler, "Spithead and Harbour Defence," Journal
RUSI 8, no. 31 (1864): 145.
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have been overcome by skilled handling, New Ironsides' sig
nificant tactical characteristics were her relatively deep
draft, soft ends, and great offensive power on the broad
side.

Her draft and her restricted forward visibility made

it unwise to place her at the head of the line, especially
since she could not cast the lead from the bows.

Her soft

ends could not be helped, but her powerful battery was best
placed near the head of the line to aid in suppressing Con
federate defensive fire.

DuPont might have improved his

formation by stationing New Ironsides second in line, to
give "encouragement" to the leader, or by leaving New Iron
sides in the middle of the line and transferring himself to
the leading or the second monitor.
During her first trial by fire, New Ironsides was hit
by more than fifty Confederate shot and shell.51 The dam
age she received, which set the pattern for her later en
gagements with the Charleston fortifications, was of four
types: Projectiles which struck the side armor, the port
shutters, the armored spar deck, and the unarmored areas.
Projectiles that struck the side armor were of little
concern.

Those that struck obliquely glanced off.

Shot

that struck squarely might indent the armor, perhaps
cracking it or crushing the wood backing behind it, without
“Abstract log of the U.S.S. New Ironsides. April 7,
1863, ORN 14: 26.
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doing significant damage (Figure 17).52
Projectiles that struck the port shutters frequently
broke them; if they broke in two, the detached part fell
overboard.

Replacement port shutters were shipped from the

North to be installed on station.53
Captain Turner had written to Admiral Smith a week

Figure 17. Damage to New Ironsides/ armor from Confederate
fire at Charleston. (Official Records . ♦ . Navies. 15:
555)
before the attack, discussing the port shutters at length.
He worried, "should a shot strike the bolts upon which they
pivot, and vibrate— doubtless they would be disabled and
perhaps the free action of them obstructed."

He wanted to

“Abstract Log of the U.S.S. New Ironsides. April 7,
1863, ibid., 14: 26; Turner to Smith, April 25, 1863, NARG
71, Entry 5, Box 449, 2: 33.
530n April 23, 1863, Lenthall directed Commodore
Charles K. Stribling, Commandant of the Philadelphia Navy
Yard, to send replacements. NARG 3.9,- Entry 54, 2: 223.
Several orders were eventually made.
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reshape them to work "longitudinally on the ship's sides—
instead of on the arc of a circle as now— moving in grooves
fitted on the outside of the [armor] cladding."

They were

to be held to the ship's side with bolts "through the entire
wood of the ship's side and the cladding" and operated by
tackles attached to the inside of each shutter.54
During the battle on April 7, one shutter was carried
away by a shot, but Turner did not mention it or press the
case for his modification, when he wrote to Smith shortly
after the battle.

Despite the number of times shutters were

damaged, they did not jam, and the proposed alteration,
which would have been very expensive, was never made.55
This was for the better as it would have weakened the armor
and complicated the working of the guns.
Projectiles that struck the deck were a greater
threat.

In addition to penetration of the deck, Turner saw

another problem "fraught with danger" to the gun crews.

The

spar deck planking was secured to the iron deck plating by
screws, about three inches long, projecting up through the
iron into the wood.

These screws were knocked loose from

the overhead in the battery when shot struck the spar deck.
54Turner to Smith, April 2, 1863, NARG 71, Entry 5,
Box 449, 2: 7.
“Turner to Smith, April 25, 1863, ibid., 2: 33. No
report of damage mentions inability to serve a gun. ORN 14:
26, 460, 534, 555. The change, clearly shipyard work, could
have been made only in the 1864 refit, but Shippen describes
the ship after that refit as having shutters "much indented
by shot." Shippen, "Fort Fisher," 11.
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Turner wrote, " . . . a shot striking anywhere over
them, drives them out— when corroded by the iron-rust— They
fly out bodily— like bullets and would kill men standing
underneath."56 His fears were groundless; although the
deck was hit repeatedly in various engagements and received
shots that completely broke the deck plating, no serious
injuries from this cause were recorded.57
The fourth category, projectiles that struck the un
armored areas of the ship, generally caused no significant
damage.58 They were always a concern since the lack of
protective bulkheads between the gun and berth decks, and
the lack of a protective deck other than the spar deck, made
the machinery and steering gear vulnerable.
The armored bulkheads between the spar deck and gun
deck protected the battery itself, but a shot could pass
through the spar deck and diagonally down through the wooden
gun deck outside the battery to reach the engines or rudder.
Similarly, a shot could pass through the stern above the
armor and reach the rudder head and tiller.
aware of this.

Turner was well

As he wrote before the April 7 attack,

56Turner to Smith, April 25, 1863, NARG 71, Entry 5,
Box 449, 2: 33.
57For instances of deck damage, July 24, 1863, ORN 14:
392; August 17, 1863, Bishop to Rowan, August 16[17], 1863,
ibid., 14: 460; Rowan to Dahlgren, November 29, 1863, ibid.,
15: 142.
580n various occasions, railings, boats and cabin fur
nishings were damaged. Ibid., 14: 392, 408, 409, 460, 509.
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If her iron bulkheads had been dropped to the berth
deck and she had been given twenty inches more
vertically of iron-plating around her bows, and
quarters— there would have been no necessity for
these additional safe-guards of sand-bags.59
Without the armored bulkheads upon which Bartol had
insisted, the ship would have been tactically useless
against fortifications.

As it was, the ship control prob

lems noted above were aggravated by the need to minimize the
unarmored areas presented to enemy fire.

DuPont recognized

this before the attack, stating, "she is not so strong as
the monitors, or has many more vulnerable places."60 Con
cern became acute after the Charleston attack.

Turner

deemed it "most important" to give the rudder "an iron-clad
protection— in any way it can possibly done."61 No addi
tions to the bow and stern protection were made, however,
and she remained vulnerable there throughout her career.
Had the Confederates' defensive torpedo system worked
as planned, improving the ship's protection would not have
been an issue— New Ironsides would have been sunk in the
April 7 attack.

During that attack, New Ironsides spent

about ten minutes anchored in the main ship channel directly
"Turner to Smith, April 2, 1863, NARG 71, Entry 5,
Box 449, 2: 7.
60DuPont to Mrs. DuPont, April 6, 1863, Hayes, DuPont
Letters, 2: 552. C. Raymond P. Rodgers told New Ironsides'
Executive Officer, "If the first fire of the enemy does not
strip the armor off this vessel, I will be agreeably sur
prised." Belknap, [Contemporary Club], 13.
“Turner to Smith, April 25, 1863, NARG 71, Entry 5,
Box 449, 2: 33.
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over a Confederate torpedo made from an old boiler filled
with 3,000 pounds of powder.62 The torpedo had an electric
detonator, and Captain Langdon Cheves, C.S.A., tried repeat
edly to set it off.
Cheves' efforts failed and New Ironsides escaped.

He

was reported to have said
that for ten minutes he could not have placed the
Ironsides more directly over it if he had been al
lowed to, but the confounded thing, as is usual,
would not go off . . . The insulation of the wire, I
suppose, defective.63
Scharf states one of the wires had been severed by a wagon
passing over it, but the man who built the torpedo, Assis
tant Engineer Ch. G. de Lisle, noted three possible causes
for the failure: a leak in the boiler, a rupture of the
cable, or a defect in the fuze.

He reported that the cable

to the torpedo was twice the intended one mile length, and
surmised, "the distance of the poles in the fuse was too
great for the length of the cable."

De Lisle was probably

“From location and time, this was during her second
anchorage. Map of Approaches to Charleston, S.C., ORN 14,
facing page 1 (Figure 13 above). This chart includes the
torpedo's position. A deserter claimed it contained 12,000
pounds of powder, but its builders said 3,000. Statement of
Seaman John B. Patrick, June 27, 1864, ORN 9: 770; report by
Assistant Engineer Ch. G. de Lisle to Beauregard, May 25,
1863, OR, ser. 1, 14: 949-50.
“Captain Francis H. Harleston, C.S.A., to Lieutenant
James Thurston, C.S.M.C., April 26, 1863, ORN 14: 111. For
a flowery narrative, A. W. Taft, "The Signal Service Corps.
A Tribute to Their Arduous and Invaluable Services During
the War." SHS Papers 25 (1897): 132-3. Surveyors' transits
were used to determine when the ship was over the torpedo.
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correct.64 Considering the damage later inflicted by a
much smaller charge (Chapter 7 below), New Ironsides could
not have survived the explosion of 3,000 pounds of gunpowder
under her keel.
Although her protection proved sound, New Ironsides
did not make the offensive contribution expected of her by
both Federals and Confederates.

Due to her maneuvering

difficulties she fired only eight rounds, although the Con
federates credited her with considerably more, believing she
was to "perform the lion's share" of the reduction of the
defenses.65 As a result of her disappointing performance,
the opinions formed of her by her Commanding Officer and
Admiral were unfavorable and she became an issue in the
controversy surrounding DuPont's failure to resume the at
tack after his first effort was repulsed.66
Convinced of the fleet's inability to take the city,
DuPont asserted he could not renew the attack due to the
64Scharf, Confederate N a w . 750. Seaman Patrick
averred that the wires had been "cut by the man who invented
the torpedo. . . . " ORN 9: 770. For De Lisle's opinion, De
Lisle to Beauregard, May 25, 1863, OR, ser. 1, 14: 951-52.
“Lieutenant A. S. Mackenzie, Ordnance Officer, to
DuPont, April 14, 1863, ORN 14: 27. "The Attack on Charles
ton," Charleston Daily Courier. April 8, 1863, 2? "The Siege
of Charleston," ibid., April 11, 1863, 2; also "The Attack
on Charleston Opens," Charleston Mercury. April 8, 1863, 1.
“DuPont originally contemplated a much longer action.
He wrote that the monitors' XV-inch guns needed repairs
after each day's fight, while "we may be a week before a
result is gained at Charleston." DuPont to James Stokes
Biddle, March 25, 1863, Hayes, DuPont Letters. 2: 509.
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heavy damage to the monitors.67 He claimed he had never
advised the attack on Charleston, but as Welles wrote,
He certainly never discouraged it . . . DuPont
claimed the right to perform this great work . . .
His third dispatch since the battle, brings me the
first intelligence he has thought proper to
communicate of an adverse character.68
Others disagreed with DuPont's assessment, blaming him for
the failure and for exaggerating the monitors' injuries, and
he was roughly handled in the press.
The Baltimore American published the severest
criticism, written by Charles C. Fulton, a reporter whom
DuPont believed had the sanction of the Navy Department.69
Fulton wrote of the "dreadful fear that overshadowed the
fleet authorities" of torpedoes and stated his belief: "The
great work has been entrusted to incompetent hands."70
Aboard New Ironsides, initial acceptance of failure
turned to resentment of DuPont and of the ship's meager
participation.

On April 8, Lieutenant John M. Butler wrote

67DuPont to Welles, April 8, 1863, ORN 14: 3, and
April 15, 1863, ibid., 14: 6-7. DuPont feared Confederate
salvage of a sunken monitor, writing, "What most oppresses
me is the possible losing of the ironclads, more or less— in
which case we lose the whole coast. . . . " DuPont to Henry
Winter Davis, April 1, 1863, Hayes, DuPont Letters. 2: 533.
68Welles, Diary, entry for April 21, 1863, 1: 277.
69DuPont to Welles, April 22, 1863, ORN 14: 51-56.
DuPont wrote, "Fulton came especially down to represent the
monitor interest in full sympathy with Fox." DuPont to H.
W. Davis, Hayes, DuPont Letters, 3: 78. Fox denied it. For
political implications, Niven, Gideon Welles. 435.
70"Newspaper clipping from the Baltimore American of
April 15, 1863," signed C. C. F[ulton], in ORN 14: 57-59.
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the repulse was "not much after all— we may grow again," but
on April 9 he noted, "Sumter is still looking us in the
face . . . we have been too slow."

On April 13 he wrote,

"We feel more and more the effects of not fighting this
ship.

All are blue."71 In his more restrained fashion,

Belknap said,
The officers and men had unbounded faith in the
prowess of the ship, and sore was their disappoint
ment at this day's failure. Sorer still was the
feeling when it was given out on the next morning
that the attack would not be renewed. . . .72
Belknap was not alone in his opinion, but others gave
more vigorous vent to their feelings.

Edward Kershner, Hew

Ironsides' Assistant Surgeon, wrote a letter to the American
attacking DuPont.

He stated, "the strongest ships and

heaviest battery that ever floated" would "wait until the
Government sends— not more iron-clads— but a MAH to take
Charleston."73 When DuPont departed Hew Ironsides after
the Charleston attack, Turner ordered his crew to cheer the
71Butler Diary, entries for April 8, 9, 13, 1863.
72Belknap, "Siege of Charleston," 171. A Philadelphia
newspaper stated, based on a letter from the ship, "All on
board have great confidence in the ship and in Captain Turn
er, and think that the Hew Ironsides can take Charleston
alone." "Particulars of the Attack on Charleston," Phila
delphia Daily Evening Bulletin. Monday, April 13, 1863, 1.
73DuPont preferred charges, Kershner admitted guilt,
and a Court Martial sentenced him to dismissal, but Welles
retained him in the Havy. General Court Martial of Edward
Kershner, June 5, 1863, Case Ho. 3253, national Archives,
Record Group 125, Records of the Judge Advocate General
(Havy), Microfilm Entry M273, Records of General CourtsMartial and Courts of Inquiry of the Havy Department, 17991867, Roll 108.
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Admiral; they refused.74
Captain Turner's own statements show an ambivalence
which appears to be the result of pride in his ship warring
with his innate pessimism and his desire to support DuPont,
his friend and superior.
varied with time.

Turner's opinion of New Ironsides

In August 1862, he took command with con

fidence, calling New Ironsides "the noblest specimen of
naval architecture."

He sent word to friends in Charleston

that he hoped they had good wine since he expected to come
to drink it, but there were still questions in some minds
about his attitude.

In October 1862 Rear Admiral Lee wrote

to Assistant Secretary Fox, "As to Turner I knew nothing of
his 'temper' in regard to the Government and the War. . . .
I shall now have an opportunity to sound him about the War
as you seem to desire."75
Turner's initial report to Welles in 1862 was followed
by a highly complimentary letter to Merrick & Sons, written
soon after the trial trip to Newport News.

After that,

74For the cheering incident, Journal of Surgeon Marius
DuVall, quoted in Report . . . Armored Vessels. 276; DuPont
to Turner, May 14, 1864, Hayes, DuPont Letters. 3: 342; Bel
knap, "Siege of Charleston," 171. Butler wrote, "The
Admiral leaves on the James A[dger] . . . no one cheers the
Admiral." Butler Diary, entry for April 12, 1863.
75"Noblest specimen" from Turner to Dahlgren, Septem
ber 10 [1862], Dahlgren Papers. For Charleston friends,
Mrs. DuPont to DuPont, August 28, 1862, Hayes, DuPont Let
ters. 2: 229n. For Lee's comment, Thompson, Correspondence
of Fox. 2: 220. DuPont wrote, "He [Turner] has the same way
of speaking discouragingly as formerly— trims his political
views. Very sound, however, and very anti-South on the
war." Hayes, DuPont Letters. 2: 372.
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Turner's letters became more pessimistic and critical.76
His anxiety at being off a lee shore at Charleston increased
until even DuPont became exasperated.77 After finding in
Port Royal that he "never could get him along with his
work," DuPont was surprised at Turner's return on February
7, 1863, and wrote, "Turner came on board with a long report
of complaints and dangers."78
Yet after the April 7, 1863, attack, Turner became
less, or at least no more, pessimistic.

He stated in his

report that the ship's damage, except the loss of a port
shutter, was not material, although he opined that had she
been in closer action, "not one port shutter could have been
left."79 In a letter to Smith, he complained, "In a sea
76Turner to Welles, August 27, 1862, in Report . . .
Armored Vessels. 30. Turner to Merrick & Sons, September
22, 1862, NARG 71, Entry 5, Box 448, 2: 79. Also Turner's
report of the trip to Port Royal, stressing the risk of a
lee shore to a ship with such low power: "Nothing could save
her but her anchors." Turner to DuPont, January 19, 1863,
ORN 13: 518-19.
77"I desire that the Navy Department may be undeceived
if they supposed that this ship was equal to any such ser
vice [at anchor off Charleston]. . . this vessel is not
calculated for any outside work, and should avail herself of
the most favorable opportunities to get from port to port as
soon as she can." Turner to DuPont, February 6, 1863,
ibid., 13: 646-48. Events proved her equal to the task.
78DuPont to Mrs. DuPont, February 1, 1863, Hayes, Du
Pont Letters. 2: 405. DuPont to Mrs. DuPont, February 7,
1863, ibid., 2: 416. DuPont later wrote, "He [Turner] is a
queer man; I believe (indeed I know) he is a devoted friend
of mine, but he has disturbed my equanimity more since he
has joined my squadron than any other officer in it." Du
Pont to Mrs. DuPont, March 18, 1863, ibid., 2: 494 and note.
79Turner to DuPont, April 10, 1863, ORN 14: 26.
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fight at close quarters— she would be terrible," but, "She
is not adapted to this kind of [blockade] service— and is
deteriorating every day under the wear and tear of it."80
At a later Court of Inquiry, Turner testified that New
Ironsides had received damage in the April 7 attack, but
there was nothing to impair her efficiency in the slightest
degree.

He stated, "She was as ready to go into the fight

ten minutes afterwards as she ever was. . . .

No shot or

shell entered the iron-clad part of the Ironsides."81
After the attack, DuPont quickly was convinced that
the monitors were worthless.

As early as April 8 he told

Major General David Hunter, "These monitors are miserable
failures where forts are concerned. . . ,"82 For the New
Ironsides, however, he initially had kinder words.

Far from

worthless, on April 11 DuPont wrote Welles to say it was
"absolutely necessary" that New Ironsides should remain at
Charleston as "the great protective force of the blockading
vessels" against Confederate raids.83 On April 16, DuPont
wrote, "But for the Ironsides the raid of the 31st January
80Turner to Smith, April 25, 1863, NARG 71, Entry 5,
Box 449, 2: 33.
^Turner's testimony at the Stimers Court of Inquiry,
Report . . . Armored Vessels. 148-49. The Charleston press
claimed "the plating could be distinctly seen to peel off,"
but this was wishful thinking. "The Siege of Charleston,"
Charleston Daily Courier. April 11, 1863, 1.
82DuPont to Hunter, April 8, 1863, ORN 14: 30-31.
83DuPont to Welles, April 11, 1863, in Report . . .
Armored Vessels. 85-86.
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would have been repeated with more serious effect."84
DuPont's attitude toward the ship became more critical
as time passed and he received more press abuse about the
attack.

In May, a month after the battle, he told Congress

man Henry Winter Davis that he was most attacked in the
Philadelphia press "just in the proportion that the Iron
sides is more worthless than the monitors . . . she is the
greatest sham of all. . . ."85 He wrote another friend of
. . . the greater worthlessness of the Ironsides as
compared with the monitors, for defective as the
latter are they have some merits. The Ironsides has
none except of accommodation for men and officers—
and is a capital scarecrow, for the rebels have not
found her out yet, and she keeps in the rams from
pouncing again on the blockaders.86
DuPont's deteriorating opinion of New Ironsides was
thus motivated by his desire to assign the blame for failure
at Charleston to someone or something other than himself.
As the controversy grew more heated, his opinion of all
ironclads become less favorable.
Eventually, to vindicate himself, DuPont requested a
court martial for Chief Engineer Alban C. Stimers, the
84DuPont to Welles, ORN 14: 139.
85DuPont to Davis, May 3, 1863, Hayes, DuPont Letters.
3: 78. The emphasis is DuPont's. The Philadelphia Evening
Bulletin noted that Farragut took the forts below New Or
leans with a wooden fleet. "It is absurd, then, to suppose
that forts cannot be taken by iron-clad vessels whose im
pregnability has been thoroughly proved." "The Iron-Clads,"
Philadelphia Daily Evening Bulletin. April 17, 1863, 4.
86DuPont to Biddle, May 4, 1863, Hayes, DuPont Let
ters. 3: 86.
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General Inspector of Ironclads.

DuPont believed that

Stimers encouraged Fulton, the Baltimore American reporter,
with false and unfounded statements.

According to DuPont,

Stimers said the monitors received less damage than DuPont
claimed and DuPont was "too much prejudiced against the
monitors to be willing to give them a fair trial."87
Stimers was competent but overly ambitious.

He

supervised construction of the original Monitor and was
favorably mentioned in the accounts of her stormy passage to
Hampton Roads and her battle with the Virginia. After that
action, he returned to New York as General Inspector of
Ironclads, the principal assistant to Rear Admiral Francis
Gregory, the General Superintendent of Ironclads.

As such,

he directly supervised the construction of the many monitors
being built along the eastern seaboard.
Self-centered and overconfident, Stimers was no friend
of Engineer-in-Chief Isherwood because he wanted that post
for himself.88 His report of the battle of Charleston,
which defended the monitors (and denigrated New Ironsides),
87DuPont to Welles, May 12, 1863, ORN 14: 59-60.
88Edward William Sloan, III, Beniamin Franklin Isherwood Naval Engineer: The Years as Engineer in Chief. 18611869 (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute Press, 1965),
71, 74-76. Stimers later designed the notoriously defective
"light-draft monitors." Sloan recounts that Stimers was or
dered to the light-draft Tunxis in 1864. "He discovered a
plaque . . . [stating the vessel was built] 'from designs
prepared by Alban C. Stimers . . .' Reflecting on the repu
tation of this class of vessel, Stimers for once became
modest of publicity and proceeded to cut his name out of the
plate with a cold chisel." Ibid., 77.
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was a masterpiece of "political" engineering in support of
the Department's monitor construction program.
Secretary Welles confided that DuPont wanted "to lay
his failure [at Charleston] on the ironclads, and with such
a court as he would organize, and such witnesses as he has
already trained, he would procure Stimers and vessels to be
condemned."

Saying he would not put anyone whom DuPont

"wished to make a victim, in his power," Welles appointed a
court of inquiry (vice a court martial) to investigate.
"Nothing less will satisfy DuPont, who wants a victim."89
DuPont's failure first to press home and then to renew
his attack on Charleston was due to his own mental state.
Belknap reported,
John Irwin, then executive officer of the Wabash
[DuPont's flagship] reportedly said: 'DuPont was
beaten before we left Hilton Head. The reason was
that he had contemplated defeat with more earnest
ness down there than he had counted upon
success. /9°
His attitude, which Welles assessed as "imparting his doubts
to his subordinates, until all are impressed with his
apprehensions," made it impossible for him to succeed.

Yet

his pride, and perhaps fear of being relieved, kept him from
89Welles, Diary, entry for May 20, 1863, 1: 307. Af
ter testimony from most of the officers commanding ironclads
in the attack, the court, under Rear Admiral Gregory (Sti
mers' immediate superior), recommended no further action on
the charges. Report . . . Armored Vessels. 114-69.
90Belknap, "Siege of Charleston," 166.
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resigning or making clear his objection to the attack.91
DuPont, for his part, believed most of the attacks
upon him in the press came "from the mechanics in the squad
ron and the representatives in the machine shop," and wrote
that Harman Newell, Chief Engineer of New Ironsides, was
"Mr. Merrick's agent, as Stimers was for Ericsson. . . . "
He stated the idea of the "clever men": "Charleston could
have been readily taken if naval officers had believed in
the irresistible machines in their hands."92
Whatever the beliefs of the "clever men," DuPont
clearly had no faith in the ironclads.

New Ironsides en

gaged in no more combat operations while DuPont commanded
the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron.93
91K. Jack Bauer, "Samuel Francis DuPont: Aristocratic
Professional," in Captains of the Old Steam Navv: Makers of
the American Naval Tradition 1840-1880. ed. James C. Brad
ford (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute Press, 1986),
154, 158-59. In October 1862 DuPont refused Dahlgren as his
second-in-command, and Welles did not force the issue. Du
Pont knew Dahlgren earnestly desired the command and stood
high in President Lincoln's favor. For Dahlgren's attitude,
Dahlgren to Welles, October 11, 1862, ORN 13: 377-78.
92DuPont to Mrs. DuPont, May 2, 1863, Hayes, DuPont
Letters, 3: 74. DuPont to H.W. Davis, May 3, 1863, ibid.,
3: 78-79.
93After the April 7 attack, New Ironsides settled into
a "blockade service" routine. Prior to the attack, she
turned her engines (for testing) once or twice a week only.
Commencing April 19, 1863, she steamed to her anchor from
about 8:00 P.M. until dawn each day, maintaining propeller
revolutions for about one knot. This increased readiness
but consumed more coal and increased wear on the machinery.
NARG 19, Entry 1072, Steam Log of New Ironsides. April 19July 8, 1863.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
COMBAT VETERAN: MATURE REFLECTION

On July 6, 1863, Rear Admiral John A. B. Dahlgren
relieved Rear Admiral DuPont as Commander of the South At
lantic Blockading Squadron.1 Dahlgren's plans for the
Squadron took full advantage of New Ironsides' unique capa
bilities, and under his command she made a contribution to
the Siege of Charleston unmatched by any other ship.
Dahlgren's arrival had an immediate if inadvertent
effect on New Ironsides. As a result of DuPont's departure,
the ship lost her first Commanding Officer, Commodore Thomas
Turner, who was relieved at his own request.
There were several reasons for Turner's departure.
First, before Dahlgren was promoted to rear admiral, Turner
was considerably senior to him, in a service where seniority
was jealously guarded.2 Second, Dahlgren had not commanded
at sea as a commander or captain, and had not seen action in
^ivil War Naval Chronology. III-110.
2"Relative rank defined one's shipboard quarters,
one's seat at the mess table, one's duties, one's social
habits, indeed, often one's very friends." Peter Karsten,
The Naval Aristocracy (New York: The Free Press, 1972), 63.
Dahlgren was promoted Captain on August 5, 1862, and Rear
Admiral on February 27, 1863. Allison, "Dahlgren," 26.
128
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the Civil War.

Third, Turner had earlier been at odds with

Dahlgren over the gun carriage problem.
As Welles confided to his diary, there was discontent
because of Dahlgren's promotion.

DuPont spoke for many when

he wrote about Dahlgren: "He chose one line in the walks of
his profession while [Rear Admiral Andrew H.] Foote and I
chose another; he was licking cream while we were eating
dirt. . . . "

Welles told Dahlgren that if officers who had

been senior to him wanted to be transferred, the Department
would permit it.3
Turner was one such officer.

Anticipating that DuPont

would be relieved, Turner wrote to Foote, expressing his
willingness to serve under Foote but not under Dahlgren.
Although he understood Turner's "natural and proper" views
on Dahlgren, Welles was on the whole displeased with this
letter, in which Turner wrote of the "miserable monitors,"
built to fill the pockets of speculators.4 When Foote died
enroute to the command and Dahlgren replaced him, Turner
chose not to remain.

His departure probably distressed

neither Welles nor Dahlgren.

On July 6, 1863, Captain

3Welles, Diary, entry for June 21, 1863, 1: 337. Du
Pont to Fox, October 8, 1862, Hayes, DuPont Letters. 2: 243.
4In Welles' words, "Tom Turner is a simple dupe, and
merely echoes the insinuations of another [DuPont], who
moulds him at pleasure and is demoralizing that entire com
mand." Ibid., entry for May 27, 1863, 1: 314. Turner's
change in feeling from the "my dear friend" of his letter of
September 10, 1862, probably came more from Dahlgren's rapid
promotion than from the carriage problem.
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Stephen C. Rowan relieved Turner as Commanding Officer of
New Ironsides.5
Stephen Clegg Rowan was born in Ireland on Christmas
Day, 1808, emigrating at the age of ten to join his parents
in Pigua, Ohio.

He entered the Navy in 1826, served in the

Seminole and Mexican Wars, and distinguished himself in the
North Carolina sounds early in the Civil War.

Fox proposed

him as Commanding Officer of New Ironsides as early as Sep
tember 1862: "If he [Turner] wishes to give up the command,
S. C. Rowan would be an admirable man. . . ."6
Although not as cautious as Turner, Rowan still laid
stress on the navigational dangers besetting his ship.

In

July 1863 he wrote to Dahlgren that his position inside the
bar was unsafe; Dahlgren's comment was, "Curious 1 The 'Iron
sides' has been at her anchor in all weather outside in the
open sea for a year, and yet here within the bar she is
unsafe. . . . "

In August, Dahlgren wrote, "Rowan is

terribly careful about that vessel."7 In battle, however,
belles wrote in May, "There would be bitter opposi
tion to Dahlgren from some good officers as well as Tom
Turner [emphasis added], were he given the squadron."
Ibid., entry for May 27, 1863, 1: 315. Turner was relieved
July 6 and left the ship July 7, 1863.
®For Fox's proposal, Fox to S. P. Lee, September 11,
1862, Thompson, Correspondence of Fox. 2: 212. After
leaving New Ironsides in 1864, Rowan commanded in the North
Carolina sounds. He was promoted to Rear Admiral in 1866
and retired as a Vice Admiral in 1889. He died March 31,
1890. Appleton's Cyclopaedia, s.v. "Rowan, Stephen C."
DAB, s.v. "Rowan, Stephen C." NARG 24, Records of Officers.
7Dahlgren, Memoir, 404, 410.
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Rowan handled his ship boldly and resolutely.
Upon taking command of the South Atlantic Blockading
Squadron, Dahlgren lost no time in resuming active opera
tions against Charleston.

On July 10, 1863, Brigadier Gen

eral Quincy A. Gillmore attacked Fort Wagner on Morris Is
land.

The Confederates repulsed the Army's coup de main and

Gillmore began a siege, with Dahlgren's ships providing
heavy naval gunfire support for the Army troops.
Between February and July, New Ironsides' mission had
changed.

She was designed and built to fight other ships,

specifically ironclad ships, and her first employment was to
counter a Confederate ironclad threat to Hampton Roads.
When she first went to Charleston it was to protect the
blockading fleet from the Confederate ironclads Chicora and
Palmetto State. As the number of Union ironclads available
increased and more than one could be kept on station at
Charleston, the threat from Confederate ironclads became
proportionately less severe.

DuPont's April 7, 1863, as

sault marked the change in the ship's primary mission, from
ship-versus-ship action to shore bombardment.8
The April 7 attack was the first time New Ironsides
was used for shore bombardment.

Although she made a poor

showing then, her large battery made her a unique asset to
8New Ironsides' secondary mission remained the protec
tion of the blockading fleet for one overriding reason: she
was the only Union ironclad which could remain on station
and fight her guns in any weather.
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any attack on fortifications.

As a result, once Dahlgren

arrived New Ironsides was soon back in action.

On July 18,

1863, she attacked Fort Wagner, an action which set the
pattern for her participation in the "Siege of Charleston."
This attack, coordinated with the Army, was Dahlgren's
first opportunity to engage the enemy.

His correspondence

with General Gillmore shows his high estimate of New Iron
sides. The ship was scheduled to cross Charleston Bar on
July 14, but due to low tides and heavy seas she was de
layed.

Dahlgren so informed Gillmore and suggested post

poning the attack to wait for New Ironsides, which "will
double the number of guns in action from Ironclads."9
At 12:15 P.M. on July 18 the ship got underway and
stood up the channel, second in line behind the monitor
Montauk. At 12:57 she opened fire on Fort Wagner with a
150-pounder Parrott rifle and at 1:12 commenced fire with
the port broadside.
ner at 1:20 P.M.

She anchored 1400 yards from Fort Wag

She stayed there, firing broadsides and

working the engines and rudder to keep the guns bearing,
until she swung to the flood tide at 4:37 P.M.
After a pause to let the ship complete her swing, at
4:55 P.M. she commenced firing the starboard broadside.

The

fleet's fire was effective, as New Ironsides' Log records,
"Fort Wagner silenced about 4.45, the enemy driven into
9Dahlgren to Gillmore, July 14, 1863, Dahlgren Papers,
Letterbook June-July 1863, 49.
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their bomb proofs."

The action continued until 7:49 P.M.,

when she ceased firing and soon withdrew out of range.
During the action she fired 665 Xl-inch shell, 15 Xl-inch
shrapnel and 125 150-pounder rifle shell.10 Federal sailors
were impressed; a seaman aboard the Powhatan wrote,
". . . 'Ironsides' comes nobly up . . . taking a commdg
position . . . and opened upon [Fort Wagner] with shell and
judging from appearances she did terrible execution."11
New Ironsides engaged Fort Wagner again on July 20,
firing 147 Xl-inch and 21 150-pounder shell and receiving
thirteen hits.12 In this and later actions, the guns were
normally fired in rotation, one at a time, instead of rapid
ly and continuously.

Firing in rotation, an option not

available to the monitors, reduced ammunition consumption
and kept the garrison in their bombproofs.

New Ironsides

again employed the tactic when she attacked Fort Wagner
early on July 24.

During this action, the ship fired 464

rounds and took only five hits.

One of these, a X-inch

solid shot, passed through the spar deck armor.13 The Con
federates had already established New Ironsides as their
10NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. July 18, 1863.
“Charles K. Mervine, "Jottings By the Way: A Sailor's
Log 1862 to 1864," Kent Packard, ed. Pennsylvania Magazine
of History and Biography 71, no. 2 (April 1947): 134.
“Rowan to Dahlgren, May 13, 1864, ORN 14: 605; NARG
24, Log of New Ironsides, July 20, 1863.
“Rowan to Dahlgren, May 13, 1864, ORN 14: 605; Rowan
to Dahlgren, July 25, 1863, ibid., 14: 391-92.
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most serious threat; in late July, Beauregard's Chief of
Staff wrote, "Our great enemy now is the Ironsides."14
On July 29, New Ironsides stood up the channel to an
chor some 1400 yards away from Fort Wagner.

At first her

battery would not bear because a southerly breeze kept her
from swinging to the ebb tide.

At 12:20 P.M. she commenced

firing at Wagner and at Battery Gregg, on the north end of
Morris Island, receiving two hits in return.

She also sent

twenty-five rounds from the spar deck fifty-pounder rifles
at Fort Sumter, some 2500 yards distant.15 Having learned
that his ship was hard to maneuver but also hard for the
Confederates to hurt, Rowan fought her from anchor in these
engagements.
On July 30, New Ironsides anchored to shell Battery
Gregg, receiving two hits.

Before retiring she threw one

fifty-pounder at Sumter.16 The Confederates, recognizing
New Ironsides as the most effective of the attackers,
14Brigadier General Roswell Ripley's endorsement on
Brigadier General Johnson Hagood's report of July 25, 1863,
OR ser. 1, 28, part 1: 433.
lsRowan to Dahlgren, May 13, 1864, ORN. 14: 605; Rowan
to Dahlgren, July 29, 1863, ibid., 14: 408; Abstract Log of
New Ironsides, ibid., 14: 405.
“Rowan to Dahlgren, May 13, 1864, ibid., 14: 605;
Rowan to Dahlgren, July 30, 1863, ibid., 14: 408-409; ii)stract Log of New Ironsides, ibid., 14: 405. One hit
cracked the armor but did not penetrate. Rowan's May letter
gives a total of 329 main battery shell vice 329 Xl-inch and
37 150-pounders; the Log agrees with the higher figures.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

135
concentrated their fire on her.17
On August 17, the ship again anchored to bombard Wag
ner and Gregg and again fired at Sumter, this time at a
range of 2700 yards.

In return, she received thirty-one

hits, mostly from X-inch guns in Wagner and Gregg.

Four of

the nineteen hits on the armor caused cracking but little
other damage; a port shutter was shot away and the spar deck
armor was partially broken in one place.

Other projectiles

hit woodwork or the smokestack, which was holed eight
times.18 In this action, characterized by a Federal sailor
as "truly terrific, on both sides," Fleet Captain Commander
George W. Rodgers was killed.19
On August 18, 1863, New Ironsides remained underway to
bombard Fort Wagner, but on August 19 she again anchored to
attack the same target, when the "very fresh" wind "kept the
rest of the fleet quiet."20 On August 20 she fired at
Wagner from anchorage and tried two fifty-pounders at a
17"Fort Sumter and Battery Gregg replied deliberately,
their shots being made with great accuracy; nearly every one
striking and taking effect on the Ironsides." "News from
the Islands," Charleston Daily Courier. July 31, 1863, 1.
18Rowan to Dahlgren, May 13, 1864, ORN 14: 605; Rowan
to Dahlgren, August 21, 1863, ibid., 14: 459-60.
19Mervine, "Jottings By the Way," 140.
20"News from the Islands."
August 20, 1863, 1.

Charleston Daily Courier.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

136
"Rebel steamer" at the extreme range of 3,400 yards.21 The
ship also anchored for an August 21 bombardment of Wagner,
during which she received one Xl-inch hit from Sumter.22
On August 22 and 23, New Ironsides stayed underway for
her attacks on Fort Wagner.

The ship received no injuries

on August 22, but on August 23 she was hit four times.23
After twelve engagements in five weeks, her primary mission
was clearly shore bombardment in support of the Army; her
prowess against other ironclads remained untested.

Her

battery did considerable damage.24
During this period, changes were made to improve the
ship's handling characteristics.

The earlier difficulties

in ship control were partially remedied by moving the
21Rowan to Dahlgren, May 13, 1864, ORN 14: 605. Fort
Wagner's Chief of Artillery wrote, "In less than thirty
minutes after I opened fire, the Ironsides came into posi
tion, and opened an enfilade fire upon the guns engaged. My
guns being now subjected to a very severe fire and in great
danger of being dismounted, I deemed it prudent to cease
firing and to close my embrasures. . . . " Captain Robert
Pringle to Assistant Adjutant General Major Henry Bryan, Au
gust 20, 1863, OR ser. 1, 28, part 1: 547.
22The summary states she anchored, but Rowan's initial
report said she was underway. Rowan to Dahlgren, May 13,
1864, ORN. 14: 605; Rowan to Dahlgren, September 3, 1863,
ibid., 14: 533.
23Rowan to Dahlgren, May 13, 1864, ibid., 14: 605;
Rowan to Dahlgren, September 3, 1863, ibid., 14: 533; Ab
stract Log of New Ironsides, ibid., 14: 509.
24Report of Captain of Engineers J. W. Gregorie to
Capt. Molony, Assistant Adjutant General, August 22, 1863:
"I repaired sea face [of Wagner], which was sadly torn up by
the Ironsides, also traverse over southeast magazine, which
was nearly cut through . . ." OR ser. 1, 28, part 1: 503.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

137
secondary steering wheel, or "fighting wheel," from the
berth deck to the gun deck under the pilot house.25 By
shortening the reaction time between the conning officer's
order and the helmsman's response, the Captain's ability to
direct the ship in action was greatly improved.
Although her handling difficulties were ameliorated,
the ship still suffered from the tactical handicap of soft
ends.

Dahlgren wrote, "Then her ends are not armored, and

between Wagner, Sumter and Moultrie she is always enfiladed
by one or more of them."2S The armored bulkheads provided
enough protection to enable her to make her approach, after
which she fought the enemy on her broadside.
As New Ironsides gained battle experience, her battery
came to be considered the most effective in the ironclad
fleet, especially by the Confederates.27 Beauregard
opined, "she was the most effective vessel employed in the
reduction of Battery Wagner," and Confederate historian J .
Thomas Scharf called New Ironsides "more troublesome to Fort
Wagner than all the monitors combined."

The Confederates

“Belknap, "Reminiscent of the 'New Ironsides'," 68.
Similarly, it was not until August 31, 1863, that the engine
room bell pull, used to give orders to the engines, was
extended to the spar deck level. NARG 19, Entry 1072, Steam
Log of New Ironsides. August 31, 1863.
“ Dahlgren to Gillmore, August 22, 1863, ORN 14: 466.
27A Union view: "The Ironsides is capable of a more
rapid and concentrated fire, which, under the circumstances,
made her guns more effective than the XV-inch of the moni
tors." Dahlgren to Welles, January 28, 1864, ibid., 14:
598-600.
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publicly affirmed this opinion when they offered a reward
for destroying a Union ironclad— they set the amount at
$50,000 for a monitor and twice that for New Ironsides.28
One Confederate officer, a veteran of the fighting on
James Island, thought her "one of the most powerful vessels
ever built."29 Another Confederate officer in Charleston
called her
the most formidable ship of the fleet . . . Her
broadsides were not fired in volley, but gun after
gun, in rapid succession, the effect upon those who
were at the wrong end of the guns being exceedingly
demoralizing. Whenever she commenced there was a
painful uncertainty as to what might happen before
she got through.30
An English officer serving with the Confederates at Fort
Wagner observed, "As for the Ironsides, she gives three
rounds for every single shot any of our batteries think
proper to send her."31 The Charleston press also
28Beauregard, "Water Defences," 151. Scharf, Confed
erate N a w . 695. For reward, Theodore D. Wagner to Beaure
gard, August 13, 1863, OR ser. 1, 28, Part 2, 280; E. Milby
Burton, The Siege of Charleston 1861-1865 (Columbia: Uni
versity of South Carolina Press, 1970), 216. The offer in
cluded $100,000 for sinking the flagship, U.S.S. Wabash.
Thomas Jordan, Beauregard's Chief of Staff, informed B. A.
Whitney, "in charge of Submarine Torpedo-Boat," on August
15, 1863. OR ser. 1, 28, Part 2, 285.
29Major John G. Pressley, C.S.A., "The Wee Nee Volun
teers of Williamsburg District, South Carolina, in the First
(Hagood's) Regiment," SHS Papers 26 (1888): 153.
30Charles H. Olmstead, "Reminiscences of Services in
Charleston Harbor in 1863," SHS Papers 11 (1883): 159. Olm
stead was Colonel of the First Georgia Volunteers.
31S. A. Ashe, "After the Evacuation of Battery Wag
ner," Confederate Veteran 35, no. 12 (December 1927): 451.
In this article he quotes a letter from a Captain DuHaume
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considered her the most dangerous of the Federal fleet.32
Her offensive prowess was due to her large battery and
to the ease of working the guns provided by her broadside
mountings, compared with the turret mountings of the moni
tors.33 In discussing an earlier action between three mon
itors and an earthwork fortification in which Passaic fired
only 100 shots in eight hours, DuPont noted the monitors'
ineffectiveness.

He wrote, "Continuity of fire is the

thing; twenty-five minutes of the Wabash. broadside, would
take that fort about three times a day. . . ."34 New Iron
sides. with her iron protection, brought "continuity of
fire" to areas where a wooden ship like Wabash could not
possibly survive.
After the initial troubles with her gun carriages were
solved, the sole defect noted in New Ironsides' battery was
that the maximum gun elevation was only 4^ degrees.35 This
dated September 10, 1863.
32"The formidable vessel in whose capacity for injur
ing us the invaders of our harbor place their chief reli
ance." Charleston Daily Courier. October 10, 1863, 1.
33The monitor Montauk's rate of fire was one round per
gun in 2.40 minutes and New Ironsides' one in 1.33 minutes.
With her larger battery, in an hour New Ironsides could fire
360 rounds; Montauk only 25. Dahlgren to Welles, January
28, 1864, ORN 14: 598.
34DuPont to Mrs. DuPont, March 4, 1863, Hayes, DuPont
Letters, 2: 467.
35Rowan answered an inquiry about the battery, saying
the guns had been fired 334 times before he took command and
4439 times since. "The recoil is easily controlled-The car
riages show no signs of weakness." Rowan to Commander
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constraint, imposed by the size of the gun ports, limited
the maximum range to under 2,000 yards.36
Short range was a handicap at Charleston, where shal
low water kept the ship at a distance from the Confederate
forts.

In one action Rowan used the ship's roll to increase

the effective elevation of the guns, but New Ironsides did
most of her work at ranges of 1200 to 1300 yards.37 On Au
gust 17, 1863, she was able to close to within 900 yards of
Fort Wagner and on September 2, to 1000 yards.

She engaged

Battery Gregg at about 1800 yards and, after the fall of
Morris Island, engaged Moultrie at 1200 yards.38 Recalling
DuPont's intent to engage Fort Sumter at 600 to 800 yards,
these ranges were greater than optimum.
The size of the gun ports was restricted to reduce the
chance of projectiles entering them, but this meant the
H[enry] A. Wise, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, October 2,
1863, Rowan Letter Book, 151.
36In a letter of August 22, 1863 to Gillmore, Dahlgren
wrote, "her ports only allow of elevations of 4 to 4^ de
grees." ORN 14: 466. Turner said under 4°; Turner to
Smith, April 25, 1863, NARG 71, Entry 5, Box 449, 2: 33.
Tabulated ranges for the Xl-inch were:
Elevation
Range (15# charge) Range (20# charge)
4°
1,524 yards
1,660 yards
5°
1,757 yards
1,975 yards
Ordnance Instructions. Appendix B, No. V, xv.
37"Firing at Battery Gregg at extreme elevation on
weather roll. . . . " NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. July
30, 1863.
38Dahlgren to Welles, ORN 14: 590, 602; Rowan to Dahl
gren, ibid., 14: 605. The ranges depended upon the tides—
with a higher tide, the ship could approach more closely.
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range of the guns was limited by the angle to which they
could elevate without striking the top of the port.

Since

New Ironsides was designed to fight other ships and such
battles rarely took place at long range, reducing the range
of the guns in exchange for reducing their vulnerability
must have appeared to the designers as a good trade.
New Ironsides' great combat effectiveness made her a
prime target for the Confederates, and Beauregard promoted a
torpedo expedition against her as early as April 1863.

He

told Captain John R. Tucker, the naval officer in charge at
Charleston, it was of the utmost importance that "some ef
fort should be made to sink either the Ironsides or one of
the monitors," emphasizing the "great moral effect" of such
an act.39 The first torpedo attack on New Ironsides fol
lowed on the night of August 20, 1863.
This attack was made by a torpedo craft built from a
gunboat hull left on the stocks at Charleston.40 Captain
James Carlin, commanding the blockade runner Ella and Annie,
took charge of the vessel, equipped with a spar carrying
39Beauregard to Tucker, July 18, 1863, ibid., 14: 728.
Scharf describes Confederate boat expeditions in Charleston
harbor, saying most had been sent out "with a view to dis
covering the possibilities of a torpedo attack upon the New
Ironsides. . . . " Scharf, Confederate Navy. 690-91, 695.
40Captain Francis D. Lee, C.S.A., was in charge of
this effort. Lee to Beauregard, July 25, 1863, OR ser. 1,
28, part 1: 229-30. A discussion is in Milton F. Perry,
Infernal Machines (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State
University Press, 1965), 77-78.
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three torpedoes each with 100 pounds of powder.41 The
night chosen for the attack was very dark and Carlin could
not see the New Ironsides until he was nearby.

Upon sight

ing her, he lowered the spar and turned to the attack.
Either Carlin misjudged the torpedo boat's motion or
New Ironsides swung to her anchor at precisely the correct
moment, because the boat passed up the starboard side of the
ironclad rather than striking her.

Carlin's misjudgment, at

night and under stress, is most likely.

Carlin's attention

was also distracted by the boat's engine, which stopped and
would not restart.

As the boat passed, about 1:00 A.M., New

Ironsides' Officer of the Deck hailed her.

Carlin, whose

crew was working frantically on the engine, identified his
vessel as the U.S. steamer Live Yankee from Port Royal.
As New Ironsides beat to quarters and fired a rocket
to alert the fleet, the torpedo boat grazed the ironclad's
bow, and Beauregard's account stated the torpedo spar became
entangled in New Ironsides' anchor chain.42 Carlin's engi
neers restarted the engine and the torpedo boat escaped into
41Burton, Siege of Charleston. 217; Lee to Beauregard,
July 25, 1863, OR ser. 1, 28, part 1: 229-30. Beauregard,
"Water Defences," 150. The spar is shown in Lee to Jordan,
August 2, 1863, OR ser. 1, 28, part 2: 251-52. Carlin was
well-regarded by the Charleston press: "Captain Carlin cer
tainly understands how to run the blockade." Charleston
Daily Courier. April 29, 1863, 2.
42Beauregard, "Water Defences," 150. A more detailed
account is in Perry, Infernal Machines. 78-80.
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the night, under Xl-inch fire from New Ironsides.43 Carlin
"most unhesitatingly" condemned the torpedo vessel and her
engine.44

No further torpedo attack was made on New Iron

sides until October 1863.45
Meanwhile, the ship continued her support of the Army.
On September 2, the ship stood in and dropped anchor at 1:40
A.M. to shell Gregg and Sumter.

She demolished "nearly the

whole of the eastern scarp" of Sumter, in return receiving
seven hits from Gregg and Moultrie which broke the port
sheet anchor hawse pipe and cracked the floor plate of the
pilot house and a port shutter.46
She engaged Wagner and Gregg on September 5.

The

Commanding Officer of Fort Wagner noted her fire "proved
43"At 1. Saw a strange looking vessel coming up astern
very fast, and upon being hailed she answered 'Live Yankee'
from Port Royal. Beat to quarters fired a Rocket, slipped
the chain and fired several Guns at stranger but as he
passed he grazed our bows and then kept directly ahead so
that we could not get our battery to bear on him. At 1.20
he disappeared under the land." NARG 24, Log of New Iron
sides . August 21, 1863.
44Beauregard, "Water Defences," 150; Captain J. Carlin
to Beauregard, ORN 14: 498-99; Rowan to Dahlgren and Ensign
Benjamin H. Porter to Rowan, ibid., 14: 497-98.
4SRowan did not resume Turner's over-anxious practice
of steaming to anchor. The ship had by then been out of
port for seven months and repairs were already frequent;
extra wear was not desirable. NARG 19, Entry 1072, Steam
Log of New Ironsides, August 20-December 31, 1863.
46Rowan to Dahlgren, May 13, 1864, ORN 14: 605; Rowan
to Dahlgren, September 3, 1863, ibid., 14: 533-34; Abstract
Log of New Ironsides, ibid., 14: 558. For damage, Brigadier
General Ripley's report of September 22, 1863, OR ser. 1,
28, part 1: 87.
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very destructive and had a rather depressing effect on many
of the garrison, to whom it was a novelty."47 After firing
all day in exchange for one hit from Gregg, she remained
anchored off Wagner overnight, and on September 6 fought
another all-day action with the same fortifications.48
The Confederates evacuated Fort Wagner that night.
The next day, September 7, New Ironsides anchored to engage
Fort Moultrie from 5:45 P.M. to 7:15 P.M.

During this bom

bardment she received 24 hits that did little damage.49
On September 8, New Ironsides was loading shell from
the store ship Memphis when she was called up to cover the
monitor Weehawken, aground off the pass between Sumter and
Cummings Point.

Anchoring some 1,200 yards from Moultrie,

New Ironsides engaged the fort and soon drove the Confeder
ate gunners to cover.

She eventually withdrew due to lack

of ammunition, having expended every Xl-inch shell she had.
During the successful action, which involved five
monitors besides the grounded and refloated Weehawken, New
Ironsides fired 483 shell and was struck at least seventy
47Colonel Lawrence M. Keitt, Commanding Battery Wag
ner, to Captain W. F. Nance, Assistant Adjutant General,
September 18, 1863, describing the action of September 5.
OR ser. 1, 28, part 1: 489.
48Rowan to Dahlgren, May 13, 1864, ORN. 14: 605; Ab
stract Log of New Ironsides, ibid., 558-59.
49At least on this occasion, anchor chains were placed
under the sandbags to give more protection to the engine
room. Rowan to Dahlgren, May 13, 1864, ibid., 14: 605;
Rowan to Dahlgren, September 10, 1863, ibid., 14: 553-56.
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times.50 The Confederates concentrated on her, one
Charleston newspaper noting, "our guns were served with
admirable precision— six out of every seven shots on an
average, striking the Ironsides."51 Even in so heavy an
engagement, she proved her powers of resistance, emerging
with minor damage.52 The Confederates again recorded their
high opinion of New Ironsides when Beauregard's Chief of
Staff directed the shore batteries to concentrate their fire
on the nearest ironclad but specified, "Should the Ironsides
at any time come within effective range, it will be well to
concentrate fire on her."53
During the night of September 8, officers and men from
New Ironsides participated in Dahlgren's attempt to capture
Fort Sumter by assault.54 Commander Thomas H. Stevens of
50Rowan to Dahlgren, May 13, 1864, ibid., 14: 605;
Rowan to Dahlgren, September 10, 1863, ibid., 14: 553-56;
Dahlgren to Welles, January 28, 1864, ibid., 14: 594-95; Ab
stract Log of New Ironsides, ibid., 14: 559-60. The latter
says 488 shell.
51"The Siege of Charleston," Charleston Daily Courier.
September 9, 1863, 1.
52Bishop to Rowan, September 9, 1863, ORN 14: 555-56.
Rowan requisitioned six more pairs of shutters, writing in a
cover letter, "These are not times for red tape." Rowan to
Merrick & Sons, September 9, 1863, Rowan Letter Book, 146;
Rowan to Stribling, September 9, 1863, ibid., 146.
53Jordan to Ripley, September 9, 1863, OR ser. 1, 28,
part 2: 351.
54Thomas H. Stevens, "The Boat Attack on Sumter," in
The Wav to Appomattox, vol. 4 of Battles and Leaders of the
Civil War. Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence C. Buel,
eds. (New York: Castle Books, 1956; reprint), 49-50.
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the monitor Patapsco led the force of 400 sailors and
Marines in which Ensign Benjamin H. Porter commanded New
Ironsides' gig*

Without being aware of Dahlgren's plan,

General Gillmore planned a similar attack for the same
night.

Neither would yield leadership of a joint expedition

to the other and their telegrams betray a total lack of
cooperation.55 Stevens, who learned he was to lead the
attack just before it occurred, tried to decline the command
but in the end proceeded as Dahlgren ordered.56
The hastily-prepared attack was poorly planned and
executed.

The boats started up the channel towed by the tug

U.S.S. Daffodil about 10:00 P.M. on September 8, 1863.

They

were to attack in two groups, with a diversionary group
assaulting the northwest face before the main force stormed
the southeast.

The main force became confused and rushed

the fort at the same time as the diversionary group.57
The lack of a diversion made little difference, be
cause the Confederates were awaiting an attack.

They had

seen the Union boats assembling and knew of Dahlgren's plans
from intercepted messages.58 Beauregard alerted the
55The correspondence is in ORN 14: 606-610.
56Stevens to Welles, September 28, 1865, ibid., 14:
633.
57Union reports of the action are in ibid., 14: 61036.
58Alfred Roman, The Military Operations of General
Beauregard in the War Between the States 1861 to 1865 (New
York: Harper & Brothers, 1884), 2: 153-54.
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garrison and the surrounding batteries and moved the iron
clad Chicora so she could cover the outside of the fort with
gunfire.

When the Union boats were sighted, at about 1:00

A.M. on September 9, the Confederates held their fire until
the boats were within a few yards.

They then opened fire

with small arms and hand grenades and made the pre-arranged
signal to the batteries and the Chicora to commence firing.
The few Federals who got ashore were pinned down and
captured or killed.

The total Union loss was four killed,

nineteen wounded and 102 more captured, the latter including
Ensign Porter; the Confederates suffered no casualties.59
The Army detachment, seeing the lack of surprise and the
Navy's failure, withdrew without attacking.60 Belknap, who
admired Dahlgren for his physical bravery and scientific
accomplishments, wrote that this failure "seemed to paralyze
the Admiral" and prevented further offensive action.61
During the "siege of Charleston," New Ironsides suf
fered many minor injuries, but her solid armor proved its
worth as she had no serious damage or battle casualties.
One novel feature of her design showed its value when a shot
from Moultrie passed through the foundation of the smoke
stack.

The grating that protected the boiler uptakes was

“Confederate accounts are in ORN 14: 636-40; OR ser.
1, 28, part 1: 125-26, 403, 724-28.
“Stevens to Welles, September 28, 1865, ORN 14: 633.
“Belknap, "Siege of Charleston," 190.
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bent, but it kept the shot from injuring the machinery.
Despite being punished by over 150 heavy projectiles,
her fighting efficiency was never impaired.

This was in

contrast to the monitors, which frequently suffered jammed
turrets from Confederate shot.62
When Fort Wagner was abandoned by the Confederates on
September 7, 1863, with it fell Battery Gregg.63 After the
fall of Wagner and the boat assault on Sumter, New Ironsides
returned to her blockade routine.

She remained at anchor

off Charleston with fires banked and steam up in all
boilers.

The crew stood alternating watches during the

night, with half awake at their stations and half sleeping
near their guns.

Sentinels and lookouts were posted around

the ship and, after evening quarters, the officers would
gather informally on deck aft for amusement.

Alarms during

the night were frequent, as ships tried to run the blockade
and blockaders saw nonexistent torpedo boats.64
“Dahlgren to Welles, September 8, 1863, Letterbook
July-August 1863, 182.
“Quincy A. Gillmore, "The Army Before Charleston in
1863," in The Wav to Appomattox, vol. 4 of Battles and Lead
ers of the Civil War. Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence
C. Buel, eds. (New York: Castle Books, 1956; reprint), 64.
“Belknap, "Reminiscent of the 'New Ironsides'," 70,
80. One officer wrote that before the October attack, "I do
not recall having heard there was such a thing as a torpedo
boat and the attack upon us was a complete surprise." Wil
liam S. Wells to James H. Tomb, January 19, 1915, from the
Tomb Papers #723, Southern Historical Collection, University
of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina. Wells must
have confused this with the earlier incident, since he him
self was the engineer on watch during the August attack.
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The Confederates had not given up the idea of sinking
New Ironsides with a torpedo, and their second try nearly
succeeded.

Unlike Carlin's converted boat, the Confederates

built the "torpedo steamer" David expressly for torpedo
attack (Figure 18).
target.

Low in the water, she presented a small

Her steam engine drove her at six knots and she was

armed with a single spar torpedo mounted on the bow.

This

torpedo, attached to a fourteen foot tube of iron, contained

Figure 18. Confederate spar torpedo boat C.S.S. David.
(Official Records . . . Navies 15: 15)
about 100 pounds of gunpowder with four percussion detona
tors.

Her Commanding Officer, Lieutenant William T. Glas-

sel, C.S.N., had been Executive Officer of the C.S.S. North
Carolina and had already made one unsuccessful attempt at
torpedo warfare in the waters around Charleston.65
There was some debate among the Confederates on the
propriety of attacking New Ironsides with a torpedo.

One

65William T. Glassel, "Reminiscences of Torpedo Ser
vice in Charleston Harbor by W. T. Glassell [sic], Commander
Confederate States Navy," SHS Papers 4, no. 5 (November
1877): 227-30.
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school feared that destroying the ship would work against
the Confederacy by causing public revulsion at this method
of warfare.

Another held that the torpedo was "correct

warfare," and the latter prevailed.66
On the evening of October 5, 1863, New Ironsides lay
at anchor off Morris Island.

The Captain and Executive

Officer had gone below shortly after 9:00 P.M.

About 9:15

P.M., the Officer of the Deck, Acting Ensign Charles W.
Howard, saw an object 300 yards away.
ceived no answer, and hailed again.

He hailed it, re
Again receiving no

answer, he hailed a third time, saying, "Keep off or I will
fire into you."
him mortally.

The reply was a shotgun blast which wounded

A minute after the first hail, the torpedo

exploded on the starboard side, under number six starboard
gun and even with the after end of the engine room.67
The shock was considerable.
General Quarters was sounded.

On board New Ironsides.

The Marines and lookouts took

the torpedo boat under small arms fire and two main battery
rounds were fired, but as the David drifted away she van
ished in the darkness and no hits were made.

The engineers

66Wells to Tomb, September 28, 1914, and December 18,
1914, Tomb Papers. Tomb told Wells years later that Glassel
had "an excess of wine" at supper before the attack. Wells
to Tomb, March 12, 1915, ibid.
67Belknap, "Reminiscent of the 'New Ironsides'," 8081? Glassel, "Torpedo Service," 231-32; Rowan to Dahlgren,
October 6, 1863, ORN 15: 12-13; NARG 24, Log of New Iron
sides , October 5, 1863? Confederate reports in OR ser. 1,
28, part 1: 731-35.
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spread fires under the boilers and started the engine, and a
boat was launched to pursue the David.68 William S. Wells,
then an Assistant Engineer aboard New Ironsides, was playing
chess with another officer when the torpedo exploded.

He

remembered a "tremendous concussion," with water coming
through the hatches and the smoke pipe.

Some joints in the

steam piping were dislocated, and, he wrote, "I can assure
you that there was considerable excitement on board to as
certain whether the ship was sinking."69
There was excitement aboard the David as well, and for
the same reason.

The plume of water raised by the explosion

went down her stack and put out her fires, and the shock
threw some of her iron ballast into the engine and jammed
it.

Glassel then ordered abandon ship.

The crew went over

board, but the pilot, Walker Cannon, could not swim and held
on to the boat.

After drifting away from New Ironsides.

Cannon got back aboard and rescued Acting First Assistant
Engineer James H. Tomb.

They rebuilt the boiler fires,

restarted the engine and proceeded back to Charleston.
68Belknap, "Reminiscent of the 'New Ironsides'," 80;
NARG 19, Entry 1072, Steam Log of New Ironsides. October 5,
1863. Fires were banked, showing the alarm was over, at
9:30 P.M.
69Wells to Tomb, December 1, 1913, Tomb Papers.
Wells, who joined the ship in December 1862, was the only
officer who served in her throughout her fighting career,
from 1863 to 1865. He struck up a correspondence with Tomb
long after the War and the two became friends. By 1913 they
were the only surviving officers of their ships.
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Glassel and Fireman James Sullivan were captured.70
The New Ironsides was inspected the next day, both by
her crew and by Dahlgren, but little damage was found.

The

engineers suffered broken floor plates and displaced bulk
heads in the engine room and "store rooms and stores thrown
into confusion."

Divers inspected the hull and told Dahl

gren, "no impression of any consequence is to be seen, ex
cept, perhaps, the removal of some copper. . . ,"71 Ensign
Howard, who was meritoriously promoted to Acting Master
before he died October 10, was the only serious casualty New
Ironsides sustained in the action.72
In recounting the action, Beauregard stated that New
Ironsides "never fired another shot after this attack," and
remained off Morris Island "undergoing repairs" until she
was "towed" to Port Royal.73 He was totally incorrect.
70Glassel, "Torpedo Service," 232-33; Tomb to Flag Of
ficer J. R. Tucker, October 6, 1863, ORN 15: 20-21. A re
port said, "[Glassel and Sullivan] state that the people of
Charleston have very little faith in the capacity of [moni
tors] to reduce the fortifications leading to the harbor,
but hold in great fear the terrible batteries of the New
Ironsides." "Yankee History of the Attempt to Blow up the
Ironsides." Charleston Daily Courier. October 13, 1863, 2.
71NARG 19, Entry 1072, Steam Log of New Ironsides. Oc
tober 5, 1863; Dahlgren to Welles, October 7, 1863, ORN 15:
11; NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. October 6, 1863.
720rdinary Seaman W. L. Knox had his left leg broken
and Master at Arms Thomas Little was bruised all over. How
ard died of the shotgun wound to his abdomen. NARG 52,
Entry 22, Medical Journal of New Ironsides. October 5, 1863.
73Beauregard, "Water Defences," 152. Beauregard also
said the ship then went to Philadelphia, "where she remained
until destroyed by fire after the war." Roman repeats
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The damage was not significant, and on November 16, 1863,
the ship got underway to aid the U.S.S. Lehigh. Although
the grounded monitor floated free before New Ironsides could
assist, it is clear that the Federals did not consider New
Ironsides to be out of action.

The fact that she remained

on station instead of retiring to Port Royal for repairs
should have told Beauregard she was not badly damaged.74
Assistant Engineer Wells wrote after the War,
Our ship was not hurt very much, for fortunately the
torpedo struck on the starboard side amidships, and
just where we had a coal bunker, and the ship did
not make any water; and after the coal was taken
out, (which was not until the following March) we
found she was crushed in a little, but nothing very
serious.75
He opined, however,
If the torpedo had struck the ship on the port side
we would certainly have gone down, for the outboard
delivery [the sea water discharge pipe from the main
condenser] was just on a line with the point where
the torpedo struck on the starboard side.76
More damage was discovered when the coal bunkers near
the explosion were emptied.
Beauregard's error.

As Dahlgren told Welles, "upon

Roman, Beauregard, 2: 181-82.

74The non-nautical Beauregard also believed New Iron
sides' hull was five feet thick and did not correct Lee's
estimate that it was twenty feet thick. F. D. Lee to Beau
regard, October 7, 1863, OR ser. 1, 28, part 1: 733. Per
ry's partisan account credits New Ironsides with an iron
hull and also magnifies the damage. Perry, Infernal Ma
chines . 82-85.
75Wells to Tomb, December 1, 1913, Tomb Papers. Writ
ing fifty years after the incident, Wells overlooked an in
spection made in November 1863 (see below).
76Ibid.
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removing coal in the bunkers of the Ironsides. it is dis
covered that the damage done by the torpedo was much more
serious than first appeared."77 Even so, the damage was
minor: some of the beams and knees of the framing were
broken, the wooden side of the ship was sprung in, some
copper was missing and the planking abreast the engine room
was "shattered" 1H inches deep over an area six feet high
and ten to twelve feet long.78 Despite the damage, the
ship could still steam and fight without impairment.
Although damaged, since New Ironsides did not leak
"excessively" there was no compelling reason to send her
North for repairs.

Welles offered to send her to Philadel

phia for repairs and for installation of a new pilot house
and steam steering gear, but Dahlgren, rightly distrusting
the Secretary's estimate of twenty days absence from station
to perform the repairs, preferred to keep her: "After the
work has been accomplished, which will not be long after the
new monitors arrive, the Ironsides can probably be spared
77Dahlgren to Welles, November 19, 1863, ORN 15: 1617.
78Carpenter T. H. Bishop to Rowan, November 24, 1863,
ibid., 15: 17-18. Underwater damage depends in part on brisance, the ability to shatter hard structures. The torpedo
contained black powder, a low explosive with brisance only
1.5 percent of that of TNT. Melvin A. Cook, The Science of
High Explosives (New York: Reinhold Publishing, 1958), 8,
17, 308; Arthur Marshall, A Short Account of Explosives
(Philadelphia: P. Blakiston's Son, 1917), 69, 71. With the
warhead so close to the surface, much of its energy was
vented to atmosphere instead of transferred to the target.
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without disadvantage."79 Since the ship could not be sent
back to Philadelphia, plates made for the new pilot house
were sent to the ship to improve the protection (but
unfortunately not the size or location) of the old one.80
After the attack, Dahlgren directed additional protec
tive measures, active and passive, for the entire squadron.
Among the active measures were heavily-armed ships' boats
and tugboats patrolling the anchorage, extra guards and
loaded boat howitzers topside, and, on New Ironsides' pilot
house, a "calcium light" to illuminate the water around the
ship.81 The primary passive measures were barriers of logs
or rope netting placed around the ships to impede the ap
proach of torpedo boats.82
New Ironsides settled again into a blockade routine,
79For leakage, Dahlgren to Welles, November 30, 1863,
ORN 15: 17. For repairs, Welles to Dahlgren, November 24,
1863, ibid., 15: 135. Dahlgren remarked that the ship would
probably consume ten days each way to and from Philadelphia.
Dahlgren to Welles, December 6, 1863, ibid., 15: 170-71.
80Merrick & Sons built a new pilot house, to be in
stalled forward of the stack. It was five feet inside diam
eter and eight inches thick. Merrick & Sons to Lenthall,
April 17, 1863, NARG 19, Entry 71, Vol 4: 198; Merrick &
Sons to Lenthall, ibid., 4: 203. Dahlgren to Welles, Decem
ber 6, 1863, notes receipt of plates. ORN 15: 135, 170-71.
81For Dahlgren's measures, ibid., 15: 148, 15: 226.
The "calcium light," probably an acetylene lamp fueled by
calcium carbide, was provided by the Army. Gillmore to
Dahlgren, October 17, 1863, ibid., 15: 50.
82The barriers also impeded the protected ships; New
Ironsides once took five hours to remove the netting and get
underway. NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. November 16, 1863.
See also Belknap, "Siege of Charleston," 194; NARG 52, Entry
22, Medical Journal of New Ironsides. November 16, 1863.
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but Rowan's unease was evident.

He wrote, "Since the night

we were struck by the torpedo, we have found it necessary,
for the safety of the ship, to go to general quarters at 8
o'clock at night and permit the men to sleep on the deck at
their guns."

The gun deck was too low and too cluttered by

the gun slides to permit the ship to be ready for action
quickly if the hammocks were slung.83
New Ironsides saw no further combat at Charleston.

To

Dahlgren, as to DuPont, the consequences of failure loomed
larger than the rewards of success.

It did not help that

the Confederates had ceaselessly improved their defenses.
In a letter to Welles on October 18, 1863, Dahlgren stated
that his preference was to "enter the harbor with adequate
force

[emphasis added] and make my way

a defeat might involve "our forces

to Charleston."Yet

on the islands, the

blockade, and other material advantages," he wrote, and "I
confess I am not prepared to risk these unless relieved of
the responsibility of such a result. . . ."04
On October 22, 1863, Dahlgren held a council of war to
discuss the options available.

The assembled captains

agreed there would be "extreme risk incurred without ade
quate results" by entering the harbor.

It would be unjus

tified to enter the harbor with the force they had, so the
preferable course of action was cooperation with the A m y to
83Rowan to Dahlgren, November

22,

84Dahlgren to Welles, October 18,

1863, ORN 15: 134.
1863, ibid., 15:53.
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reduce Sullivan's Island and Fort Moultrie.85
Another conference, with similar results, was convened
on May 10 and 12, 1864.

Rowan's caution showed again when

he at first endorsed an attack on Sumter "with much qualifi
cation."

When the question was discussed the next day,

however, he was strongly against an attack.86 Dahlgren,
ever sensitive about his reputation, later came to believe
that Rowan was part of "that 'Ironsides' and Gillmore co
alition . . . Gillmore, undermining [me] in the papers, and
then preparing his book; while Rowan was ready to take the
vacancy!"87 In the event, the Army could not spare the men
to continue joint operations.

No further offensive moves

were made at Charleston until the end of the War.
Thus the blockade routine continued uninterrupted for
New Ironsides. There were few things to occupy the crew's
attention, but a favorite was smuggling liquor aboard.

On

one occasion, a batch of hams, "neatly covered with cotton
85Ibid., 15: 67-68. Dahlgren's need to diffuse re
sponsibility reflects Welles' opinion: "As a bureau officer
he is capable and intelligent, but he shuns and evades re
sponsibility. This may be his infirmity in his new posi
tion." Welles, Diary, entry for May 27, 1863, 1: 341.
86Dahlgren, Memoir, 453-4; ORN. 15: 430-33.
87Recorded as March 31, 1865, in conversation with
Fox. Dahlgren, Memoir. 507. There is no sign of intrigue,
but the "general sentiment" in the squadron was that if
Dahlgren left, Rowan should succeed him. J. A. DeCamp, com
manding U.S.S. Wabash, to Admiral David D. Porter, January
1, 1864, National Archives, Record Group 45, Microfilm Entry
M625, Squadron Letters: South Atlantic Blockading Squadron,
Roll 208: 74.
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cloth, painted yellow and branded true grocer fashion," came
aboard from the supply steamer that regularly visited the
ship.

Upon noticing liquid oozing from one of the "hams,"

the Executive Officer had the Master-at-Arms attack it with
a battle axe, whereupon a spurt of liquid "showed that the
tinsmith and the rumseller had put their heads together."
On another occasion, when half of the crew became more or
less drunk, a search turned up a five gallon keg of whiskey
packed in a barrel of potatoes.

Fishing over the side was

popular as well, and once provided a sea turtle which fur
nished sixteen gallons of soup for the crew.88
Dahlgren's increasingly obvious anxiety about torpedo
boats enlivened the blockade.

The information he received

from deserters and prisoners certainly showed a growing
threat.

By January 1864, the Federals had accurate informa

tion about the existence and unsuccessful trials of the
"American Diver" (the submersible torpedo boat Hunley), and
an informant had seen eight more torpedo boats like the
David under construction.89
88For liquor, George E. Belknap, "The Old Navy, His
torical and Reminiscent, With Side Glances at the British
Navy," typescript annotated in pencil, "Read January 5th,
1897." George E. Belknap papers, Box 2. The surgeon pro
vided whiskey to flavor the soup. NARG 52, Entry 22, Medi
cal Journal of New Ironsides. April 17 and June 16, 1863.
89"Information obtained from the examination of de
serters from the enemy," January 7, 1864, ORN 15: 227-31;
also Dahlgren to Welles, January 13, 1864, Dahlgren Papers,
Letterbook January-February 1864, 166. It is corroborated
in Beauregard, "Water Defences," 152-54, although in March
1864, Beauregard wrote that there were but three torpedo
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Commenting on the precautions he had earlier directed,
Dahlgren required that ships be anchored out of each other's
lines of fire and not in the deepest part of the channel,
since with minimum clearance between the ship and the
bottom, the "diving torpedo" (Hunlev) could not operate
effectively.50 He emphasized, "The blockade is important,
but the safety of the ironclads much more so."51
The next successful torpedo attack was made not by a
David but by the Hunley. On February 17, 1864, Hunlev
passed the ironclads inside the bar, apparently deterred
from attacking them by their vigilance, to reach the wooden
steam sloop U.S.S. Housatonic. At about 8:45 P.M. Housatonic saw the submersible at a range of 100 yards.

She

slipped her anchor chain and backed engines to get clear,
but three minutes later a torpedo exploded on her starboard
side.

She sank immediately, though her rigging remained

above water and all but five of her crew were saved.

Hunlev

also sank, but Dahlgren could not know of this lessening of
the threat; his concern was again increased.
In a letter to Welles, Dahlgren noted, "the whole line
of blockade will be infested with these cheap, convenient,
boats ready. Beauregard to Major General W. H. C. Whiting,
March 31, 1864, OR ser. 1, 35, part 2: 396.
50A 1 s o , he noted, raising a sunken ship would be eas
ier in shallow water. Dahlgren to the South Atlantic Block
ading Squadron, January 7, 1864, ORN 15: 226-27.

5dahlgren to Rowan, February 5, 1864, ibid., 15: 273.
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and formidable devices, and we must guard every point."92
Torpedo warfare was certainly in his mind when in May 1864
he wrote Welles that, with the forces at his disposal,
"there will be no opportunity for active operations against
the enemy at this place for some time."

New Ironsides would

probably have to be withdrawn for repairs, no more monitors
were coming to him, and most of the Army troops had depart
ed.

He asked to be relieved, "having effected all that I

believed to be in my power to punish the atrocious rebels
who harbor here. . . ."93 Welles did not agree to the re
lief, and Dahlgren remained in command of the South Atlantic
Blockading Squadron until June 1865.94
The damage from the October 1863 David torpedo attack
eventually caused New Ironsides to go North for repairs,
though she did not travel under tow as Beauregard asserted.
Dahlgren would not send the ship back to Philadelphia in
1863, but by the spring of 1864 she clearly needed a refit.
On May 5 and 6, 1864, divers again examined New Ironsides'
hull.

Their report to Rowan stated,

In our opinion from the appearance of the ships bot
tom, so much copper being off and loose, we consider
92F. J. Higginson, Executive Officer of U.S.S. Housatonic, to Dahlgren, February 18, 1864; Dahlgren to Welles,
February 19, 1864; ibid., 15: 329.
93Dahlgren to Welles, May 14, 1864, ORN 15: 430-33,
including the report of the council of war mentioned above.
94Dahlgren, Memoir, 612. Dahlgren, unrelieved, did go
North in the spring of 1864 and Rowan was "Commanding S.A.B.
Squadron Pro Tem" from March through May of that year.
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it an imperative necessity that the ship be sent
North and docked at once, for in the next two months
the worms will pierce in so many places as to seri
ously injure the planking and keels.95
By that spring of 1864, New Ironsides had been on her
blockade station for fifteen straight months and the strain
was beginning to tell on the crew as well as the ship.

Upon

Dahlgren's return to Charleston in May, he received a letter
from Marius DuVall, surgeon of the New Ironsides, who al
leged that Rowan, Belknap, and other officers had made dis
paraging remarks about Dahlgren which had demoralized the
entire fleet.

Rowan endorsed that the allegations concer

ning him were false and pressed charges against DuVall.
Since Rowan neglected to mention the other officers in
his endorsement, on May 9 Dahlgren "decided to begin with
[Belknap] as the senior officer."96 A Court of Inquiry
cleared Belknap; Duvall was found guilty by a General Court
Martial but was saved from dismissal "by the extreme favor
of Secretary Welles and Assistant Secretary Fox."97
"Messrs Smith and Phelps to Rowan, May 6, 1864, Rowan
Letter Book, 193. NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. May 5-6,
1864. The shipworm or teredo, an elongated clam, feeds on
wood particles.
"Dahlgren expressed astonishment to Rowan at this al
leged state of things. "He said he was astonished too, and
that Belknap was as clear of it as he was. . . . " Dahlgren,
Memoir, 453.
"Belknap, "Siege of Charleston," 196-97. For Bel
knap's Court of Inquiry, NARG 125, Entry M273, Courts-Mar
tial, Roll 167, Case 4305. For DuVall's preliminary Court
of Inquiry, ibid., Roll 167, Case 4306; for his General
Court-Martial, ibid., Roll 128, Case 3606. Dahlgren wrote,
"It seems that nobody ever spoke disrespectfully of me in
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On May 3, 1864, Rowan wrote to Dahlgren asking to be
relieved, stating that his health was "breaking down from a
long confinement of ten months to this ship."98 Many of
his crew had been confined much longer.

Because of her

superior seakeeping and coppered bottom, New Ironsides
stayed at Charleston while the monitors were rotated to Port
Royal for repairs and cleaning.

Belknap wrote that New

Ironsides "was the only vessel never permitted the recre
ation and refreshment of leaving behind for a few days the
wearing and unceasing strain of the blockade."99
The divers' report and the growing backlog of repairs
finally impelled the ship's return North in June 1864.
June 6, New Ironsides left Charleston for Port Royal.

On
On

June 7, Rowan wrote to Dahlgren, protesting an order to
transfer all of New Ironsides' crew with over six months of
service remaining to the receiving ship U.S.S. Vermont.
This would take over forty petty officers and disorganize
the ship, Rowan said.

Also, his men had been twenty-three

months onboard ship without liberty.100
Dahlgren's answer showed the Union manpower shortage:
the squadron was 1300 men short, the shortage was getting
the 'Ironsides.' Fortunate man!" Dahlgren, Memoir, 454.
"Rowan to Dahlgren, May 3, 1864, ORN 15: 418.
"Belknap, "Reminiscent of the 'New Ironsides'," 70.
100Rowan to Dahlgren, June 7, 1864, Rowan Letter Book,
216.
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worse and he was already keeping every man the allowed thir
ty days over the term of his enlistment.

It would be un

fair, he wrote, to send back men who had months left to
serve.

"Would not this disorganize the whole sguadron

instead of one ship. . . .?"101 Despite two more protests
from Rowan, on June 12 and 14 New Ironsides transferred 135
crewmen and 33 Marines to the Vermont.

In return, she re

ceived 121 men for passage north.102
On June 8, 1864, New Ironsides received her masts and
full sail rigging.

On June 16, 1864, she offloaded much of

her ammunition and set off for Philadelphia.

After dis

charging her remaining ammunition at Fort Mifflin, she ar
rived at the Philadelphia Navy Yard on June 24, where she
was decommissioned on June 30, 1864.103
New Ironsides made two vital contributions to Federal
efforts in the South Atlantic Squadron area.

First, her

ability to keep the sea saved the blockade of Charleston
during the early months of 1863.

No low-freeboard monitor

101Dahlgren to Rowan, June 9, 1864, Rowan Letter Book,
229-31 and Dahlgren Papers, Letterbook May-June 1864, 435.
On February 15, Dahlgren had offered a month's furlough to
any man who would reenlist for one year. ORN 15: 324.
102NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. June 12-15, 1864.
Dahlgren to Rowan, June 10, 1864, Dahlgren Papers, Letterbook May-June 1864, 474, restated Dahlgren's position and
assured Rowan that the Petty Officers who left New Ironsides
would not be disrated because of their transfer.
103NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. June 30, 1864. Bel
knap noted that after nearly 18 months without seeing any,
"there were more pretty girls in Philadelphia than any other
city could boast of." Belknap, "Siege of Charleston," 199.
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could have remained on station in all weathers as she did;
had it not been for New Ironsides, the Confederates could
have repeated their ironclad raid on the blockaders.

Se

cond, without her great offensive capability the Navy's part
in the "Siege of Charleston" would have been minimal.

The

monitors could not have supported the Army as New Ironsides
did.

While their slow firing helped eventually to batter

down Fort Sumter's walls (without, however, driving the
Confederates from the fort), they could not provide the vol
ume of fire needed to silence defending artillery, drive
troops into their bombproofs or disrupt earthworks.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
FINAL CAMPAIGNS: FORT FISHER AND JAMES RIVER

Only sketchy information is available about New Iron
sides7 refit at the Philadelphia Navy Yard.

Much of the

work was undoubtedly the result of the ship's strenuous ex
tended operations.

Drydocking would have been required, and

the work must have included hull and machinery repairs as
well as recoppering.1 Some work involved alterations based
on experience; for example, a second auxiliary pump was
installed, relieving the ship's engineers of the anxiety of
depending so heavily on only one.

Although both the steam

steering gear and the new pilot house were ready, neither
was installed, probably due to time constraints.2 Some of
1Several letters from Lenthall to Stribling are ger
mane, including one of August 3, 1864 (NARG 19, Entry 54, 2:
280) which directs a survey of the "metal sheathing on the
bottom of the 'New Ironsides'" and one of August 11 which
directs "no delay" in repairing it (ibid., 2: 281).
2For pump, NARG 19, Entry 1072, Steam Log of New Iron
sides, September 2, 1864. For pilot house and steering gear
completion, Merrick & Sons to Lenthall, October 3, 1863,
NARG 19, Entry 71, 5: 184; for installation, Lenthall to
Stribling, September 7, 1864, and Lenthall to Isaac B. Hull,
April 21, 1865, NARG 19, Entry 54. In April 1865 both were
still on hand; Merrick & Sons wanted either to install them
or be paid for them. Merrick & Sons to Lenthall, National
Archives, Record Group 19, Entry 70, Letters Received from
Contractors, 1: 107.
165
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the work was apparently done by Merrick & Sons; in June the
Bureau of Steam Engineering disapproved Merrick & Sons'
proposal to remove the forced draft blowers.3
Upon completion of her refit, New Ironsides was recom
missioned at 6:00 P.M. on August 22, 1864, under the command
of Commodore William Radford.

Radford, born in Fincastle,

Virginia, on September 9, 1809, had joined the Navy in 1825.
His career included extensive West Coast operations during
the Mexican War.

He was introduced to ironclad warfare in

Hampton Roads: his first Civil War service was as Commanding
Officer of the frigate U.S.S. Cumberland, although he was
absent on court-martial duty when his ship was sunk by the
Virginia. Between 1862 and 1864 he served as Executive
Officer of the New York Navy Yard.4
After her re-commissioning, New Ironsides remained at
the Navy Yard until August 29.

She then moved out to anchor

off Fort Mifflin, where she loaded powder and shell.

The

straining urgency which marked her previous departure from
Philadelphia was missing.

During the next month the ship

remained at Fort Mifflin while her crew exercised at General
3Isherwood stressed that no means of increasing New
Ironsides' speed should be omitted. Isherwood to Merrick &
Sons, June 25, 1864, National Archives, Record Group 19,
Entry 968, Letters Sent to Contractors, 413.
4After promotion to Rear Admiral in 1866, Radford com
manded the European Squadron from 1869 to 1870, when he
retired. He died January 8, 1890. DAB, s.v. "Radford, Wil
liam;" Appleton's Cyclopaedia, s.v. "Radford, William;" NARG
24, Records of Officers.
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Quarters and gunnery and sail drills.
Most of the men were kept aboard, although officers
had shore leave and some men went ashore on liberty.

As at

Charleston, the men did their best to sneak alcohol on
board.5 Visits from dignitaries and petty infractions of
the ship's regulations broke the monotony.6 There were
more serious incidents, too.

Marine private Terrence Devlin

died of illness on September 14; seaman Hugh Looney drowned
on October 2 when he tried to desert and swim ashore.7
On October 6, 1864, New Ironsides stood down river to
join the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron at Fortress
Monroe, Virginia, where she arrived October 8.

Target prac

tice was held October 10, "to get the men accustomed to the
smell of powder and working in the smoke."8 On October 12,
the ship moored at the Norfolk Navy Yard, where her rigging
and upper masts were removed.9 After coaling and taking in
5James Rowbottom, a second class fireman, was confined
for "endeavouring to smuggle liquor." NARG 24, Log of New
Ironsides. September 26, 1864.
6Commodore John L. Worden of Monitor fame visited the
ship (ibid., September 15, 1864) and Edward Bennett received
five hours extra watch for "committing a nuisance" out a gun
port (ibid., September 20, 1864).
7Ibid., September 14 and October 2, 1864.
8Surgeon Edward Shippen to "My dear Wife" Kate, Octo
ber 10, 1864. Edward Shippen Collection, Historical Society
of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
9The original intent was to replace her masts with
signalling masts, as had been done at Port Royal, but during
the job she was ordered to keep the lower masts. NARG 24,
Log of New Ironsides. October 12 and 13, 1864.
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shell, men went ashore to fill sandbags to protect the deck.
New Ironsides moved back across Hampton Roads to Fortress
Monroe on October 19, 1864.10
New Ironsides spent the next seven weeks near Fortress
Monroe.
wind.

It must have been evident something big was in the
The crew conducted gunnery exercises and sent men

ashore to exercise as landing parties.

Boat drills were

frequent.11 Rear Admiral David D. Porter visited the ship
on November 25, and on December 1 the crew practiced shift
ing steering from the open spar deck wheel to the fighting
wheel, "to see that everything was in order."

On December

6, 1864, three of the ship's boats were painted black, indi
cating the possibility of night action.12
The objective was officially secret.

Although Porter

wrote, "We don't often surprise the rebels; there are too
many leaky people who participate in our secret movements,"
there was only one remaining Confederate objective important
enough to merit a full-scale joint expedition.13 It was
Fort Fisher, which guarded the mouth of the Cape Fear River
10Ibid., October 14-19, 1864.
11For example, armed boat drills are logged on October
21, 22, 26, 31, November 2 and 8. Ibid., dates indicated.
“ Ibid., November 25-December 8, 1864.
“Porter to Welles, January 11, 1865, ORN 11: 228.
Major General William H. C. Whiting, Commander of the Third
Military District, Department of North Carolina, referred to
"my spy from Norfolk." Whiting to Major General J. F. Gil
mer, December 23, 1864, OR ser. 1, 42, part 3: 1297.
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and the city of Wilmington, North Carolina (Figure 19).
By the autumn of 1864, the Confederacy was visibly
failing, but Wilmington was its busiest remaining seaport.
Most of the blockade-runners came to Wilmington, and most of
the imports which kept the Confederate Army in the field
moved through there.

Closing the port had been a Federal

objective since 1862, when Rear Admiral Lee proposed a joint
expedition to capture it, but troops could not then be
spared.14 In late 1864, Secretary Welles argued that the
loss of Wilmington would be a serious blow to the Confeder
ate Army's supplies, and this argument persuaded General
Ulysses S. Grant to provide the needed troops.15
General Robert E. Lee apparently agreed with Welles.
He wrote to Colonel William Lamb, commander of Fort Fisher,
that Fort Fisher must be held or he could not subsist his
army.16 Lamb used his two years tenure as commander to
make Fort Fisher as secure as possible.
14Anderson, By Sea and By River. 277.
15Grant considered the port of "immense importance" to
the Confederacy. Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U.S.
Grant (New York: Charles L. Webster & Co., 1885), 2: 385.
Welles wrote, "I have been urging a conjoint attack on Wil
mington for months." Welles, Diary, entry for August 30,
1864, 2: 127.
16William Lamb, "The Defense of Fort Fisher," in The
Wav to Appomattox, vol. 4 of Battles and Leaders of the
Civil War, eds. Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence C.
Buel (New York: Castle Books, 1956; reprint), 642. For a
book-length treatment of the Fort Fisher campaign, Rod
Gragg, Confederate Goliath: The Battle of Fort Fisher (New
York: HarperCollins, 1991).
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TORT FISHER

MUD FLATS
NEW INLET

FORTS

OLD
INLET
SMITH’S ISLAND

STATUTE MILES

Figure 19. Fort Fisher and vicinity. (From An Atlas to
Accompany the Official Records of the Union and Confederate
Armies 1861-1865: Plate 132 Section 1.)
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There were two entrances to the Cape Fear River.

Old

Inlet was just west of Cape Fear itself, between Smith's
Island and the mainland.

It was only some six miles south

and west of New Inlet, but because deep draft vessels had to
skirt Frying Pan Shoals, which extended east from Cape Fear,
they faced a voyage of thirty or forty miles between the two
entrances.

Fort Fisher occupied the tip of the peninsula

which formed the eastern bank of the Cape Fear River and the
northern side of New Inlet.
Fisher was an earthwork, its "sea face" stretching
three quarters of a mile from the semi-detached Mound Bat
tery in the south to the northeast bastion, whence the works
turned west (the "land face") to cross the spit.

Battery

Buchanan, a detached battery, covered the fort's rear and
the Cape Fear River, and other detached batteries and torpe
does protected the landward side.17
The Fort Fisher expedition was subject to many delays,
among them those caused by lack of coordination between the
Army and the Navy.

Porter commanded the warships, and Grant

chose Major General Godfrey Weitzel to command the Army
troops.

Fort Fisher, however, lay within the military de

partment commanded by Major General Benjamin F. Butler, who
17Lamb, "Defense of Fort Fisher," 642-43; Gragg, Con
federate Goliath. 20. In December 1864, the fort mounted
twenty-four guns on the sea face and twenty on the land
face. Ibid., 19.
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insisted upon taking charge of the expedition himself.18
Butler conceived the idea that the fort could be de
molished by exploding a ship filled with powder near it, and
preparing this ship further delayed the expedition.

But

ler's force, with its transports and supply ships, was
finally ready to sail on December 9 but storms delayed it
until December 14.19 Meanwhile, the Navy portion of the
expedition rendezvoused off Beaufort, North Carolina.
New Ironsides left Hampton Roads on December 13, 1864,
and anchored off Beaufort December 15.20 The fleet left
Beaufort on December 18, arriving at their rendezvous (twen
ty miles off New Inlet) on December 20.

Meanwhile, Butler's

troops were again delayed, this time by running out of food,
water and coal.

After weathering a gale which began Decem

ber 20, the fleet awaited the transports.21 Not until
December 24 did the entire expedition join off New Inlet.
By this time, the defending Confederates were
18Anderson, By Sea and By River. 278; Grant, Personal
Memoirs, 2: 388-90; Thomas 0. Selfridge, "The Navy at Fort
Fisher," in The Wav to Appomattox, vol. 4 of Battles and
Leaders of the Civil War, eds. Robert Underwood Johnson and
Clarence C. Buel (New York: Castle Books, 1956; reprint),
655.
19Shippen, "Fort Fisher," 13; Grant, Personal Memoirs.
388-90. Shippen, writing after a lapse of years, is some
times careless of chronological detail.
20NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. December 13-17, 1864.
21Grant, Personal Memoirs. 2: 390-91; NARG 24, Log of
New Ironsides. 19-23 December, 1864; Porter to Welles, De
cember 26, 1864, ORN 11: 254-55; NARG 24, Log of New Iron
sides. December 21, 1864.
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thoroughly alarmed.

Reinforcements were sent, though they

were few because there were few to send.22 Federal volun
teers exploded the powder boat on the night of December 23,
1864, with no effect on Fort Fisher whatsoever, and on De
cember 24 the fleet commenced its bombardment.23 The fleet
carried 293 guns of IX-inch or larger caliber and included
five ironclads: four monitors and New Ironsides.24
Porter planned for New Ironsides to lead the ironclads
to a position 1,500 yards from Fort Fisher, about 500 yards
from the beach, where she would anchor and "open fire with
out delay."

The larger wooden ships would then anchor

forward of the ironclads about 2,000 yards from the fort,
with a third line of wooden ships still farther out (Figure
20).25 The fleet stood in toward Fort Fisher at daylight
on December 24.

New Ironsides set General Quarters at 9:06

A.M., and at 11:30 A.M. Porter signalled to engage.
New Ironsides headed inshore and anchored some 2,000
yards from the fort at 12:53 P.M.

A ranging shot burst

22Report of Major General Whiting, December 30, 1864,
OR ser. 1, 42, part 1: 994, 996.
23Selfridge, "Navy at Fort Fisher," 657; Grant, Per
sonal Memoirs. 392-93; Anderson, By Sea and By River. 27980; Porter to Welles, December 26, 1864, ORN 11: 254-60.
The Wilmington (NCI Daily Journal reported that the explo
sion, which "shook the houses," was the Federals blowing up
a ship which had run aground and could not get off. "Blowed
Up." Wilmington Daily Journal. December 24, 1864, 2.
24Selfridge, "Navy at Fort Fisher," 662. A list of
participating ships is in Porter's report, ORN 11: 254.
“General Order No. 70, ibid., 11: 245-47.
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short, so at 1:10 the ship steamed closer.

A range between

1,500 and 2,000 yards was better and she immediately com
menced firing.2* Porter complimented Mew Ironsides for
taking position "in the most beautiful and seamanlike man
ner."

The ship engaged the Confederate guns which fired on

the fleet and they "were silenced almost as soon as the
Ironsides opened her terrific battery."27 New Ironsides
fired 646 rounds with such enthusiasm that Porter signalled
repeatedly for the ships to "fire more deliberately."28
The fleet shelled the forts for five hours but could do no
more since the transports had not arrived.

A few arrived at

sunset, too late to land troops that day.
On Christmas Day the rest of the transports arrived,
and Porter sent twenty-six ships and gunboats to help land
troops.

For this unopposed amphibious assault the Navy

provided about 100 small boats to add to the 20 the Army
brought.

At 9:30 A.M., New Ironsides again steamed in to

bombard the fort.

On this day Porter reported the ships

fired slowly, "only sufficient to amuse the enemy while the
26NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. December 24, 1864.
27Porter to Welles, December 26, 1864, ORN 11: 255.
Lamb averred, "The guns of Fort Fisher were not silenced."
Due to limited ammunition, he had given orders to fire each
not more than once every thirty minutes. Selfridge, "Navy
at Fort Fisher," 657; Lamb- "Defense of Fort Fisher," 64748. See also reports of Colonel Lamb, December 24, 1864, OR
ser. 1, 42, part 1: 1003; December 27, 1864, ibid., 1004.
28NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. December 24, 1864.
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army landed," but New Ironsides still fired 416 rounds.29
At sunset Porter directed her to remain in position during
the night.
Meanwhile, Butler landed his men some four miles up
the spit from Fort Fisher.

After closing the fort, Butler

decided it could not be taken.30 He reembarked most of his
troops and sailed for Hampton Roads.

The remaining troops,

some 700, were reembarked by the fleet on December 27 and
the Navy returned to Beaufort.31 New Ironsides left for
Beaufort on December 28, arriving on December 29.32
During the bombardments, New Ironsides fired over a
thousand heavy shell.33 The Navy was optimistic about its
effect; New Ironsides' Log records, "Judging from the many
fires & explosions in the fort and the severe fire of the
fleet, it was evident that the fort was greatly injured or
damaged inside."34 Despite the heavy expenditure of ord
nance, however, little significant damage was done.

The

29Porter to Welles, December 26, 1864, ORN 11: 256-57;
NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. December 25, 1864.
30Butler to Porter, December 25, 2864, ORN 11: 251.
31Selfridge, "Navy at Fort Fisher," 657; Grant, Per
sonal Memoirs. 393-94; Anderson, By Sea and By River. 27980; Porter to Welles, December 27, 1864, ORN 11: 261. Shippen's chronology is wrong. Shippen, "Fort Fisher," 16-17.
32NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. December 28-29, 1864.
33Ibid., December 24, 1864; Radford to Porter, Decem
ber 31, 1864, ORN 11: 275.
34NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. December 25, 1864.
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defenders suffered only three men killed and sixty-one
wounded.35 Shells tore up the earthworks but did not pene
trate any bomb-proofs or magazines, and only four guns were
permanently disabled.36 Confederate repairs began as soon
as the fleet left, and by mid-January at least three re
placement heavy guns had been mounted.37
In return for her contribution, New Ironsides received
no significant damage or casualties from the Confederate
fire, although several shot cut up her topsides.38 Part of
her immunity must be laid to the inadequate Confederate
ammunition supply, which caused the fort's commander to
restrict his firing.39 Although Confederate fire did some
damage, most of the fleet's eighty-three casualties were
caused by the bursting of 100-pounder Parrott guns.40
35Report of Surgeon Spyers Singleton, December 30,
1864, OR ser. 1, 42, part 1: 1008-1009.
3SReport of Colonel Lamb, December 27, 1864, ibid.,
ser. 1, 42, part 1: 1004; Report of Captain John C. Little,
December 30, 1864, ibid., 1007-1008; Gragg, Confederate
Goliath. 99.
37Extract from the official diary of Colonel Lamb, ORN
11: 746-47.
38Shippen, "Fort Fisher," 15; Radford to Porter, De
cember 31, 1864, ORN 11: 275. Shippen said the dispensary
was deunaged, but that was in January 1865. NARG 24, Log of
New Ironsides. December 24-26, 1864, and January 13, 1865.
39Lamb, "Defense of Fort Fisher," 647-48. The fort
fired only 1390 rounds from forty-four heavy guns during the
December 24-25 bombardment. OR ser. 1, 42, part 1: 1007.
40Porter to Welles, December 26, 1864, ORN 11: 256;
Selfridge, "Navy at Fort Fisher," 662. An inquiry deter
mined five guns burst and forty-five men were killed or
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The enemy had not hurt New Ironsides, but nature dealt
her a heavy blow.

Her rudder, partially disabled December

30, received injuries on December 31 which put it completely
out of commission.

The outer rudder broke loose first and

soon both outer and inner rudders were adrift.
head was twisted off just above the blade.

The rudder

Although Radford

rigged improvised steering gear consisting of a chain around
the rudder, the ship's steering was impaired.41
Porter was irate at the failure to take Fort Fisher
and Grant was distressed, not least because Butler had ig
nored Grant's explicit instructions not to relinquish a
foothold if he obtained one.42 Grant informed Porter he
would send the same troops back with a different leader and
selected Major General Alfred H. Terry to command the Army
portion of the expedition.

The troops reembarked on January

6, 1865, and arrived off Beaufort on January 8.43 Delayed
wounded. Resolution of the House of Representatives, Jan
uary 5, 1865, with endorsements, ibid., 11: 359-60.
41Radford to Welles, January 20, 1865, ibid., 11: 616.
New Ironsides participated in the second attack on Fort
Fisher with temporary steering gear. Radford to Porter,
January 7, 1865, ibid., 11: 414. NARG 45, Entry 395, Sub
entry 87, Radford to Porter, December 30, 1864, and January
1 and 2, 1865; NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides, December 3031, 1864.
42Porter to Welles, December 27, 1864, ORN 11: 261-62.
43Grant, Personal Memoirs. 2: 394-96. "Porter told
Grant the fort could be had any time they sent a competent
general to take it. The presidential election was over and
the war was on the downhill slope, and it was suddenly real
ized that Butler no longer need be handled with tongs. So
Grant relieved him. . . . " Bruce Catton, A Stillness at
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again by a heavy gale, the fleet got underway from Beaufort
on January 12 and the first landings at Fort Fisher took
place January 13.44 This time the Army had come to stay.
The Confederates saw the fleet's approach on January
12 and sent again for reinforcements.45 Even with the 700
men who arrived on the 13th, Colonel Lamb had only 1,800 to
defend Fort Fisher and its outlying works.46 Porter's plan
was similar to that used in December, but all the ships were
closer to the fort, with the monitors engaging at a range of
1,200 yards (Figure 2l).47 In addition, Porter formed a
force of seamen to assist the Army troops.48
The ironclads steamed inshore to their anchorages
early in the morning of January 13.

At about 8:30 A.M. New

Ironsides anchored and at 8:36 Fort Fisher "fired the first
gun . . . which was immediately answered."49 The ships
Appomattox (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1954), 329.
44Porter to Welles, January 14, 1864, ORN 11: 432-33;
Grant, Personal Memoirs. 2: 396; Selfridge, "Navy at Fort
Fisher," 657-58.
45Report of General Braxton Bragg, January 20, 1865,
OR ser. 1, 46, part 1: 431-32.
46Lamb, "Defense of Fort Fisher," 647; Selfridge, "Na
vy at Fort Fisher," 658, 661.
47General Orders 78, January 2, 1864, ORN 11: 425-27.
48General Orders 81, January 4, 1864, ibid., 11: 427.
Selfridge said volunteers were called for, but this General
Order required commanders to detail as many men as they
could spare. Selfridge, "Navy at Fort Fisher," 658.
49NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. January 13, 1865.
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opened fire in a "spirited engagement" which soon made the
fort "look very dilapidated."50 Lamb judged the fire of
the ships was concentrated with the intent of destroying the
landward defenses, and the fort suffered much more heavily
than during the December bombardment.51
The Confederates were still short of ammunition,
having received ncne between assaults, so Lamb imposed the
same restrictions on firing as before.52 New Ironsides was
again a target.

"Our fire was returned very briskly, and we

were struck more frequently" than in December, but the only
significant damage was an X-inch shot which entered sick bay
and smashed the dispensary.S3 Meanwhile, Terry's troops
landed five miles up the spit from the fort.

They moved

south to a point three miles from the fort, then closed to
two miles by 2:00 A.M. on January 14.54
After dark on January 13 the wooden ships withdrew to
anchorage, but the ironclads remained to harass the enemy
with sporadic fire.

New Ironsides shifted anchorage at 9:30

P.M., "The enemy having found the exact range of this ship
50Porter to Welles, January 14, 1865, ORN 11: 433.
Porter timed the first shots from Fort Fisher at 7:30.
51Report of Major General Whiting, January 18, 1865,
OR ser. 1, 46, part 1: 439-40.
“Lamb, "Defense of Fort Fisher," 647-48.
“Shippen, "Fort Fisher," 17; NARG 24, Log of New
Ironsides. January 13, 1865.
“Report of Major General Terry, January 25, 1865, OR
ser. 1, 46, part 1: 396-97.
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during the day."55 Lamb noted that the defenders "could
scarcely gather up and bury our dead without fresh casual
ties," and it was impossible to repair the damage done to
the land face of the fort.56
On January 14 the bombardment resumed, with the wooden
ships returning to their positions during daylight.

New

Ironsides resumed firing at 11:00 A.M. when directed by
Admiral Porter.

Her target was Fort Fisher, but "at 1.30 A

rebel gunboat in Cape Fear River attempted to shell our
camp, when the fire of this ship's battery was directed to
her with effect and she withdrew." New Ironsides also dis
abled a "very troublesome" X-inch which had damaged her the
day before.57 The Army landed artillery and moved down the
river, or inland, side of the peninsula.

By evening they

were within a mile of the fort.58
The Confederates tried to stop the Federal troops with
artillery but could not; "to fire from that [land] face was
to draw upon the gunners the fury of the fleet."

Only three

55NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. January 13, 1865.
This corroborates Shippen's anecdote. Shippen, "Fort Fish
er," 18.
5SLamb, "Defense of Fort Fisher," 648; Whiting to Gen
eral Robert E. Lee, February 19, 1865, OR ser. 1, 46, part
1: 441.
57NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. January 14, 1865.
58Report of Major General Terry, OR ser. 1, 46, part
1: 397.
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or four guns remained on the land face.59 Lamb repeatedly
telegraphed General Braxton Bragg, in charge of defending
Wilmington, to organize a counter-attack using the 6,000
troops of General Robert Hoke's division.

Bragg, believing

the garrison could hold the fort and that committing Hoke
risked losing the whole state, did not attack.60
New Ironsides remained in position without having to
shift anchorage the evening of the 14th.

Since she had

fired over 2,300 rounds in two days, she loaded 518 Xl-inch
shell from the U.S.S. Wilderness.61 New Ironsides resumed
her bombardment at 7:16 A.M. on January 15, firing slowly
and bursting her shells precisely, and continued all day.
Late in the morning, Porter landed his 1,600 sailors
and 400 Marines north of the fort, in view from New Iron
sides. He planned to have them assault the seaward side of
the fort while the Army attacked the landward side.62 Af
ter some delay, both attacks commenced at 3:00 P.M.

New

Ironsides ceased firing at 3:10 P.M. and at 3:27 saw that
59Lamb, "Defense of Fort Fisher," 648; Whiting to Lee,
February 19, 1865, OR ser. 1, 46, part 1: 441.
60Lamb, "Defense of Fort Fisher," 648-49, 654; Report
of Major General Bragg, January 20, 1865, OR ser. 1, 46,
part 1: 433-34. Gragg, Confederate Goliath. 26-29, 59-60,
99-101, 110-11, 117-20 for Lamb's difficulties with Bragg.
“NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. January 14-15, 1865.
“Porter to Welles, January 17, 1865, ORN 11: 439; Re
port of Major General Terry, OR ser. 1, 46, part 1: 398.
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the sailors had been repulsed.63
The Navy assault failed when the defenders pinned the
sailors down within 100 yards of the fort, but it occupied
many Confederates and permitted the Army to gain a foothold
on the northwest corner.64 In addition, three days of na
val bombardment had disabled all but one heavy gun on the
landward face of the fort.65
Once inside, the troops cleared each traverse in turn,
the Confederates fighting stubbornly and making frequent
counter-charges.

About 350 reinforcements, comprising two

South Carolina regiments of Hagood's brigade, arrived by
steamer during the fighting but Navy gunfire drove the ves
sel off before the rest of the brigade could land.66
Naval gunfire was decisive.

In addition to destroying

the fort's landward artillery and preventing reinforcement,
the ships, especially the ironclads, supported the Army
directly, firing on the traverses with "deadly precision"
“NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. January 15, 1865.
“Porter to Welles, January 17, 1865, ORN 11: 439-41;
Lamb, "Defense of Fort Fisher," 650-51; Selfridge, "Navy at
Fort Fisher," 659-60; Report of Major General Terry, OR ser.
1, 46, part 1: 398-99. Porter blamed the Marines for the
failure, but the sailors were poorly organized and armed for
land combat. Lamb wrote, "Had the fleet helped their own
column as they did afterward that of the army, theirs would
have been the glory of victory."
“Lamb, "Defense of Fort Fisher," 648; Whiting to Lee,
February 19, 1865, OR ser. 1, 46, part 1: 441.
“Lamb, "Defense of Fort Fisher," 649; Report of Gen
eral Bragg, OR ser. 1, 46, part 1: 433.
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and breaking up defensive concentrations.67 Again New
Ironsides took the lead.

Porter wrote.

His [Radford's] vessel did more execution than any
vessel in the fleet, and even when our troops were
on the parapet I had so much confidence in the accu
racy of his fire that he was directed to fire on the
traverses in advance of our troops and clear them
out. This he did most effectually, and but for this
the victory might not have been ours.68
In the evening, the fort's remaining defenders with
drew south toward Battery Buchanan, expecting to cover their
further retreat from there.

They found the battery's Con

federate Navy garrison already gone, the guns spiked and all
the boats taken.

New Ironsides' part in the battle ended

when she ceased fire about 7:00 P.M., having supported the
Army with a total of 2,783 main battery rounds and 113
fifty-pounders.69 Battery Buchanan, the last remaining
outpost of Fort Fisher, surrendered at about 10:00 P.M.70
In return for her vital contribution, New Ironsides
received little damage.

Radford reported that though the

67Lamb, "Defense of Fort Fisher," 652. The traverses
are spaced so closely that the precision firing New Iron
sides did would not be easy for modern fire control systems.
68Porter to Welles, January 28, 1865, ORN 11: 453.
Lamb agreed: "Just as the tide of battle seemed to have
turned in our favor the remorseless fleet came to the rescue
of the faltering Federals." Lamb, "Defense of Fort Fisher,"
652.
69NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. January 15, 1865.
70Lamb, "Defense of Fort Fisher," 653-54; Porter to
Welles, January 15, 1865, ORN 11: 434-35; Reports of Major
General Whiting, January 18, 1865, and February 19, 1865, OR
ser. 1, 46, part 1: 440, 442.
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ship was often struck, "she has not been much hurt."

Once

again, no one aboard was injured.71 The fleet suffered 82
killed, 269 wounded and 35 missing in the second attack,
mostly in the ground assault on the fort.72
Upon departing Fort Fisher on January 17, 1865, New
Ironsides returned to Hampton Roads, arriving off Fortress
Monroe on January 18.

The reason for her return was to

repair her rudder at the Norfolk Navy Yard, but there was
soon other work for her to do in the Hampton Roads area.
The Confederates had built three ironclads on the
James River at Richmond, the Richmond. Fredericksburg. and
Virginia II.73 They were both protected and restricted by
obstructions in the James.

In 1862, the Confederates

blocked the James at Drewry's Bluff, six miles below Rich
mond, to prevent the Union Navy from passing upriver and
attacking the Confederate capital (Figure 22).

Though the

obstructions kept the Union ironclads from going upriver,
71A X-inch solid shot "badly smashed" one armor plate,
and another came through the side forward of the armor.
Radford to Porter, January 20, 1865, ORN 11: 616. NARG 52,
Entry 22, Medical Journal of New Ironsides.
72Selfridge, "Navy at Fort Fisher," 662; Porter to
Welles, January 17, 1865, ORN 11: 442-44. New Ironsides
lost a former shipmate when Lieutenant Benjamin Porter was
killed ashore. Selfridge, "Navy at Fort Fisher," 662; Por
ter to Welles, January 15, 1865, ORN. 435.
73The Richmond was the first completed, in mid-1862.
Scharf states July 1862; Still states the incomplete ship
was towed up from Norfolk in May 1862 and completed six
months later. Scharf, Confederate States N a w . 727; Still,
Iron Afloat. 168-71. The others were commissioned in March
1864, ibid., 170.
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they also prevented Confederate ironclads from attacking
Union troops or shipping below Drewry's Bluff.
Despite the completion of the Richmond in 1862 to
protect the city, President Jefferson Davis refused until
May 1864 to permit a channel through the obstructions.74
The Confederate ironclads finally passed the obstructions in
late May 1864.

By then there were several monitors in the

James and it was too late for the Confederates to accomplish
anything against the Union base at City Point.
Grant was still worried about his supplies.

Not con

fident of the Navy's ability to prevent a raid, he directed
Butler to block the James at Trent's Reach, the northwestern
anchor of Butler's defensive line across the Bermuda Hundred
peninsula.75 Butler blocked the river on June 13, 1864, by
sinking hulks filled with stones.76 Conditions in the
James remained stalemated, with Confederate ironclads above
Trent's Reach and Union ironclads below, until January 1865.
In mid-January 1865 the Confederates determined that a
successful raid on City Point would relieve Union pressure
74Ibid., 169-71, 173; Parker, Recollections. 356-57.
7STrent's Reach was six statute miles west northwest
of City Point as the crow flies but some seventeen miles up
the James, and ten miles downstream from Drewry's Bluff.
"Map of the James River from Chaffin's Bluff to City Point,"
ORN facing 11: 663; Still, Iron Afloat. 176-77.
76Scharf, Confederate States N a w . 734-35; Still, Iron
Afloat, 176-78, 180. In August, Butler began digging a canal
across the Dutch Gap peninsula to bypass the Trent's Reach
obstructions and give the Union a clear route to attack
Drewry's Bluff. Although completed, it was never used.
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on Richmond.

On January 23, heavy rain washed away some of

the Trent's Reach obstructions, at a time when there was
only one Union ironclad in the James, the monitor Onondaga.
Taking advantage of the opening, a Confederate force com
prised of the three ironclads, a gunboat, and four torpedo
craft arrived at Trent's Reach that evening.

The Freder

icksburg . with the shallowest draft, could pass the obstruc
tions but the other two ironclads grounded above them on a
falling tide.

Fredericksburg returned above the obstruc

tions and the expedition was effectively over.

Onondaga

engaged the Confederates from a distance on the morning of
January 24, causing some damage, but the Confederates re
floated their ships on the rising tide and retired.77
The abortive attack caused consternation in the Union
command.

New Ironsides, which had steamed from Fortress

Monroe to Norfolk on January 21, 1865, started up the James
on January 25, her mission once again countering Confederate
ironclads.

After anchoring for the night, she continued on

upriver, grounded briefly on Harrison's Bar, and anchored
off Bermuda Hundred at 11:10 A.M. on January 26.78
Upon his arrival, Radford relieved Commander William
77Ibid., 183-86; Scharf, Confederate States N a w . 74042; Parker, Recollections. 365-66. Commander William A.
Parker (no relation to William H. Parker), the commander of
the James River Division, was relieved at Grant's request
for lack of aggressiveness. OR ser. 1, 46, part 2: 218.
78NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. January 21, 25, 26,
1865. The river was so shallow that she later grounded
while at anchor. Ibid., February 9, 1865.
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A. Parker as commander of the James River Division of the
North Atlantic Blockading Squadron.79 There were frequent
alarms and considerable small boat activity, but New Iron
sides remained at Bermuda Hundred without major incident
until February 17, 1865.80 Radford departed the ship on
that date, hoisting his pennant as commander of the James
River Division in U.S.S. Dumbarton. He left his Executive
Officer, Lieutenant Commander Robert L. Phythian, in charge
of New Ironsides as acting Commanding Officer.81
Phythian's first duty was to return New Ironsides to
Norfolk for the repairs interrupted by the Confederate
sortie.

She left Bermuda Hundred at 7:30 A.M. on February

18, grounded again on Harrison's Bar, and later anchored for
the night.
19.

She arrived at Norfolk at 4:30 P.M. on February

After offloading shot and shell on February 23 and 24,

she proceeded on February 27 to the Navy Yard.

She spent

until March 3, 1865, offloading guns and carriages, and then
79Radford was ordered to report to Grant when he took
command of the Division. By February 23, 1865, the command
had been retitled the James River Flotilla. Radford to
Porter, February 23, 1865, ORN 12: 48.
80For example, Radford telegraphed Welles on January
29, 1865: "Deserters report rebel ironclads to come down
again; all ready for them." Ibid., 11: 710. On February 6,
New Ironsides' Log noted the rams were moving downriver. On
February 22, "It is thought an attack will be made in a few
days, or at any time." Radford to Captain E. T. Nichols,
February 22, 1865, ibid., 12: 46.
81Radford to Porter, February 23, 1865, ORN 12: 48;
NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. February 17-18, 1865. Phy
thian styled himself as "Commanding pro tern." NARG 19,
Entry 1072, Steam Log of New Ironsides. February 21, 1865.
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on March 6 offloaded powder.

Finally, on March 9, her draft

was reduced enough to remove the rudder for repairs.82
The Navy Yard completed the repairs and rehung the
rudder on March 20, 1865.

On March 20, 21 and 22, New Iron

sides took in her guns and carriages and the spars she
landed in October 1864.

On March 23, Radford was officially

detached, making Phythian the ship's Commanding Officer.83
By this time the war, as far as the Navy was con
cerned, was over.

The Navy Department was already trying to

reduce expenses and there were no enemies left against whom
New Ironsides could fight.84 On March 24, the ship took in
powder and on March 25, she completed loading powder and
shot.

On March 27, the ship moved into Hampton Roads, and

on March 28, she left Norfolk for the last time, bound for
Philadelphia with the steamer U.S.S. Fahkee.85
New Ironsides arrived in Philadelphia on March 30,
82NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. February 18-March 9,
1865. Report of Vessels at the Naval Station Norfolk for
the week of March 11, 1865, NARG 45, Subject File, AR— Mis
cellaneous Material Relative to Repairs, U.S. Ships, Box
106; also weeks of March 18 and March 25, 1865.
83NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. March 23, 1865. On
April 28, 1865, Radford relieved Porter as Commander of the
North Atlantic Blockading Squadron. ORN 12: 129.
84The Secretary's letter was dated February 24, 1865.
Report of the Secretary of the Navy. 1865 (Washington: GPO,
1865) (hereafter SecNav rvearll. ix. "With the war coming
to an end, however, Welles' ingrained sense of thriftiness
reasserted itself." Niven, Gideon Welles. 506.
85NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. March 21-27, 1865?
Captain E. T. Nichols, Senior Officer at Hampton Roads, to
Porter, March 28, 1865, ORN 12: 86.
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1865, and anchored off the Philadelphia Navy Yard.

The pace

of operations was "normal peacetime:" the ship started to
offload ammunition on Saturday, April 1, and completed the
effort on Monday, April 3, rather than working on Sunday to
finish the job.

On April 5, she moored at the Navy Yard and

sent her remaining stores ashore.

At 9:45 A.M. on April 6,

1865, New Ironsides7 commissioning pennant was hauled down
for the last time.86
86NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. March 31-April 6,
1865.
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CHAPTER NINE
CONTEMPORARIES AND COMPETITORS

New Ironsides was a successful ship, both in the eyes
of Union and Confederate contemporaries and in the light of
history.

She proved herself in combat under severe condi

tions and amply justified the pride of her builders by
spending fifteen uninterrupted months off Charleston without
the refit or repair periods granted to the monitors.

Her

gunnery was more effective than the monitors, and she could,
as DuPont phrased it, keep the sea.

She compared very fa

vorably with her contemporaries, both monitors and foreign
ironclads.
The monitor type was characterized by low freeboard,
complete absence of sail power, and an armament consisting
of a few heavy guns placed in closed, revolving turrets,
whereas New Ironsides had high freeboard and a broadside
armament.1

The most important difference between the two

types was in freeboard, the vertical distance between the
definition from William Hovgaard, Modern History of
Warships (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute Press,
1971; reprint of 1920 edition), 27.
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water and the edge of the weather deck.2
John Rodgers, who commanded the monitors Weehawken and
Dictator. wrote in 1864 an exposition of the virtues of the
monitors.

He noted that, while the monitors and the New

Ironsides type each had "peculiar advantages" and both were
needed,
When the Monitor class measures its strength against the
Ironsides class, then, with vessels of equal size, the
Monitor class will overpower the Ironsides class; and,
indeed, a single Monitor will capture many casemated
vessels of no greater individual size or speed. . . .3
Rodgers' analysis, based upon equal displacement, begs the
question of effectiveness.

Compared to the monitors, New

Ironsides makes an excellent showing.
In resistance to damage, New Ironsides was the equal
of any monitor, despite her unarmored ends.

She never had a

man seriously hurt in action.4 This was at least in part
due to the protection given by her solid plating, which gave
more resistance for the same total thickness of iron than
did laminated plate.5 Although the later monitors gained
2Gillmer, Modern Ship Design. 26, for a discussion of
freeboard and its significance.
3John Rodgers to Welles, April 7, 1864, quoted in
Johnson, John Rodgers. 220.
4Ensign Howard, mortally wounded by a shotgun blast
from the David. was the only man killed by the enemy. Bel
knap, "Reminiscent of the 'New Ironsides'," 64; NARG 52,
Entry 22, Medical Journal of the New Ironsides. The ship
did lose men to accidents and disease.
5Chapter 2, 42n above for modern results. Lenthall
and Isherwood to Welles, June 10, 1862, found laminated
armor "very inferior for equal aggregate thicknesses." NARG
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some advantage in protection from their eleven inch turret
armor, their major protective advantage was their small
target area.

At Fort Fisher, for example, the monitors were

"fired at a great deal" but seldom hit.6
When they were hit, the monitors sustained consider
able damage.

Their laminated armor required complex bolting

and riveting to hold it together.

Shot hitting the outside

frequently sheared the bolts and caused the nuts to fly
around inside like projectiles.

In an engagement between

the monitor Montauk and Fort McAllister on the Ogeechee
River, Montauk suffered considerable damage of this kind.7
Of the seven monitors engaged in DuPont's attack on
Charleston, at least four suffered severely from broken
bolts.8 Passaic had the roof of her pilot house knocked
loose and several bolts broken.

Weehawken had thirty-six

broken in the turret and "a good many" in the pilot house.
Nantucket lost many bolts and Nahant had seventy-seven
19, Entry 49, 387. Lieutenant Commander E. Simpson, Com
manding U.S.S. Passaic. to Welles, October 14, 1863: "Solid
plates . . . only 4 [sic] inches thick, resist the impact of
shot much better than the 5 inches of laminated iron. . . ."
ORN 15: 38. See also Baxter, Ironclad Warship. 202-203.
6Porter to Welles, ORN 11: 602.
7Commander John L. Worden to DuPont, February 2, 1863,
enclosing Second Assistant Engineer Thomas A. Stephens to
Worden, February 2, 1863, ibid., 13: 630-32.
8Very, "Development of Armor," 396. Testimony at the
Stimers Court of Inquiry is presented in Report . . . Ar
mored Vessels. 61-73. Hunter, A Year on a Monitor. 51, de
scribes injuries to the Nahant.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

196
broken in the turret and pilot house, one of which killed
the quartermaster.9 Fabric or light iron screens had to be
installed inside the turrets and pilot houses to protect the
occupants.

Even with the screens, casualties occurred; in

August 1863 Dahlgren's fleet captain, Commander George W.
Rodgers, was killed in U.S.S. Catskill by pieces of broken
bolts.10
In speed, New Ironsides was at a slight disadvantage
to most of the monitors.

Dahlgren, who was favorably im

pressed with the monitors, credited them with seven knots
and New Ironsides with six to seven.11
The broadside battery was far more effective than the
turret batteries of the monitors in providing a high volume
of fire.12 The monitors had more flexibility, since New
9For Passaic. Captain Percival Drayton to DuPont,
April 8, 1863, ORN 14: 10; for Weehawken. John Rodgers to
DuPont, April 8, 1863, ibid., 14: 12; for Nantucket, Comman
der D. M. Fairfax to DuPont, April 8, 1863, with enclosures,
ibid., 14: 18-20; for Nahant, Commander John Downes to Du
Pont, April 8, 1863, ibid., 14: 22, and Hunter, A Year on a
Monitor, 51-53.
10Report of Lieutenant Commander Charles C. Carpenter,
August 17, 1863, ORN 14: 458.
11Dahlgren to Welles, ORN 14: 598. The Charleston
monitors were rotated to Port Royal for maintenance and
cleaning; New Ironsides was not. New Ironsides was coppered
to prevent fouling, but during her first commission she suf
fered from copper falling off in sheets. Turner to Smith,
April 2, 1863, NARG 71, Entry 5, Box 449, 2: 7.
12"If the depth of water would only permit her to ap
proach, I would sweep the ground clean with her powerful
broadside." Dahlgren to Welles, July 30, 1863, ORN 14: 410.
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Ironsides could not fire except on the broadside.13 The
monitors had essentially unlimited firing arcs.

The Xl-inch

guns of the New Ironsides were the largest which could
practicably be handled and trained without the mechanical
assistance provided by the turret.
Due to their powerful XV-inch guns, the Passaic and
Canonicus classes of monitors would have been more effective
than the New Ironsides in ship to ship combat in protected
waters.

Against such antagonists, the best tactic for New

Ironsides would have been to close as rapidly as possible,
accepting the chance of a disabling hit from the monitors'
slow-firing XV-inch to come to a range where the smaller but
far more numerous shot from her rapid-firing Xl-inch could
tell.

Once at close range she would have had an excellent

chance of disabling the monitor turrets.14
The most significant difference between New Ironsides
and the monitors was in freeboard.

The early monitors had

one to two feet of freeboard, and the trunnion axes of their
guns were within five feet of the water.

Even "seagoing"

monitors such as the Miantonomoh class had a freeboard of
13New Ironsides could fire twenty degrees forward and
abaft the beam. Chief Constructor Henry Hoover to Smith,
March 31, 1863, NARG 71, Entry 5, Box 449, 1: 160.
14The monitor captains reported "much solicitude" for
their turrets' "liability . . . to cease to revolve" when
struck. Joint Report of Officers Commanding Ironclads, May
25, 1863, ORN 14: 214.
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only two feet seven inches.15
New Ironsides' freeboard was about thirteen feet and
her gun port sills at least seven feet above the water.
Depending on her loading, the trunnion axes of her guns were
at least nine feet above water.

The result was increased

command for the guns and less interference from waves.

In

anything but protected waters, the low freeboard of the
monitors left them unable to work their guns, placing them
at a serious disadvantage.16
In addition, the Ericsson turrets of the monitors were
in theory kept watertight by having the bottom of the turret
plates bear against a brass ring set into the deck.

The

turret revolved around and was supported by a central spin
dle, which was wedged up to permit the turret to turn.

When

the turret was so raised, there was a gap between the turret
and the ring which permitted much water to enter.

After the

action at Charleston Captain Percival Drayton, commanding
the Passaic. called this "a most serious evil” and said it
required correction "if the turret is to be kept up [ready
lsHovgaard, History of Warships. 33; Gardiner, Fight
ing Ships. 121.
16"At times the sea would go over the turrets. . . ."
Porter to Welles, on the transit to Fort Fisher, ORN 11:
601. Similarly, Radford to Porter, January 16, 1865: The
monitors had "not only proved that they could ride out heavy
gales at sea, but fight their guns in moderately smooth
[emphasis added] weather, which has been doubted by many in
telligent officers." Ibid., 11: 462.
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for action] in any but the smoothest weather."17
High freeboard also helps a ship maintain her speed,
especially against a head sea, since with a low freeboard
the bow is often buried in the waves and this increases the
ship's resistance.

The monitors suffered severely from

this; although their motion was generally easy, they shipped
dangerous quantities of water and could not make much head
way.18 Due to her higher freeboard and better seakeeping
New Ironsides could have maintained her speed better at sea.
Being coppered, she could expect a longer useful time before
bottom fouling would markedly reduce her speed.19
It was only in their shallow draft that the monitors,
under the conditions of the Civil War, had a decisive advan
tage.

The monitors drew less than twelve feet of water; the

New Ironsides about fifteen.

Dahlgren's opinion was that

ten to eleven feet was the "most convenient" draft and that
17Drayton to DuPont, April 8, 1863, ibid., 14: 11.
18Drayton, referring to John Rodgers' riding out a
gale in Weehawken: "If he can get her along against a head
sea comfortably and safely, she is a different concern from
the Passaic." Drayton to DuPont, February 7, 1863, Hayes,
DuPont Letters. 2: 425. Rodgers himself co-signed a report
to Welles stating that the monitors "have been exaggerated
into vessels capable of keeping the seas, and making long
voyages alone." Joint Report of Officers Commanding Iron
clads, May 25, 1863, ORN 14: 214.
19When foul, the monitors' speed was 3.5 or 4 knots.
After cleaning, Montauk's speed improved from 3.5 to 6
knots. Dahlgren to Welles, November 4, 1863, ORN 15: 79.
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anything more was too restrictive.20 During the Charleston
campaign the light draft of the monitors made them the
choice for inshore work, whereas New Ironsides was the only
vessel suited for outside work.21 The psychological impact
of the original Monitor aside, one reason the U.S. Navy
built so many monitors and so few seagoing ironclads was
that only ships of relatively light draft could reach the
fighting.22
Dahlgren, who served both in New Ironsides and in
monitors while in action and was known as a "monitor man,"
summed up the discussion.

He wrote,

Keeping in view the peculiar exigencies of the case,
which required light draft and great ordnance power, it
appears that the selection of the Department could not
have been more judicious in preferring a number of moni
tors to operate from a heavy frigate as a base.23
Together, they provided both the inshore punch and the off
shore security required.
20Dahlgren to Welles, January 28, 1864, ibid., 14:
598. In a letter of August 22, 1863, to Gillmore, Dahlgren
called her "powerful but most impractical . . . Her great
draft prevents approach to the main object. . . . " Ibid.,
14: 466.
21"I have only one [ironclad] vessel which can do out
side blockading duty. . . . " DuPont to Welles, June 3,
1863, ibid., 14: 231.
22"So great was the need of light-draft ironclads
suited for the immediate task . . . and so popular was the
Monitor, cheap, novel, and fresh from her dramatic struggle,
that the opportunity for building a high seas ironclad fleet
was largely overlooked." Baxter, Ironclad Warship. 302.
23Dahlgren to Welles, January 28, 1864, ORN 14: 599600. Dahlgren, who owed his admiral's stars and his command
to Lincoln, firmly supported the Administration's position.
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In comparison with those European ships which were her
contemporaries, New Ironsides also makes a favorable impres
sion.

All three were of the high freeboard type.

Although

the smallest of the three, New Ironsides7 armament and
protection were the equal of either Gloire or Warrior.2*
In protection, New Ironsides7s chief defects were that
her armor did not cover her bow and stern and that her deck
armor was only one inch thick.25 As noted above, deck pro
tection was not then particularly important in ship to ship
combat.

To avoid the weight of heavy deck armor, minimal

deck protection was common to all early ironclads.26
Against New Ironsides' one inch, Warrior carried 3/4 inch of
iron deck plating and Gloire carried only 4/10 inch.27
New Ironsides had no armor above a single waterline
strake for thirty feet forward and aft of the battery.

Her

soft ends were vulnerable but so were Warrior7s. Warrior,
with no waterline belt, had only the 3/4 inch plating of her
“The rapid progress of naval architecture in the
1860s and 1870s makes it necessary to compare ships of
roughly similar date. Warrior. laid down in 1859, was com
pleted in late 1861; Gloire, laid down in 1858, was com
pleted in 1860. By the end of 1862, Great Britain had four
ironclad ships completed and France had six.
“Dahlgren7s report to Welles, November 5, 1863, dis
cusses these flaws, ORN 15: 99.
“Due to its large area, the one inch deck of New
Ironsides weighed 170 tons, compared to 650 tons for her
entire 4^5 inch side protection. NARG 19, Plan 107-9-12H, is
a listing of weights (reproduced as Appendix A).
“For Warrior. Lambert, Warrior. 72.
diner, Fighting Ships. 286.

For Gloire. Gar
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hull to protect her forward and aft of the 213 feet amid
ships covered by her ih inch armor.28 Gloire was the only
one of the three to have her sides completely covered with
armor.29 Because of the unarmored areas of her wooden
hull, New Ironsides would have been more likely to catch
fire in action than Warrior or Gloire.
As a result of poor protection at the stern, rudder
damage was another danger.

Neither New Ironsides nor War

rior had protection for their steering gear.30
A vulnerability common to all masted ironclads was
dismasting.

New Ironsides had her masts removed for most of

her Civil War service, which eliminated the problem.31 Her
masts might have been helpful for operations in the open
ocean, however, and both Gloire and Warrior remained fully
28Parkes, British Battleships. 19; Lambert, Warrior,
181. New Ironsides was armored over 74 percent of her
length, Warrior over only 56 percent.
29Baxter, Ironclad Warship. 61; Parkes, British Bat
tleships . 3. See also plates of Gloire and Warrior which
accompany Russell, "Iron-Cased Vessels," Plates IV and V.
30Parkes, British Battleships. 18; Dahlgren to Welles,
November 5, 1863, ORN 15: 99.
31New Ironsides made her first voyage with signalling
masts which carried no sail. The full rig was reinstalled
in September 1862 and again replaced by signalling masts in
January 1863. The full rig was reinstalled in June 1864.
In October 1864, the topmasts and yards were removed,
leaving only lower masts, and the full rig was restored in
March 1865. NARG 24, Log of New Ironsides. 5-7 September,
1862; 29-31 January, 1863; 8 June and 12-13 October, 1864;
and 21-22 March, 1865; Dahlgren to Rowan, June 1, 1864,
Dahlgren Papers, Letterbook May-June 1864, 290.
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rigged throughout their careers.32 All three would have
been liable to severe embarrassment in action by damage to a
mast, because of the chance of fouling their propellers.33
In armament, New Ironsides was distinctly superior to
the Europeans.

Warrior's main battery gun was the smooth

bore 68-pounder, a muzzle-loading weapon incapable of
penetrating good 4% inch iron plate even at the muzzle.34
Gloire's 16-centimeter rifled muzzle-loaders could barely
pierce 4.7 inch plate at their muzzles.35 The Xl-inch
Dahlgren firing 166-pound shot could penetrate 4*5 inches of
iron at over 950 yards.36
32There were two reasons for re-masting New Ironsides
for prolonged ocean service. First was seaworthiness? for
Turner's pessimistic opinion, Turner to Welles, August 27,
1862, Report . . . Armored Vessels. 30. Although the ship
rode out gales without them, masts would have steadied her.
Second, sails might have slightly increased her endurance.
33No masted ironclad sailed well. Unarmored ships
carried from 6.15 to 13.9 square feet of sail per ton of
displacement, whereas British ironclads carried about 3.25
square feet per ton. Horsepower per ton was thus against
armored ships. Parkes, British Battleships. 690.
34Very, "Development of Armor," 383. Theoretically,
the 68-pounder with wrought iron shot could pierce 4% inch
armor to 650 yards; in practice it could not. Theoretical
penetration using PENETRA, a program to calculate armor
piercing effect, using data from Lambert, Warrior, 86-87.
35Baxter, Ironclad Warship. 207-209, for armor tests;
Gardiner, Fighting Ships. 286, for battery composition.
“Firing tests showed 4.5 inch armor with twenty inch
wood backing was near the limit of penetration for the Xlinch gun. Very, "Development of Armor," 402-404. Theoreti
cal penetration from PENETRA with velocity from BALLISTA.
Initial velocity extrapolated from Ordnance Instructions.
Appendix B, xv. The Instructions permitted a thirty pound
charge; ibid., Part III, 39, 53.
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Shell would, of course, be preferable to solid shot
for inflicting damage to ships.

In theory the 68-pounder

shell could penetrate ih inch armor at 250 yards, which the
Xl-inch Dahlgren could penetrate at 600 yards.37 It is
extremely doubtful that any spherical shell could remain
intact after penetrating armor.

In practical terms, none of

the weapons could penetrate 4% inch plate with shell.
One problem attributed to the Xl-inch was that its
bulk would make it too heavy to handle at sea.38 Had the
Xl-inch been mounted on an old-fashioned wooden carriage
this might have been true, but with the positive control
afforded by iron carriages this objection was overcome.
The only characteristic in which New Ironsides would
have been at a disadvantage was speed.

Her service speed of

6 knots was well below the 12.5 knots claimed for Gloire and
the 14-knot trial speed of Warrior.39 Either European ship
could have caught or evaded New Ironsides at will.

With a

superior battery and equal protection, New Ironsides could
discount any advantage the European ships would gain from
their ability to control the range of a battle, but she
37Penetration for 68-pounder from PENETRA program;
ordnance figures from Lambert, Warrior, 86-87. Penetration
for Xl-inch from PENETRA; gun data from Ordnance Instru
ctions. Appendix B, xv.
3SA British author called the Xl-inch an example of
American folly. Andrew Lambert, Battleships in Transition;
The Creation of the Steam Battlefleet 1815-1860 (Annapolis:
United States Naval Institute Press, 1984), 92-93.
39Gardiner, Fighting Ships. 7, 286.
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could not pursue an enemy who desired to break off action.
Since New Ironsides was originally built to counter
Confederate ironclads, specifically the Virginia. a direct
comparison is in order.
in all areas.

New Ironsides was clearly superior

First, New Ironsides was a seagoing ship,

Virginia strictly a smooth water vessel.40 Although their
speeds were similar, New Ironsides' engines were reliable;
Virginia's were decidedly not.41
Virginia's four inch armor, in two layers of two
inches each, was only 63% as effective as New Ironsides'
solid 4% inch plating.

New Ironsides' armor would have been

proof against the Confederate ship's battery.42 Each ship
had a ram and neither was very handy, but New Ironsides'
protection below the waterline was of iron three inches
40William H. Parker, a Confederate who commanded a
wooden ship in the Monitor-Virginia battle, observed, "rVir
ginia! would have foundered as soon as she got outside Cape
Henry. She could not have lived in Hampton Roads in a mod
erate sea." Parker, Recollections. 288.
41New Ironsides' maximum speed was 6h knots; Vir
ginia's six to eight. Still, Iron Afloat. 25. A lieutenant
in Virginia stated, "We could not depend upon [the engines]
for six hours at a time." John Taylor Wood, "The First
Fight of Iron Clads," in The Opening Battles, vol. 1 of
Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. Robert Underwood John
son and Clarence C. Buel, eds., (New York: Castle Books,
1956; reprint), 694.
42For Virginia, Still, Iron Afloat. 20. Monitor's
eight inch laminated armor [(l2x8)1/2=2.83], which Virginia
could not pierce, was equal to Virginia's four inch armor
[(22+22)1/2=2.83]. Either was only 63 percent as effective as
New Ironsides' solid armor (2.83/4.5=0.629).
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thick and Virginia's only one inch.43 In addition, New
Ironsides drew only fifteen feet of water against Virginia's
twenty-two feet, and could have employed the same tactic of
withdrawing to shallow water as did Monitor.44
Withdrawal would not have been required, since New
Ironsides' decisive superiority was her armament.

Her bat

tery of fourteen Xl-inch Dahlgren guns and two 150-pounder
Parrott rifles was much more powerful than the mixed bag of
six IX-inch Dahlgrens, two 6.4-inch and two 7-inch Brooke
rifles mounted by the Virginia.45 The Xl-inch Dahlgren
guns carried by New Ironsides were the same as those mounted
in Monitor, which did not seriously damage Virginia.

By the

time New Ironsides was commissioned, however, the Bureau of
Ordnance had approved the use of larger powder charges in
them, which would have improved penetration.46
Monitor's two slow-firing Xl-inch guns, using fifteen
43Virginia's Executive Officer, Lieutenant Catesby ap
R. Jones, noted, "We are least protected where we most need
it. The constructor should have put on six inches where we
now have one." Quoted in ibid., 23.
44Ibid., 26, for Virginia's draft.
45Ibid., 22, for Virginia's battery.
4SThe thirty pound charge doubled muzzle energy. Had
Monitor used wrought iron shot instead of standard cast
iron, she could have penetrated Virginia's armor with a
fifteen pound charge. Monitor did not use her wrought iron
shot because they were out of round, making the risk of
jamming while loading too great. Very, "Development of
Armor," 388.
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pound powder charges, did some damage to Virginia.47 Mew
Ironsides' far more rapid gunnery, employing the thirty
pound powder charge, would have been decisive.48 The re
port of the October 17, 1862, examining board on the gun
carriage problem shows that New Ironsides' unmodified bat
tery, although not as effective as it later became, could
easily have carried her through an action with the Virginia.
47Still, Iron Afloat. 34.
48New Ironsides could fire 360 rounds per hour; Moni
tor 2 rounds every seven to eight minutes or about 16 per
hour. For New Ironsides. Dahlgren to Welles, January 28,
1864, ORN 14: 598; for Monitor. Wood, "First Fight," 701.
The Executive Officer of the Monitor noted the labor of
working the guns. Samuel D. Greene, "In the 'Monitor' Tur
ret," in The Opening Battles, vol. 1 of Battles and Leaders
of the Civil War. Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence C.
Buel, eds., (New York: Castle Books, 1956; reprint), 723-25.
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CHAPTER TEN
SEAGOING IRONCLADS: FAILURE OF HILL

Large seagoing vessels were planned from the beginning
of the U.S. Navy's ironclad construction program, when the
original Ironclad Board recommended that the smaller experi
mental vessels it approved be followed by "a more perfect
system of large iron-clad sea-going vessels of war."1 Nu
merous seagoing ironclads were proposed and several projects
actually commenced, but only three "seagoing" ironclads were
finished during the Civil War.

Of the three, only two saw

action and of those two, only New Ironsides could actually
have fought another ship at sea.
As a seagoing ironclad in a coastal and riverine war,
New Ironsides did yeoman service but gained few headlines.
In the absence of a seagoing enemy her seakeeping ability,
the major advantage she had over the monitors, was
discounted and her disadvantages emphasized.

There was,

however, a considerable body of wartime opinion in the Navy
Department that realized that monitors were deficient in any
but protected waters.
More seagoing ironclads were proposed in March 1862,
1Report . . . Armored Vessels. 5.
208
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when John Lenthall, Chief of the Bureau of Construction and
Repair, and Benjamin Isherwood, Chief of the Bureau of Steam
Engineering, broached a project to Secretary Welles.

Their

design was for "frigate built, iron steamships . . . of a
size larger than any vessel we now possess."2 That same
month they also proposed to convert the wooden screw frigate
Roanoke to a seagoing ironclad with four turrets, each con
taining two guns.

The Navy specified solid 4^ inch plates

instead of less effective but readily available laminated
armor.

This delayed the project and Roanoke was not fin

ished until June 1863.3
In the spring of 1862, what was to become the "Monitor
craze" was not fairly begun, and the design of the ironclad
fleet was not yet firmly set.

In March 1862, an editorial

in the New York Times argued strongly for large ironclad
ships, saying, "No small vessel can be fast, and carry her
armor and armament . . . to be fast, they must be large."4
In addition to the Lenthall-Isherwood proposal, in April
1862 William H. Webb of New York sent a model of a "Steam
2Joint Committee, "Light Draught Monitors," 111.
a discussion, Sloan, Isherwood. 53.

For

3Ibid., 55-56. The ship was badly overweight and was
completed with only three turrets. Gardiner, Fighting
Ships. 120; Alden, "Forty Years Too Soon," 252-63.
4"Large and Small Iron-Clad Ships," New York Times.
March 22, 1862, 4. The comparison was between Monitor and
the Stevens Battery, an ironclad of 5,000 tons begun by Rob
ert L. Stevens in 1842 but never completed. Baxter, Iron
clad Warship. 48-52, 211-19.
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Battery" to the Department, and discussions about his vessel
continued into the summer of 1862.5 This ambitious design,
which resulted in the Dunderberg, was for a wooden-hull
casemated ironclad of about 7,000 tons.
The contract for the Dunderberg was signed on July 3,
1862, seven weeks before the commissioning of the New Iron
sides.6 The detailed specifications were approved on
August 27, 1862, too soon to incorporate any lessons learned
from the Merrick ship.7 Dunderberg was to have a broadside
armament of eight Xl-inch Dahlgren guns, plus two turrets
each equipped with two XV-inch guns.

Her armor above the

main deck was to be solid 4% inch iron, and from the main
deck to five feet below the load waterline was to be 3^5
inches, tapering to 2h inches.

The machinery would propel

her at fifteen knots on a draft of not more than twenty feet
six inches.

Webb was to complete the ship in fifteen months

5This may be the model shown in Edwin L. Dunbaugh and
William duBarry Thomas, William H. Webb Shipbuilder (Glen
Cove, NY: Webb Institute of Naval Architecture, 1989), 95.
6Smith to Webb, August 8, 1862, NARG 45, Entry 464,
Subject File, AD— Ironclads, Box 51, typescript, NWR, 2634:
367; Gregory to Lenthall, October 31, 1862, National Ar
chives, Record Group 19, Entry 64, Letters Received from
Superintendents Outside of Navy Yards, Box 1, 1: 171.
Experience with New Ironsides was later incorporated
into some facets of the design. Webb to Smith, March 11,
1863, NARG 71, Entry 5, Box 449, 1: 128; Henry Hoover to
Smith, March 31, 1863, ibid., 1: 160.
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for $1,250,000.8
Dunderberg. the only seagoing broadside ironclad other
than New Ironsides, was never completed for the U.S. Navy.
The ship proved to be too ambitious a project, beset with
delays and major design changes, and the Civil War ended
before she was launched.

In 1867, Webb bought her back from

the Navy and sold her to France.9
In October 1862, Lenthall and Isherwood advertised for
bids on a seagoing ironclad of 7,300 tons, to have an iron
hull and a broadside battery.

The project received consid

erable criticism, much of it due to partisan attacks on
Isherwood.

They issued a revised proposal for a casemated

vessel of 8,000 tons in March 1863.10 Merrick & Sons sub
mitted a design which would have mounted ten XV-inch guns.11
8Details from an "Historical Statement" prepared in
1900. Lieutenant L. H. Chandler, "Memorandum for the Chief
of the Bureau of Ordnance," March 26, 1900, NARG 45, Entry
464, Subject File, AD— Ironclads, Box 51.
sThe turrets were eliminated but her final armament of
two XV-inch and four Xl-inch made her undergunned. Ibid.
Webb's partisans blamed the delay on the Government, but the
problem was the continual addition of "improvements." Dunbaugh, William H. Webb. 92, 110-13; Gardiner, Fighting
Ships. 119, 287.
10Sloan, Isherwood. 61. Sloan states, "It was not un
til the end of the year [1862] that private builders began
tentative negotiations with the department concerning a
large, sea-going ironclad." The March 1862 proposal appar
ently does not meet his definition of "large." For a copy
of the March 12 advertisement, G. W. Tatham to Lenthall,
March 30, 1863, NARG 19, Entry 71, Box 3, 1: 165.
“Drawings and specifications of this vessel, which
would have displaced over 11,000 tons, are in NARG 19, BuShips Plan 80-9-2.
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Merrick & Sons proposed a 3,500 ton follow-on design
similar to New Ironsides on June 13, 1863.

This ship, an

iron hull, ironclad steamer equipped with four masts for
sail power, appears to be a smaller version of the earlier
8,000 ton design.

With its higher length to beam ratio and

twin screws, it would have corrected some of the propulsion
and maneuvering faults of the New Ironsides. This 3,500 ton
ship would have carried four XV-inch Dahlgren guns in a
casemate, with a pilot house atop each end.12
The ship was never built because Merrick & Sons' price
was too high for the Navy.

The original proposed price was

$1,950,000, but with the Government's additions it went up
to $2,400,000.

When the Bureau objected and asked Merrick &

Sons to recalculate, it increased again to $2,404,000.13
Although this figure seems exceptionally high compared
to the original prices for New Ironsides ($780,000) or Moni
tor ($275,000), it reflects not only the increased size of
the vessel but the advance of prices due to inflation and
the scarcity of materials for shipbuilding in general.14
12This ship would have been 325 feet long and 54 in
beam, with a draft of seventeen feet. Lenthall to Welles,
July 23, 1863, NARG 19, Entry 49. Drawings are in NARG 19,
BuShips Plan 80-9-1. Although her measurement tonnage was
3,500, her displacement would have been over 5,300 tons.
13A detailed description and rationale for the price
is in Merrick & Sons to Lenthall, September 7, 1863, NARG
19, Entry 71, 5: 131.
14For materials, see Cramp's comments (Chapter 2);
testimony by Chief Engineers Hoyt and Wood, Joint Committee,
"Light Draught Monitors," 35, 64-65; Erastus W. Smith to
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By comparison, the pre-Civil War frigate Roanoke cost
$820,000 to build in 1856.15 During the War, the cost of
building commercial ships rose 60 percent.16
As an example of the increased cost of armored ships,
the Navy Department between March and June 1863 contracted
for twenty "light draft" monitors.

Designed by Chief Engi

neer Stimers, each was to carry two Xl-inch Dahlgren guns in
a single turret.

The contract price was $386,000 apiece.

During construction the ships were modified repeatedly and
the modifications aggregated some $100,000 per vessel.

When

the first were launched they were seriously overweight, and
most were modified or rebuilt for another $80,000 each.17
Thus, vessels little superior to the original Monitor cost
William H. Webb, November 7, 1864, National Archives, Record
Group 19, Entry 186, Records Relating to Claims, Subentry
137, s.v. Dunderberg. Smith said materials prices had ad
vanced 76 percent and mechanics' wages 83 percent.
15Alden, "Forty Years Too Soon," 252.
16K. Jack Bauer, A Maritime History of the United
States (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1988),
288.
17Testimony of Donald McKay, builder of the Nanset,
Joint Committee, "Light Draught Monitors," 43. McKay would
charge $586,000 to duplicate Nanset. ibid., 42. Testimony
of Nathaniel McKay, builder of Squando. ibid., 29. Tunxis
was to be altered for $115,000. Testimony of Rear Admiral
Gregory, ibid., 76. Raising Nanset's sides would cost
$86,000; for other ships Wood gave the cost of "raising up"
as $55,000 to $80,000, and Gregory estimated $55,000 to
"more than $90,000," ibid., 45, 64, 76.
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twice as much to build.18
Part of the increase in asking price for armored ships
was due to the growing sophistication of shipbuilders as
they learned more about the material with which they had to
work.

Thomas F. Rowland of the Continental Works contracted

to install the port lids of the Galena for ten cents per
pound.

He found the amidships ports cost almost fifty cents

per pound for labor to install, and those at the stern cost
nearly $1.00 per pound for labor alone.

He wrote, "Until we

have had more experience in this country in forming and ap
plying these heavy plates, I, for one, don't care to tackle
it at any price that I dare at present name."19
In late 1863 the Navy Department advertised for more
seagoing ironclads but none was built, apparently because of
the extremely high cost.

In December 1863, Merrick & Sons

proposed a seagoing broadside design of 7,100 tons costing
$4,300,000.20 In January 1864, Otis Tufts of Boston pro
posed a ship 380 feet long and 61 feet in beam, to carry
18The "light drafts" were to carry two Xl-inch Dahlgren guns in one turret, the same as Monitor, on a displace
ment of 1,175 tons, close to Monitor's 987 tons. Figures
from Gardiner, Fighting Ships. 119, 123.
19T. F. Rowland to Wm. E. Everett, May 15, 1862, NARG
19, Entry 71, 2: 172.
20Sloan,
of unrequited
Lenthall they
proposals for

Isherwood. 61-62. Even Merrick & Sons tired
proposals. On January 23, 1864, they wrote
did not plan to answer his advertisement for
a large ironclad. NARG 19, Entry 70, 1: 24.
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four XV-inch Dahlgrens in caseinate and cost $3,160,000.21
Others proposed ships costing as much as $6,948,000 and
requiring up to three years to complete.22
Still another follow-on design was that of Charles H.
Cramp, who said in 1897 that he proposed building two more
ironclads of "similar type" to the New Ironsides, presumably
with wooden hulls.23 He planned to improve the ships by
using twin screws and "increasing the efficiency of the
armor."

He asserted, "At that time [1863], what was known

as the 'MONITOR craze' was in full blast and, notwithstan
ding the excellent all-around performance of the 'IRONSIDES'
she remained the only seagoing broadside iron-clad in the
Navy."24 By 1864 ultimate Union success was becoming clear
but war weariness was growing in the North.

The investment

of time and money required to build a large seagoing iron
clad was no longer politically or militarily practical.
The "Monitor craze" was a drawback to those in the
Navy Department, particularly Lenthall and Isherwood, who
21This started as a 3,500 ton proposal but grew to
5,400 tons. Tufts to Lenthall, January 4, 1864, NARG 19,
Entry 71, 4: 4. For a larger Tufts design, Smith to Welles,
December 26, 1862. NARG 45, Entry M518, Roll 18: 91.
22Sloan, Isherwood. 61-62.
23Cramp, [Contemporary Club], 3-4; Joint Committee,
"Light Draught Monitors," 39, 42-43, 76, 96-97.
24Cramp, [Contemporary Club], 9. For a discussion of
the psychological roots of the "Monitor craze," Earl J.
Hess, "Northern Response to the Ironclad: A Prospect for the
Study of Military Technology," Civil War History 31 (1985):
126-43.
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supported the building of seagoing high freeboard iron
clads.25 After the Monitor-Virginia engagement, Fox became
an ardent supporter of Ericsson and Welles capitalized po
litically upon the Monitor's success.26 Other influential
officers such as Admirals Dahlgren and Porter were strong
monitor supporters as well.

Grudgingly admitting that New

Ironsides was "better suited for attacking fortifications
under certain conditions," Porter believed she would have
stood no chance in a ship-to-ship engagement with a monitor.
After the Monitor-Virginia battle, he wrote, ". . . there
was no longer, as regarded the Monitor system, a pin to hang
a doubt on.”27
To the unbiased, that lack of doubt did not survive
the rough handling the monitors received in DuPont's Char
leston attack.

The Department's enthusiastic espousal of

25Cramp and Merrick climbed on the monitor bandwagon.
Gardiner states Cramp contracted for the light-draft Yazoo
on March 2, 1863, (Gardiner, Fighting Ships. 123), but Ben
nett assigns Yazoo to a Merrick contract and states Cramp
built Tunxis for Reamy, Son & Archbold. Bennett, Steam
N a w . Appendix B. Cramps' history says the firm built Yazoo
and does not mention Tunxis♦ Cramp's Shipyard. 16. Merrick
& Sons was the contractor for Yazoo. Merrick & Sons to
Lenthall, NARG 19, Entry 71, 4: 337.
26Sloan, Isherwood. 66. Belknap wrote that Welles and
Fox "pinned their faith to the Monitor class of iron-clad."
Belknap, "Siege of Charleston," 187. "Welles, though more
objective about the monitors than Fox, steadfastly supported
his Assistant Secretary." Niven, Gideon Welles. 437.
27David D. Porter, The Naval History of the Civil War
(Seacaucus, NJ: Castle, 1984; reprint of 1886 edition), 362.
Dahlgren expressed his preference in Dahlgren to Welles,
January 28, 1864, ORN 14: 598-600.
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the Monitor type undoubtedly contributed to the acrimony
when that attack failed.

In the emotionally charged atmo

sphere of the war, the blame for failure had to be placed
either upon the ships themselves or their employment.

The

Department had thrown in its lot with the "monitor men" and
DuPont was the commander.

It is thus understandable that

DuPont officially bore sole blame for the failure, although
clearly both ships and leader were flawed.
Pro-monitor prejudice was evident outside the Depart
ment as well.

By December 1862, the same New York Times

which had so strongly supported large ironclad ships in
March 1862 was calling the proposed seagoing ironclads
"Another Job."

The New York Times wrote, "We are threatened

with two 7,000-ton ships, iron-clad in a manner which the
whole practice of Europe and America has proved defective,
at four million two hundred thousand dollars a-piece."28
Writing in 1883, Lieutenant Edward Very was critical
of the monitor proponents.

He stated,

. . . so great was the glamor cast over the monitor
type of ships by the defeat of the Merrimac [sic]
and the name of Ericsson, that although steeringgear was deranged and turrets were jammed in every
general action, the spindle-turret with its pilot
house mounted on top was retained unaltered even in
28"Another Job," New York Times. December 25, 1862, 4.
The editorial continued, "If that is not bad enough, we may
add that the designs of hull and machinery were made by the
Bureaux of Construction and Steam-engineering."
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the monitors rebuilt in 1874.29
Instead of regarding DuPont's attack on Charleston as a test
of the ships so that their weak points could be remedied,
"there was a demand— not only implied, but expressed, in
official language and the most positive terms— that the
shortcomings of the monitors should not be made known, in
order not to give encouragement to the rebels." Because
these serious faults were not corrected, the monitor type
"never passed the age of swaddling-clothes" in the United
States.30
Besides Dunderberq and New Ironsides, the other "sea
going" ironclads built by the U.S. Navy during the Civil War
were of the low freeboard monitor type.31 The Miantonomoh
class included four 3,400-ton, wooden-hulled monitors, de
signed by the Bureau of Construction and Repair and built in
29Very, Development of Armor," 399. DuPont, comment
ing that the government sent "untried machines . . . all
received on Mr. Ericsson's dictum," noted that these "novel
ties" were tested "against the most thoroughly and scientif
ically defended place in America. . . . " DuPont to H. W.
Davis, May 3, 1863, Hayes, DuPont Letters. 3: 77.
30Very, "Development of Armor," 400. Welles wrote Du
Pont that since many of the official reports detailed the
"imperfections, or supposed imperfections, of a class of
formidable vessels of our service," their publication would
"discourage our friends" and encourage the rebels. ORN 14:
62. Accordingly, Welles refused to publish them.
31Roanoke was to be a high-freeboard seagoing vessel
but was overweight when completed and capable only of harbor
service. Sloan, Isherwood. 56-57; Gardiner, Fighting Ships,
120; Alden, "Forty Years Too Soon," 257-59, 261-63.
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Navy Yards.32 Their armament was four XV-inch guns in two
turrets.

U.S.S. Monadnock of this class saw some action but

the other three were not completed until after the War's
end.

Although they were reasonably effective in combat,

they were not particularly successful in the open sea.33
U.S.S. Dictator was an iron-hulled Ericsson design, of
4,400 tons displacement and carrying two XV-inch guns in a
single turret.

After her completion in November 1864, she

set out to join the assault on Fort Fisher but had to return
to port because of engineering difficulties.34
Puritan, another iron-hulled Ericsson design, was to
carry one turret with two XX-inch guns on her 4,900 tons.
She was never finished, nor were the four wooden-hulled
ships of the 5,660-ton Kalamazoo class, a Bureau design.35
The seagoing monitors were contracted for in 1862 and
1863, some very soon after the original Monitor's action
32Gardiner, Fighting Ships. 121; Bennett, Steam Navy.
Appendix B.
33Monadnock rounded Cape Horn and Miantonomoh crossed
the Atlantic, but neither was particularly habitable at sea
and their performances were "achieved at great price of
human labor and suffering . . . Full confidence in the sea
worthiness of monitors does not exist yet. . . . " Frank M.
Bennett, "Reconstructed American Monitors," Journal of the
American Society of Naval Engineers. August 1897, 529. Ben
nett served in Amphitrite (ex-Tonawanda), which had been
completely rebuilt under the guise of repairs. Conditions
aboard the original ship must have been even worse.
34Gardiner, Fighting Ships. 121; Johnson, John Rod
gers. 268-73, 275-78. Dictator's propeller shaft bearings
were too short to support the shaft without overheating.
3SGardiner, Fighting Ships. 122.
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with the Virginia. Even taking into account the difficul
ties of obtaining material and skilled labor in the wartime
United States, they, like the other seagoing ironclad pro
jects, were not pushed with the vigor which attended the
construction of the coastal and "light-draft" monitors.

A

major reason lay in the changing international situation.
In 1861, there was considerable European approval of
the Confederate cause, especially in England.

English

sympathy for the Confederacy was partly due to a romantic
feeling for the South as the underdog and partly due to Eng
land's need for Southern cotton for her textile mills.

The

Union blockade was a constant irritant and incidents such as
the "Trent Affair" exacerbated the situation.36 The Trent
episode ended in an American apology, and the feeling in the
U»S, that war with England must be avoided for the time "for
the plain reason that now we are unable to meet it."37
This did not mean that war with England must be
avoided for all time.

Welles wrote in 1862, "We shall how

ever have a day of reckoning with Great Britain for these
wrongs [the Alabama's depredations], and I sometimes think I
360n November 8, 1861, James M. Mason and John Sli
dell, Confederate commissioners to Great Britain and France,
were forcibly removed from the British mail packet Trent.
The affair inflamed British public opinion. Shelby Foote,
The Civil War; A Narrative. Fort Sumter to Perrwille (New
York: Random House, 1958), 139-40, 156-63.
37Attorney General Edward Bates, quoted in Bruce Catton, Terrible Swift Sword (Garden City: Doubleday & Co.,
1963), 116.
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care now how soon that reckoning comes."38 Yet if the
reckoning had come in 1862, the Union would have been poorly
prepared to meet it.

The U.S. Navy was in no condition to

compete with the Royal Navy.

Maintaining and tightening the

blockade of the South was difficult enough; if each blockad
ing squadron had to be protected against the British fleet
it would have been impossible.

Welles rightly concluded

that ironclads that could fight at sea were needed.
The Confederacy had no seagoing ironclads, nor the
means to build or buy more than a few, and the failure of
DuPont's attack on Charleston showed the Confederates could
have done only minor damage to Northern ports defended by
forts and coastal monitors.

After it became clear Confeder

ate ironclads could not venture to sea, the only remaining
opponents for U.S. seagoing ironclads were European.
Welles obviously thought the European threat was sig
nificant.

In December 1863 he wrote,

If I go forward and build large and expensive
vessels, I shall be blamed for extravagance, partic
ularly if peace takes place. On the other hand if I
should not build, and we have war with England or
France, I shall be denounced for being unpre
pared. . . . A strong navy will deter commercial
nations from troubling us, and if not troubled, we
need no strong and expensive navy.39
The seagoing ironclad projects which were approved, includ
ing both low and high freeboard types, show that Welles
38Welles, Diary, entry for December 29, 1862, 1: 207.
39Ibid., entry for December 26, 1863, 1: 436.
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fully supported a seagoing Navy able to protect the country
from foreign intervention.

As the threat from Europe dimin

ished, so did his support for these expensive ships.
Writing in his diary after the War, Welles noted that
when Dunderberq was laid down, "We had a large defensive
force, but not as many and formidable vessels as we should
need in the event of a war with a maritime power."

Dictator

and Puritan could break up any attempted blockade, "but we
could not cruise with them."
that purpose.

Welles wrote, "In view of what was being done

by England and France . . .
vessel."

Dunderberq was intended for

I felt that we might need such a

He felt that three vessels were sufficient; al

though "I have rejoiced that I did not yield to the appeals
[by Fox and others] for more. . . .

I feel assured I did

right in ordering rDunderberq! to be built."40
Thus, the seagoing ironclads of the U.S. Navy failed
of their wartime promise.

The main reason was a change of

heart by the British and to a lesser extent the French.
This reversal of British sympathy was based upon a growing
realization of Confederate failure as manifested by Antietam, Gettysburg and Vicksburg, upon a recovering textile
industry, and upon the Emancipation Proclamation.

One ef

fect of improving U.S. relations with Great Britain was that
on September 3, 1863, the British government issued orders
40Ibid., entry for July 24, 1865, 2: 340-41.
Niven, Gideon Welles, 506.

See also
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to prevent the sailing of two seagoing ironclad rams which
Laird and Company were building for the Confederacy.41
The "Laird Rams" might have caused the U.S. Navy a
serious, although not overwhelming, problem.

The British

decision to prevent their delivery removed both the
immediate threat to the blockade and the long-range threat
of war with England.

As the prospects of war at sea de

clined, so did the urgency with which seagoing ships were
constructed.
The vessels the Navy needed immediately to defeat the
Confederacy took precedence: shallow draft armored ships
which could operate in large numbers in the shallow harbors
and rivers of the Confederacy, instead of a few, expensive
oceangoing ships which could meet European ironclads on
equal terms at sea.

As Welles wrote, "I was accused of not

having a navy of formidable vessels.

I had vessels for the

purposes then wanted. "42
Matters might have changed had New Ironsides, rather
than Monitor, met Virginia in combat.

Much of the enthusi

asm for the monitors was generated by the original Monitor's
41 Ephraim D. Adams, Great Britain and the American
Civil War (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1957), 2: 116-51; Allan
Nevins, The War for the Union. The Organized War. 1863-1864
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), 480, 483-87, 494503. For Confederate projects in France, Lynn M. Case and
Warren F. Spencer, The United States and France: Civil War
Diplomacy (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1970), 427-80.
42Welles, Diary. entry for July 24, 1865, 2: 341.
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battle with the Virginia; what might have happened had New
Ironsides. rather than Monitor. reaped "the glamor cast over
the monitor type" from that engagement?

Given the urgent

need for many shot proof, shallow draft ships which could be
constructed quickly, small armored ships would still have
been built, but they might have been the Isherwood-Lenthall
"Bureau" design rather than the Ericsson "monitor"
design.43 The publicity from a successful single ship ac
tion would have dramatically improved the Navy's chances of
building more seagoing, high freeboard ironclads like those
later proposed by Merrick, Cramp and others.44
43The "Bureau" design, by Lenthall and Isherwood,
would have had solid plate armor, twin screws and two tur
rets, compared to the "monitor" design which had laminated
armor, a single screw and one turret. Sloan, Isherwood. 58.
44Robert Albion concurred; "In many ways, it was un
fortunate that the New Ironsides was not completed in time
to acquire the prestige of 'stopping' the Merrimack. Like
her European counterparts, she would have been a useful
nucleus for a general-purpose seagoing fleet. . . . " Robert
Greenhalgh Albion, Makers of Naval Policy 1798-1947 (Annapo
lis: United States Naval Institute Press, 1980), 198.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
CONCLUSION

New Ironsides was the United States Navy's first essay
at building a seagoing, high freeboard ironclad.

Imperfect

in some ways like any prototype, overall she was highly
successful.

Her high freeboard design was squarely in the

European mainstream.

She should have been followed up, both

during the war and more deliberately afterward; the lessons
learned from her construction and wartime service should
have provided invaluable instruction for U.S. designers.
She was not followed up, for reasons discussed below.

By

the time twenty years later that the U.S. again built sea
going armored ships, the lessons she could have taught were
obsolescent.
During the Civil War, the "Monitor craze" was taken
for granted.

The decision to build an entire fleet on a

single basic design, inconclusively tested in a single ac
tion— to place most of the country's naval eggs in a single
basket— was accepted as a foregone conclusion.

The "Monitor

men," led by Gustavus Fox, effectively denied the United
States Navy the strategic and tactical benefits of more

225
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ironclads like New Ironsides.1
The New Ironsides type offered significant tactical
advantages, both in offensive power and in seakeeping abil
ity.

Before quick-firing guns were developed, the only way

to increase volume of fire was by multiplying the number of
guns engaged, so the broadside ship's large battery and the
rapidity of her fire made her superior.

New Ironsides could

put over twenty times as much weight of metal on target in
an hour as the original Monitor and at least ten times as
much as the later classes of monitors with their mixed XIand XV-inch guns. Off Charleston, New Ironsides fired more
shots than all Dahlgren's monitors put together, and despite
her lack of XV-inch guns threw over forty-four percent of
the total weight of Union Navy metal.2 While a single ship
was tactically less flexible than multiple ships (and more
would be sacrificed if she were lost), a broadside ship
could concentrate fire to achieve an effect that monitors
acting jointly could not.
While the large battery and high volume of fire of the
New Ironsides type was a great tactical advantage in pro
jecting power ashore, the ship's high freeboard and ability
to fight at sea could have been even more vital to the Union
*As Belknap stated, regarding the New Ironsides and
monitor types, "Both classes of iron-clads were incomparable
for their special purpose, but unfortunately for the coun
try, the Monitor class had the most potent countenance of
the Navy Department." Belknap, "Siege of Charleston," 188.
2Based on figures from Dahlgren's report, ORN 14: 596.
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strategically.

The ironclads the Confederacy was building

overseas, such as the "Laird rams," could fight in the open
ocean while the monitors could not.

Cramp's two follow-on

high-freeboard ships of the New Ironsides type would have
greatly improved the Union's strategic position at rela
tively small cost.
The demonstrated superiority of the New Ironsides
against shore fortifications offers tantalizing "what-ifs."
There were other ports, such as Wilmington, Mobile, and New
Orleans, where the Union might profitably have employed New
Ironsides good seakeeping qualities, invulnerability and
*

firepower.

Her draft, although greater than that of the

monitors, was up to two feet less than that of unarmored
ships which mounted batteries less capable than her own.3
The two additional ironclads which Charles Cramp proposed to
build to the New Ironsides design could have permitted ear
lier neutralization of Fort Fisher, potentially shortening
the war by choking off supplies to the Army of Northern
Virginia.
Economy was another consideration in favor of more
ships of the New Ironsides design.

In relative terms, each

of the two guns of the original Monitor cost $137,500 to put
afloat; the sixteen guns of the New Ironsides only $50,815
each.

If the price of the original New Ironsides doubled to

3New Ironsides drew fifteen feet, Hartford drew seven
teen feet two inches, Brooklyn drew sixteen feet three
inches.
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account for inflation and modest improvements, a follow-on
New Ironsides would still have cost only $102,000 per gun.
By contrast, the monitor Passaic cost $211,585 per gun.

The

light-draft monitors, contracted at $193,000 per gun, final
ly cost from $265,000 to $324,000 per gun; the "seagoing"
double-turreted monitors Miantonomoh and Monadnock, $245,000
and $327,700 per gun.4 In absolute terms, for each three
useless light-draft monitors, the Navy could have had at
least one more follow-on New Ironsides.
While the situation in 1863 was not as desperate as
during the first year of the War, speed of construction was
still a consideration.

Of the twelve seagoing ironclads

built for the Union, only three (including New Ironsides!
were completed during the war.

The New Ironsides design, a

proven one, could have been repeated more easily and built
more quickly than new ships designed from the keel up.
Despite her advantages, New Ironsides received little
attention in Europe, and British discussion of the naval
aspects of "the American war" was predominantly monitororiented.5 This is not surprising for several reasons.
First, monitors were novel.

Second, their low free

board and revolving turrets fit in with ideas already
4Figures based on Bennett, Steam N a w . Appendix B.
sSome examples are John Bourne, "On the American Sys
tem of Turret Ships," Transactions INA 7 (1866), 131-43;
Jasper Selwyn, "On Armoured or Iron-clad Ships— Their Ad
vantages and Defects," Journal RUSI 8, no. 30 (1864), 81104; Tyler, "Spithead and Harbour Defence," 139-47.
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advanced in the Royal Navy by Captain Cowper Coles.

Third

and most important, in high freeboard seagoing ironclads the
Europeans were already ahead of New Ironsides. Although she
compared well with the first British and French ironclads
(the Warrior and Defence classes in England and the French
Gloire and Couronne and the Magenta class), by the end of
the Civil War New Ironsides was obsolescent, eclipsed by
newer European designs.
Despite the general lack of attention to New Ironsides
herself, Europe recognized the value of high freeboard.
Ironclad development was far from homogenous among the Euro
pean powers but the tendency toward high freeboard designs
is unmistakable.

By the end of the 1860s, few low freeboard

designs were being built, and most of those were unsuccess
ful at sea.

British attempts to combine low freeboard with

masts and sails came to an abrupt end when H.M.S. Captain
foundered in 1870.

In France, the mastless monitor Tonnerre

nearly capsized as a result of a sharp turn to port.

Even

the British "breastwork monitors," nominally "low freeboard"
ships but with a raised superstructure, had almost twice the
freeboard of American monitors and carried their guns four
teen feet above the water.6
By 1870, high freeboard for good gunnery and seakeeping was recognized as an important element of ironclad
6For Captain. Parkes, British Battleships. 137-43; for
Devastation and her four feet six inch freeboard, ibid.,
195-202? for Tonnerre. Hovgaard, History of Warships. 37.
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design.

In this vital respect, New Ironsides was well ahead

of the monitors.

Despite this head start, the seagoing

ironclad was poorly followed up in the U.S. Navy.

During

the Civil War, the Navy's advantages of wartime urgency and
free-spending Congresses notwithstanding, the service was
unable to build more ships like the New Ironsides, the only
seagoing ironclad design proven to be successful.

After the

war the situation deteriorated.
Sailing ships and smoothbore ordnance changed little
in two centuries, but iron ships, steam machinery and rifled
ordnance changed from year to year.7 In this environment,
an evolutionary construction program was mandatory for any
navy that wanted to maintain its relative power.

Yet with

the end of the Civil War the U.S. Navy's immediate need for
armored warships also ended, and politically popular re
trenchment struck hard at the Navy's shipbuilding programs.
Retrenchment began even before the end of the war,
when it was clear the Confederacy was close to defeat.

In

February 1865 Welles directed squadron commanders to reduce
expenses.8 By July 1865, the blockade was reduced to about
30 ships, from 471 in January 1865, and by December 1865,
the improvised wartime Navy was gone.
The Navy's budget was almost $117 million for fiscal
7Peter Padfield, Guns at Sea (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1974), 57-69, 111-16, 137-43.
8Navy Department circular letter dated February 24,
1865, SecNav 1865. ix; Niven, Gideon Welles. 506-507.
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year 1865 and its expenditure during the War about $72.5
million annually.

The United States budget deficit was $974

million in 1865 and its total national debt was over $3
billion, not to mention the damage inflicted upon both North
and South by the War.9 There was no surplus of funds which
could conveniently be used to continue the evolution of the
ironclad, and Congress was unwilling to take money from
elsewhere for the purpose.
Several things compounded Congressional parsimony.
Even before the War ended, antipathy to the Administration
was expressed in politically motivated investigations of the
Navy Department.

Welles and Fox came under heavy fire from

legislators intent on settling old scores.

Among them was

Radical Republican Congressman Henry Winter Davis of Mary
land, a close friend of Rear Admiral DuPont and deadly
political enemy of the Francis Blair family, whose "violent
assaults" Welles noted in his diary.10 Congressman Elihu
Washburne of Illinois considered even Welles' much-reduced
9For budget, SecNav 1865. xxxi-xxxii. For deficit and
debt, Andrew McLaughlin and A. B. Hart, eds. Cyclopedia of
American Government (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1914), 2:
16.
10Welles, Diary, entry for July 24,
liam E. Smith, The Francis Preston Blair
(New York: Da Capo Press, 1969), 2: 255,
relations with other Republicans, Niven,
438-39. Davis died in December 1865.

1865, 2: 341; Wil
Family in Politics
263. For Davis'
Gideon Welles. 435,
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budget to be excessive.11
Congress's attitude was that the Navy was good enough.
In Congressional debate in 1865, Senator James W. Grimes of
Iowa said of the monitors, "For harbor defense, the purpose
for which they were originally devised, they are unap
proached by anything yet invented by the ingenuity of man,"
and in 1865 his attitude was still justified.12 At the end
of the Civil War, the United States possessed the world's
largest ironclad fleet.

Within a strictly limited sphere,

the coastal waters of the United States, the United States
Navy was superior to any possible invader.
Given the economic climate of retrenchment and Con
gressional satisfaction with the country's naval power, the
multitude of leftover monitors eliminated any political or
financial support in the Congress for evolutionary develop
ment of naval architecture of the sort accomplished in
Europe.

The armored ships needed to extend U.S. naval power

“Sloan, Isherwood. 133-41. A discussion of the "Pol
itics of Decline" is in William Scott Peterson, "The Navy in
the Doldrums: The Influence of Politics and Technology on
the Decline and Rejuvenation of the American Fleet, 18661886" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illi
nois at Urbana-Champaign, 1986), 10-43. Albion avers,
"There was money enough, if intelligently spent, to have
secured an adequate Navy." Albion, Naval Policy. 199.
“Congressional Globe. 38th Cong., 2d Sess., February
17, 1865, 866. Grimes, generally a friend of the Navy, also
said, "The trouble about the monitors has arisen from the
fact that their friends have claimed too much for them while
their enemies have too greatly undervalued them." Senator
Benjamin F. Wade of Ohio called vessels like New Ironsides a
failure.
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beyond the coastal area never joined the fleet.13 As a
result, the local superiority of 1865 had completely evapo
rated ten years later.14
Congressional economic arguments against seagoing
ships were bolstered, not opposed, by the strategic theory
of the day.

In this pre-Mahan era, U.S. Navy strategy may

be simplistically described as coastal defense and commerce
raiding.

It rested on two premises: first, commerce raiding

would wreck an enemy's commerce and tie down his navy in
attempts to protect what little shipping remained to him,
and second, fortifications supplemented by coastal (or even
harbor) defense ironclads could protect the coastline and
ports from invasion and bombardment.15 Seagoing ironclads
were not vital to the Navy's strategic vision.
When the range of guns was only a few hundred yards,
the strategy of harbor defense had validity.

To damage a

13The Navy built ten seagoing monitors and two broad
side ironclads. New Ironsides and the five monitors of the
Miantonomoh and Dictator classes were eventually completed.
The broadside Dunderberq was sold to France in 1867 and five
monitors of the Puritan and Kalamazoo classes were broken up
on the stocks. Gardiner, Fighting Ships. 119, 122.
14In 1874, Commodore Foxhall Parker wrote, "What could
be more lamentable . . . than to see a fleet armed with
smooth-bore guns, requiring close quarters for their devel
opment, moving at the rate of four and a half knots an hour?
What inferior force could it overtake, or what superior one
escape[?] . . . " Foxhall A. Parker, "Our Fleet Maneuvers in
the Bay of Florida," Proceedings USNI 1, no. 8 (1874): 16869.
15Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of Amer
ican Naval Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1946), 80-82.
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seaport city, an enemy ship had to enter its harbor, passing
or destroying its fortifications.

Once past the shore

batteries, the enemy ship would be at a qualitative disad
vantage against a harbor defense vessel, which in theory
could concentrate thick armor and heavy guns on a small,
shallow draft hull.

The harbor defense vessel had no need

for speed or endurance to seek the enemy, since the enemy
had to enter the harbor to achieve his objective, and its
shallow draft permitted it to move freely where the seagoing
enemy could not.

In fact, many American harbors could not

be entered at all by deep draft European ironclads.
With improvements in gunnery came a divergence between
theory and practice.

As gun ranges increased, ships could

inflict damage at dramatically greater distances.

The ocean

area from which the enemy could damage a seaport, and thus
the area which the defender had to deny to the enemy,
increased geometrically.16 The harbor defense vessel could
no longer rely upon meeting a seagoing opponent in protected
waters.

With its tactical advantage of shallow draft thus

nullified, its slow speed prevented it from reacting fast
enough to cover the enlarged area and its poor seakeeping
prevented it from meeting the enemy at sea.
Lenthall and Isherwood foresaw this.

In their March

1SA graphic depiction of this growth, from the coast
artillery view, may be found in Emmanuel R. Lewis, Seacoast
Fortifications of the United States; An Introductory History
(Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1970), 13.
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1862 letter on seagoing ironclads, they argued that it was
"cheaper, more effective, and more sustaining of the na
tional honor" to protect the nation's coasts "by keeping
command of the open sea."

Although harbor defenses could

keep an enemy from entering a port, "they could not drive
him from its gates." They concluded it was better to fight
at the threshold than on the hearthstone.17
Surprisingly, the strategy of coastal defense and
commerce raiding remained in vogue despite the experience of
the Civil War.

In that conflict the South used that stra-

tegy, partly by intention and partly because Southern
resources were inadequate to do much else.

The Confederacy

built forts and ironclads for coastal defense and raided
Union commerce using fast wooden cruisers.

The dominant

Union Navy enjoyed freedom of action and hampered its
enemies' warmaking by blockade.

Union armies which

maintained contact with the coast could be supplied or evac
uated.

The weaker power tried to protect its coastline and

to force the stronger to capitulate by commerce raiding.
As in the War of 1812, the weaker power failed.

Coas

tal defense and commerce raiding were strategic failures.
The Union won command of the sea and denied its use to the
Confederacy.18 This lesson of strategic failure, dearly
17Lenthall and Isherwood to Welles, March 17, 1862,
reprinted in Joint Committee, "Light Draught Monitors," 11112

.

18Sprout, American Naval Power. 160-64.
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bought, was not applied to post-War naval construction.
The "line-engineer controversy" involved Lenthall and
Isherwood and provided another reason for failure to develop
the seagoing ironclad.

Although the evolution for which the

Bureau chiefs agitated was necessary to maintain the U.S.
Navy's relative position, development was disturbing to
older naval officers.

When peace came, parsimony joined

conservatism to impel a return to the "conventional" Navy—
the sailing Navy.
Although a detailed discussion is beyond the scope of
this work, the conflict was between the "line" officers (who
navigated, fought and commanded ships) and the naval engin
eers.19 With steam propulsion, a split developed between
the men who fought and those who operated the ship.

The

result was greater status for engineers and a relative de
cline for line officers.

Predictably, the line reacted.

Since the influence of the engineers came from their en
gines, the line officers set out to reduce the importance of
steam.

Ironclads, full of machinery and dependent on steam,

were prime targets.

Since Isherwood was anathema to senior

line officers, it is not surprising that his seagoing
lsFor a fuller discussion, see Sloan, Isherwood. 189212; Karste l, Naval Aristocracy. 65-69, and Elting E. Morison, Men. Machines and Modern Times (Cambridge, MA, and Lon
don: The MIT Press, 1966), 114-18.
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ironclad projects did not meet with their favor.20
The superiority of high freeboard ships for seagoing
action and New Ironsides' demonstrated effectiveness in
action against shore fortifications were insufficient to tip
the postwar balance in favor of seagoing ironclads.

Sea

going armored ships needed powerful sponsorship and
unanimity within the Navy, to overcome objections to their
cost and prod Congress into action.

In the absence of spon

sorship, the Navy was unable to persuade Congress that money
for ironclads would be well spent.
By failing to develop the seagoing ironclad the United
States forfeited the advantages it might have gained over
the European navies from its extensive combat experience.
The lessons learned from the Civil War were largely lost and
deficiencies in industrial base, ship design, personnel ex
perience, and tactics inevitably followed.

The gap between

American and foreign practice widened year by year until
when naval building recommenced in the 1880s it was extreme
ly difficult to cross.
Thus New Ironsides, the precursor of the seagoing,
high freeboard battleship, had no direct descendant in the
United States Navy.

No other Union ironclad could have done

what she did, whether it was protecting the blockaders off
20All the most senior Navy officers were line offi
cers. There were factions in the Engineer Corps, pro- and
anti-Isherwood, and the latter short-sightedly allied with
the line. Sloan, Isherwood. 210-11; also 133-41, 189 ff.
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Charleston during the stormy early months of 1863 or sup
porting the Army at Fort Wagner and Fort Fisher.

Her bright

promise and brilliant career were neglected in the post-War
reaction, and the U.S. Navy's best opportunity to build a
seagoing ironclad fleet was Jost for a generation.
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EPILOGUE

The night of Saturday, December 15, 1866, was windy in
Philadelphia, and the cold rain borne on the northeast wind
made a stove a welcome fixture.

Shortly after eight

o'clock, Frederick Frederickson, a shipkeeper at the League
Island Navy Yard, made his evening rounds.

He attended to

the coal stove in the engine room of the New Ironsides, and
then to the stoves on the other four ships in hir charge.
On his return to New Ironsides at 10:25 P.M., he
reached the gun deck on his way below when he smelled smoke.
He saw smoke coming from the lower deck hatches, but could
not find the fire and returned ashore to give the alarm.
The watchmen tried to fight the fire while the duty officer,
Acting Ensign William A. Stannard, was called.

He, with

Second Assistant Engineer Absalom Kirby, roused the watch
and sent messengers to his superiors.
Stannard and Kirby located the fire on the berth deck
and hold, aft of the engine room, but the bucket brigade
they formed was handicapped by choking smoke, too few men
and too few buckets.

By the time the steam fire engines

from the Shiffler, Franklin and Southwark fire companies
arrived, it was too late— the fire was out of control.
239
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ship was towed to shoal water, where she burned to the
water's edge and sank.1
The Philadelphia papers on the seventeenth were full
of the news.
Ship."

"DESTROYED11 Sad End of an Invincible War

said the Philadelphia Inquirer. The Philadelphia

Public Ledger noted that the ship, "considered the best
iron-clad in the American Navy," was "an especial favorite
with Philadelphians." All the papers agreed with the wit
nesses who testified at the Navy's preliminary inquiry— the
fire must have been the work of an incendiary.

The quarter-

inch iron of the engine room bulkhead made it impossible
that the pine wood behind it could catch fire from the
stove.
The investigating board, headed by Captain James Mad
ison Frailey, reached the same conclusion.

In their report,

forwarded to Secretary Welles on December 27, 1866, they
stated the fire "did not originate from any fire or light
authorized or known to be on board," and the Commandant of
the Navy Yard, Rear Admiral Thomas Selfridge, agreed.2
The endorsers at the Navy Department were not so
xRear Admiral Thomas 0. Selfridge, Sr., to Welles, De
cember 17, 1866, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division,
Naval Historical Foundation Collection, Papers of Thomas 0.
Selfridge, Sr., "Copies of Letters to Hon. Secretary of the
Navy, Bureau of Yards and Docks, and Bureau of Construction
&c., 1866-'68, from U.S. Navy Yard Philadelphia," no. 419,
addresses the tow.
2Frailey was the officer responsible for the inactive
ironclads and Selfridge was his immediate superior.
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charitable.

One Bureau chief noted that the suppositions of

the witnesses concerning incendiarism were "not sustained by
a single fact," and that the fire organization and apparatus
were very defective.
standing open as well.

The gun deck ports and hatches were
Another Bureau chief noted that the

testimony showed there were only four or five persons on
board forty minutes after the fire had started, and that the
General Orders governing fire fighting and the proper con
duct of the watch had all been issued two days after the
fire.

The Department's consensus was that the stove had set

the wooden backing of the engine room bulkhead on fire, and
that the ship could have been saved had the Navy Yard's fire
organization been adequate.3
Whatever the cause, New Ironsides was gone.

During

the Civil War, New Ironsides was in action more days than
any other vessel of the Navy.

Admiral Porter once wrote

that she had a reputation for having been hammered more
thoroughly than any vessel that ever floated.4 That com
ment can stand as her epitaph.

The Navy received its

money's worth in the New Ironsides.
3The investigations, both preliminary and formal, are
in NARG 45, Subject File, HF— Fires and Explosions, Box 178.
The Philadelphia Inquirer story occupies the front page of
Monday, December 17, 1866; the Philadelphia Public Ledger's
story is on page one of the same day. The Philadelphia
Daily Evening Bulletin ran its story on page 12 of the De
cember 17, 1866 edition.
4Porter, quoted in Bennett, Steam N a w . 273.
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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

Despite her seagoing superiority and successful wartime
service, there has been little written about New Ironsides.
The primary reason has been overwhelming concentration on
the monitors.

Historians tend to dismiss New Ironsides, if

they mention her at all, as an old fashioned design com
pletely outclassed by the revolutionary monitor type.

Noth

ing succeeds like success; after the Union won the war, the
defects of the monitors and the wartime controversies about
them paled alongside their glorious victories.

As the moni

tors quickly passed into obsolescence, the legend of the
brave little "cheesebox on a raft" remained.
The small amount of historical literature associated
with the New Ironsides is operationally oriented, of the
"untarnished gold on the sleeves of our heroes" school.

The

major secondary sources for the New Ironsides comprise four
articles.

George E. Belknap's 1379 "Reminiscent of the 'New

Ironsides' Off Charleston" and Edward Shippen's 1889 "Fort
Fisher— December, 1864, and January, 1865" were published by

242
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United Service Magazine.1 They are first-person reminis
cences, the former by the Executive Officer and the latter
by the assistant surgeon.

The third is a chapter in a 1903

book by Frederic S. Hill, and the fourth, which probably had
the widest circulation of any, was a section in Robert W.
Neeser's 1926 series on "Historic Ships of the Navy," pub
lished in the United States Naval Institute Proceedings.2
Belknap's "Reminiscent of the 'New Ironsides'" is not
simply a personal narrative.

His recounting of the events

of DuPont's Charleston assault includes a critique of the
battle as well as a description of conditions in the New
Ironsides. He briefly discusses ironclad policy and con
cludes the Navy should have built fewer monitors and more
armored frigates:
The same energy, expended early in the war in build
ing a fleet like the 'Ironsides' class, that was put
forth in constructing the monitors, would have led
to the capture of Charleston, Mobile and Wilmington
early in '63, and the Confederates would have been
cut off entirely from the supplies carried in by the
blockade-runners, and the enormous expense of block
ading those ports would have been saved.3
Belknap saw combat both in New Ironsides and in
1George E. Belknap, "Reminiscent of the 'New Ironsides'
Off Charleston," United Service Magazine, o.s., 1 (January
1879): 63-82; Edward Shippen, "Fort Fisher— December, 1864,
and January, 1865," United Service Magazine, n.s., 2 (July
1889): 11-25.
2Frederic S. Hill, Twenty-six Historic Ships (New York:
G.P. Putnam, 1903); Robert W. Neeser, "Historic Ships of the
Navy— New Ironsides," Proceedings USNI 52 (1926): 2443-51.
3Belknap, "Reminiscent of the 'New Ironsides'," 79.
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monitors; after leaving New Ironsides, he commanded the
monitor Canonicus.

His article is the best available source

from which to gain an appreciation of New Ironsides' contri
bution to the Civil War, at least through 1864, but it is
still generally limited to shipboard events and observations
and does not extensively discuss any larger issues.
Shippen's work on Fort Fisher is more personal and
anecdotal than Belknap's article and includes a bare minimum
of information descriptive of the ship.

About half of the

article deals with the fighting on land and the author's
subsequent tour of the captured fort.
conclusions in any area.

The article draws no

It shows the lapse of years be

tween action and recollection in errors of date and detail.
Both Hill's and Neeser's articles are essentially
operational histories.

Each commences with a description of

the ship and continues, in more or less detail, with a
chronological narrative of the ship's career.
Hill's 1903 effort is the longer and more detailed of
the two, but includes much information about the operations
off Charleston, the siege of Charleston and the attack on
Fort Fisher which does not relate directly to the New Iron
sides.4 The work draws heavily upon Belknap's articles.
Hill errs in several constructional and operational details,
including the ship's dimensions, the design of her pilot
4It is easy to believe this matter is padding to fill
up Hill's chapter on New Ironsides to respectable length.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

245
house, and the dates of her decommissioning and destruction.
He does not evaluate her performance and draws no conclu
sions about her impact upon ironclad development.
Neeser's 1926 article is also devoid of evaluation.
More accurate in his description of the ship than Hill, he
depends less overtly upon Belknap.

The dates he assigns for

Captain Turner's relief from command and the ship's destruc
tion by fire are incorrect.
There are two less-well-known secondary sources, one
an article and one a section of a book, which deal primarily
with the ship's construction.

The article, which would have
9

had only limited circulation, is an 1867 editorial entitled
"The U.S.S. Armored Frigate New Ironsides," which appeared
in the Journal of the Franklin Institute.5 This anonymous
editorial, a good source of design and constructional de
tail, appears to have been written by someone closely con
nected with Merrick & Sons.

In his book, A Year on a Moni

tor. Alvah F. Hunter states that the author was J. Vaughn
Merrick.

Because of the Merrick family's close connection

with the Franklin Institute, the statement is credible.6
In keeping with the nature of the Journal, the article is
5[J. Vaughn Merrick], "Editorial. The U.S.S. Armored
Frigate New Ironsides," Journal of the Franklin Institute.
3d ser., 53, no. 2 (February 1867): 73-81.
6Samuel Vaughn Merrick, J. Vaughn Merrick's father,
helped to found the Franklin Institute and served as its
President from 1841 to 1853. J. Vaughn Merrick was elected
to the Institute's Board of Managers in 1863 and served as
President from 1868 to 1869.
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technical, focused upon the design and construction of the
ship.

It has just sufficient discussion of New Ironsides'

operations to support the author's contention that the ship
was successful.
The book passage is Charles H. Cramp's address to the
Contemporary Club of Philadelphia, which appears in Augustus
C. Buell's 1906 book, The Memoirs of Charles H. Cramp.7
This address, apparently given in 1897, contains valuable
material on the ship's design and construction.

The printed

version is longer than the typescript, a copy of which is in
the Belknap Papers.

Cramp makes observations on the course

of the Navy's ironclad program, but only to discuss in pas
sing the "Monitor craze."

He makes some errors of chron

ology in his discussion, but this can be attributed to a
lapse of thirty-five years between the events and the recol
lections.
The Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships is a
widely distributed tertiary source, apparently compiled from
secondary sources including Neeser.

The brief historical

sketch given is purely narrative but contains numerous
’Augustus C. Buell, The Memoirs of Charles H. Cramp
(Philadelphia and London: J. P. Lippincott Co., 1906), 6371. I have used the typescript where possible since Buell's
reputation for scholarly accuracy is not without spot.
Allan Nevins wrote, referring to another Buell book, "When
his sources ran thin, Mr. Buell calmly manufactured new
ones." Allan Nevins, from The Gateway to History, quoted in
The Historian as Detective: Essays on Evidence, ed. Robin
Winks, (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1969), 201-202.
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errors, especially of chronology.8
Among primary sources, the most valuable for New Iron
sides ' design and construction is National Archives Record
Group 71, Records of the Bureau of Yards and Docks.
of Merrick & Sons' correspondence has survived.

Little

According

ly, the several series of Yards and Docks letters provide
almost all of the primary information available about the
original proposal and the evolution of the design during the
construction period.

Other entries contain the contract for

the ship and the record of the Government's financial deal
ings with the contractor.
There is little about the ship in Record Group 19, Re
cords of the Bureau of Ships, since the Bureau of Ships'
predecessor bureaux (Steam Engineering; Construction, Equip
ment and Repair; and Construction and Repair) were not di
rectly involved in her construction.

The Plan File, also

part of Record Group 19 but housed at the National Archives
Cartographic Branch, contains plans of the ship and of her
novel gun carriages but not of her machinery.

This lack is

made up by a very complete set of plans for U.S.S. Wyoming's
8United States Navy Department, Naval History Division.
Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships 8 vols. (Wash
ington: GPO, 1959-81), 5: 58-59. Hereafter DANFS. For
example, DANFS states the ship joined the squadron off Char
leston on January 17, 1863, but that was actually when she
reached Port Royal. She served as DuPont's flagship only
for the April attack. The dates given for her departure
from station and her recommissioning in 1864 and her de
struction by fire in 1866 are incorrect. Since these errors
match those Neeser makes, the editors of DANFS probably used
Neeser's material without checking it.
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machinery, of which New Ironsides' was a duplicate.

Record

Group 19 also contains New Ironsides7 Steam Logs.
Record Group 24, Records of the Bureau of Personnel,
includes the Deck Log for the ship's entire commissioned
service, an incomplete series of Muster Rolls, and individu
al Records of Officers.

Record Group 45, Office of Naval

Records and Library, contains much material in the "Old
Navy" Subject File.

It also contains Captain Radford's let

ter books and the Squadron Letters for the ship's service in
the North and South Atlantic Blockading Squadrons.
Considerable information, generally scattered, about
New Ironsides is found in other groups.

Record Group 52,

Records of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, contains the
ship's medical journals.

Record Group 125, Records of the

Judge Advocate General (Navy), includes several Courts
Martial and Courts of Inquiry which involve officers of the
New Ironsides. Record Group 74, Records of the Bureau of
Ordnance, has valuable but well-scattered information about
the ship's ordnance difficulties.
Two noteworthy sources for information on the ship's
early active service are the Thomas Turner papers in the New
York Public Library and the diary of Acting Master John M.
Butler in the Western Reserve Historical Society.

The

Turner papers applicable to New Ironsides comprise his let
ter book for the period of his captaincy.
junior officer aboard the ship.

John Butler was a

His diary, from January 1,
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1863, until his detachment in May 1863, gives a revealing
although biased view of life aboard New Ironsides during the
period of DuPont's attack on Charleston.
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APPENDIX A
SPECIFICATION OF HEIGHTS AND DISPLACEMENT

From National Archives/ Record Group 19, Plan 107-9-12H.
"Specification of Iron Plated Steamer proposed to the Navy
Department by Merrick & Sons of Philadelphia. 1861."

Weight of Hull, 230 feet long
"
" 4 1/2 inch iron plating
" 1
"
deck
Armament & Ordnance Stores
Eng.ines, Boilers, Machinery and
Water in Boilers
Coal
Chains. Same as "Lancaster"
Anchors "
"
"
Water and Tanks, Same as "Wyoming"
Boats
Masts, Spars and Sails. Bark rig.
Rigging and Blocks
Clothing
Provisions
Small Stores
165 Men and appendages
Wood for Cooking
Boatswain, Gunner, Carpenter and
Sailmaker's Stores
Engineers Stores
Total Weight

Tons
1965
650
170
100
300
300
60
13
20
4
40
15
8
100
10
15
5
33
20
3828

Displacement
At 14 feet load line, exclusive of Keel
Surplus Displacement

4015
187

To these "as designed" weights, the increased battery
added 301 tons, the armored bulkheads 110 tons, and the
269
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pilot house 16.5 tons.

The additional men and their

"appendages" added 29 tons, and the increased storage for
fresh water another 51 tons.

The total with other additions

and deletions, was 495 tons beyond that initially estimated.
This included a deduction of 40 tons for masts and rig
ging.1 The full sail rigging was discarded for pole masts,
but was returned after the ship's initial trials.
burner to Merrick & Sons, September 22, 1862, NARG
71, Entry 5, Box 448, 2: 79.
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APPENDIX B
SALVAGE AND FINAL DISPOSITION

New Ironsides was sold for "removing or wrecking and
recovering" the property in her.

On March 22, 1867, adver

tisements were placed requesting bids to purchase her "as she
lies."1 All of the original bids were rejected, but a late
bid from the Atlantic Submarine Company of New York was ac
cepted in May 1867.2
The company soon started work.

Loose plating and fit

tings were removed and sold, and Atlantic Submarine made at
least one progress payment to the Government.3 Her boilers
were salvaged between 1867 and late 1868 and were offered for
sale separately by Merrick and Sons, apparently after being
National Archives, Record Group 19, Entry 405, Pro
posals and Advertisements of Sales, 48.
2The Government was to receive one-third of the value
of the salvaged material. NARG 19, Entry 71, 7: 40, 43,
118. The correspondence with the Atlantic Submarine Company
is with George D. Norton and F. W. Beers. They later sold
their interest; in late 1867 David Boyd, Jr., purchased what
was left of the ship. "The New Ironsides Again Afloat," New
York Times. December 5, 1868, 2.
3A payment of $5,000 was received on June 28, 1867.
NARG 19, Entry 71, 7: 119.
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reconditioned.4 Finally, the hull was raised using pontoons.
Chains were run under the ship and connected to the pontoons
at low tide.

When the tide rose, so did New Ironsides.

After she was refloated, tugs towed her upriver by stages,
and she was eventually beached and broken up.5
4In an advertisement of August 1869, Merricks' offered
the boilers of the New Ironsides "taken from her wreck."
"Advertisement for One or More (4 in all) Horizontal Tubular
Boilers" (Figure 8).
5"Again Afloat," 2.
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